The Power of Primacy and the Domination of the Injunction: Appayya Dīkṣita’s Two Personas in a Debate about Vedic Hermeneutics

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Abstract: This article is the first study of Appayya Dīkṣita’s Upakramaparākrama. Here he attacks Vyāsātīrtha’s new and provocative argument according to which the hermeneutic protocols of Vedic passages always assumed that the closing of a passage overrides its opening. Appayya offers a systematic refutation of Vyāsātīrtha’s examples in an effort to show that sequence matters and that, as was known at least since the time of Śabara, it is the opening that outweighs the closing and not the other way around. But, as the article shows, midway through the work the author presents a new and comprehensive theory that, he believes, underlies both Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta reading protocols, one in which sequence is completely immaterial. The article argues that the tension between these two voices is not entirely resolvable and is, moreover, emblematic of the author’s intellectual legacy and of scholarly work in his period more generally.

Lawrence McCrea’s article ‘Over When it’s Over: Vyāsātīrtha’s Hermeneutic Inversion’ (also in this issue of the Journal of Hindu Studies) is a case study in the intellectual legacy of Vyāsātīrtha (1460–1539), one of India’s leading thinkers in the late-fifteenth and early-sixteenth centuries and the key figure in turning dualism into a formidable Vedānta school.1 A great deal of Vyāsātīrtha’s scholarly efforts consisted of supporting Madhva’s radical claims, often presented in an ad hoc manner, by grounding them in the methodologies and language of India’s established philosophical traditions. McCrea discusses Vyāsātīrtha’s treatment of the question of the relative importance of the opening (upakrama) and the closing (upasamhāra) in interpretation. Vyāsātīrtha, he shows, collected a sizeable corpus of cases of hermeneutic decisions where, he maintained, even Mīmāṃsakas were basing themselves not on their official line, according to which the opening overrides the closing in cases of contradiction, but on exactly the opposite hierarchy first spelled out by Madhva centuries later. This essay is
the first attempt to deal with the main response to Vyāsatīrtha’s intervention, written by another towering intellectual of the period, Appayya Dīkṣita (c. 1520–1593).

As is well known, Appayya, who hailed from the village of Adayapalam in the Tamil country, was an extremely prolific and versatile author. He took pride in having composed over one hundred works in an astonishing array of disciplines: Vedānta in all its four major schools of the time, Mīmāṃsā, grammar, poetics, interpretations of the Sanskrit epics, praise poems to various gods, and learned commentaries on the poetry of others. Although Appayya’s actual sphere of activity was limited to the South, he had a remarkable impact on scholars throughout India, and particularly in Banaras, which around the end of the sixteenth century began to assert itself as a powerful transregional intellectual centre of a magnitude never seen before in South Asia. As I show elsewhere, Appayya’s works in different disciplines were an extremely hot topic in Banaras of the 17th and 18th centuries, where they provoked strong positive and negative opinions across sectarian, familial, and discipleship lines. Indeed, the lively debates stirred by his works were later thematised in stories narrating dramatic personal encounters between Appayya and two of the most famous intellectuals of the city in the 17th century: Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, who was likely influenced by his work, and Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja, the king of pandits in Shah Jahān’s court, who was one of his major critics.2

One important reason for the trans-subcontinental stir caused by Appayya’s interventions was the fact that he was rightly perceived to speak in conflicting voices that represented multiple scholarly identities. He had a strong Śaiva agenda but also was an admirer of Vedānta Deśika who could actually think and write as a Vaiṣṇava; he was an avowed non-dualist but also the leading proponent of his generation of a Śaiva version of qualified non-dualism; he was a participant and even a vehement polemicist in various sectarian debates but also an intellectual historian who situated himself above the fray and recorded honestly and even sympathetically the same views he ridiculed under his polemicist’s hat; and he was an avowed traditionalist who claimed not to say anything new, but he was also a bold innovator who took great liberties with the cherished tenets of all schools in a way that was true to the ideal of complete interdisciplinary freedom (sarvatantra-svatantratva) as he understood it. It is little wonder that he was attacked and admired by Vaiṣṇavas and Śaivas alike, as well as by both conservatives and innovators.3 Appayya often spoke in conflicting voices even within the confines of a single work. Indeed, my main argument here is that, in a way that is consistent with this sort of intellectual multiple personality, not one Appayya wrote the Upakramaparākrama, or The Charge of Primacy, his response to Vyāsatīrtha’s aforementioned arguments, but two, each promoting a very different agenda. For the sake of convenience, I will call them Appayya 1 and Appayya 2 and will deal with their arguments separately.
The *Upakramaparākrama* of Appayya 1

Appayya 1, an outspoken polemicist, a staunch traditionalist, and a strong defender of his Vedānta party line against the dualists, is the author we first encounter in the *Upakramaparākrama*, a one-theme prose work that is between a long essay and a short monograph in length. Appayya 1 is unmistakably manifest in the outer frame of this composition. In his single opening verse, he vows merely to resurrect the line of reasoning (tarka-saṇṭati) by which the sages of old decisively demonstrated the dominance of upakrama (opening) over upasa (closing) as the only proper response to the mutterings of an unnamed opponent (pratikūla-jalpita). The language is unmistakably that of ‘us’ and ‘them’, enmity (virodhin, pratikūla), and victory (parākrama). The work’s concluding prose statement draws the boundaries in even stronger terms:

\[
\text{evan} \text{ ca sakala-mimāṁsaka-yyavahāra-viruddho naya-saraṇi-gamdbhānabhijñānair arvācina}\
\text{sva-matasyētara-mata-vailaksanyā-prakaṭanāyā kalpitōpākramōpasaṁhāra-}
\text{balabala-yyatayo yavana-gūpapadīśa-śauca-mukha-prakṣālana-paurvāparyay}
\text{vyatyaśa-vad upkeśanīyah prāmāṇikārīt iti siddham iti. (Upakramaparākrama, 72)}
\]

So it has been established that this position of some latter-day thinkers who know not the scent of the path of reason and who have dreamt up the reversal of power relations between the powerful upakrama and the powerless upasa stands contrary to the statements of every single Māma:sa, and is motivated merely by the desire to make their school distinct from others. Indeed, for those who respect the voice of authority, this view is comparable to the teaching of a Muslim guru, who would preach the reversal of the normal order between washing one’s hands after going to bathroom, on the one hand, and brushing one’s teeth, on the other.

The setting, as Appayya 1 describes it, is crystal clear. The debate began because of an entirely senseless and needless intervention of heretic-like others who pose a dangerous threat to traditional tenets, and he merely wishes to resurrect these tenets. For, as this Appayya maintains, sequence matters, and unnecessarily reversing the correct order of things is an act akin to severe self-defilement.

Note that the new and dangerous intervention is described as flying in the face of a complete traditional unanimity. The relative power of upakrama, Appayya 1 argues, is the consensus of ‘every single Mīmāṁsaka’ (sakala-mīmāṁsaka), and he puts much energy into demonstrating that not only was this the presumed position of Jaimini, the author of the *Mīmāṁsāśāstra* (although Jaimini never brought this topic up), and the explicit view of Śabara, his authoritative commentator (who adhered to the upakrama position, although very infrequently and perhaps less decisively than Appayya 1 would like us to believe), and of Kumārila Bhātā (the first to actually make a strong case for this position, albeit in a rather ad hoc way), but also it was the stance of thinkers across Mīmāṁsa’s main disciplinary divide, beginning with Prabhākara, whose views were almost obsolete by this time. Moreover, Appayya 1
extends his reach across the divide between Early Mīmāṁsā and Late Mīmāṁsā, that is, between Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta, and demonstrates that the consensus he posits included Vedāntins from various generations and different sectarian affiliations. Thus, in the last part of the work, he follows Śaṅkara’s readings of a sizeable selection of Upaniṣad passages and shows that he, too, adhered to the view of upakrama’s supremacy (even though Śaṅkara’s position was actually that upakrama and upasamhāra must be in harmony as a tool that helps the hermeneutic process), as did later authors in this tradition, including Rāmānuja.

The implication of this impressive collation of sources and citations is that Mīmāṁsā, in the broadest sense of the term—here applying to all responsible efforts to interpret any part of the Veda—is a tight and coherent system, and the last thing one ought to do is mess with it. The relative power of upakrama over upasamhāra, although admittedly not a major component of this system, is nonetheless an integral piece, the reversal of which will cause acute damage. Accordingly, Appayya 1 goes through the examples provided by Vyāsatīrtha (as well as many others of his own) and shows that in every case in which his predecessor ascribed (or would have ascribed) explanatory power to upasamhāra and denied the power of upakrama, he did (or would have done) so unnecessarily in a way that goes against the basic hermeneutic principles of the system (mīmāṁsaka-maryādā).

Take, for example, his response to the argument about the aktadhikarana, already mentioned in McCrea’s essay. Recall that the injunction (vidhi) to place wet stones (aktāh śarkār upaddadhāti) is followed by praise (arthavāda) of a particular liquid, ghee (tejo vai ghtam), which is why performers of the ritual use stones that are made wet with ghee. But how do they arrive at this conclusion? According to Vyāsatīrtha, the reader is faced with a direct contradiction (bāḍha) between the upakrama, according to which the stones can be wetted with any fluid substance, and the upasamhāra, which speaks specifically of ghee. Vyāsatīrtha believes that when the reader is confronted with two contradictory options, he weighs them in his mind and opts for the latter, precisely because of its lateness. He compares this to the experience of reading a text with the help of a (necessarily later) commentary that determines its meaning. In response, Appayya 1 wants us to enter the mind-set of a ritual performer, who reads the Veda not unlike a manual. Upon encountering a generic instruction that does not specify, say, the exact substance to be used in a rite, the ideal pragmatist interpreter is immediately put on the lookout for further specification that will aid him in the actual performance. The generic information supplied first is valid and limits his degrees of interpretive freedom—so, for example, once ‘wet’ has been stated, a dry stone will not do—but he makes a mental note to himself to seek more specific instructions as he reads (or hears) on, which is where the upasamhāra’s praise of ghee comes in handy:

na cāтра durbalasyāpy upasamhārasya upakramena virodhah; pratyuta tad-ākāṁksīta-samarpakatayānugunyam eva. avaśyaṁ hy anuṣṭheyatayōpasthāpyamānaṁ
The opening is not contradicted by the weaker ending. On the contrary, the latter conforms to it insofar as it supplies it with what it requires. For surely, if the performance stipulated is general, it seeks to settle on something specific in order to be performed. After all, you simply cannot employ in a ritual an unspecified universal or all of its specific individual manifestations. True, if with the intention to settle on something more precise, one fails to find a specific that is explicitly enjoined in some way or another, then one will end up picking a specific of one’s own choice, one that conforms with the universal already indicated and that the human mind can conjure. But once [a specific that is stipulated] is found [in the text], one ought to stop right there, because when one is presented with two specifics, one already designated and the other the result of one’s own design, opting for the first option is more parsimonious.

An ideal pragmatist reader is always on the lookout for specifications that will relieve him of the need to postulate ritual substances or actions by himself, which is the less parsimonious option and hence his last resort. This is why the upasamhāra does not at all contradict (let alone overrule) the upakrama but actually conforms to its need or request (ākāṃksita) to narrow down a universal (‘wet’) and settle on a definite specific (‘ghee’). In other words, appearances can be misleading. It may seem that the upasamhāra is stronger because it determines the use of ghee and not of any odd liquid. But, in fact, it acts not unlike a servant propelled (kārita) by his master, the upakrama, to fetch him what he needs.11

Indeed, even if (for the sake of the argument) Appayya 1 is willing to put on hold his understanding that the upasamhāra does what the upakrama has it do, he still argues that the fact that the opening conforms to the specification of the closing does not, in and of itself, determine their hierarchical order. Sometimes, Appayya 1 reminds his readers, it is precisely the more senior person who voluntarily restricts himself or herself to assist a junior. Consider, in this connection, the proverbial example of eating from a brass vessel (kāṃsyā-bhoji-nyāya). The guru eats from such utensils even though he is not ritually required to do so; he can eat from any kind of vessel. Nonetheless, he limits himself to the brazen variety so as to enable his student, living in his home, to meet his ritual restrictions. But just as in the case I discussed, this does not mean that the student is stronger or superior to his guru; in fact, the opposite is obviously the case.12 Hence, argues Appayya 1, the most important example that Vyāsatīrtha supplies, fails to prove his case.
The Upakramaparākrama of Appayya 2

The preceding presentation does not do justice even to Appayya 1’s refutation of Vyāsatīrtha’s interpretation of this one example, let alone to the many other examples he addresses, some in reaction to Vyāsatīrtha, others in response to counterarguments (pūrvapakṣa) of his own. But it is representative in demonstrating the decisive manner in which this Appayya defends the traditional Māmāṃśa position regarding the relative importance of the opening. It is also useful in illustrating a problem in the argument, like any argument ascribing explanatory power to the sequence in which information is supplied, and certainly in a complex text like the Veda. After all, it is not as if the Vedic corpus is so neatly organised that general or ambiguous stipulations are always given first and are only then followed by added information that helps disambiguate them. What if the order is reversed, as it often is, and the disambiguating bit precedes the ambiguousness, not to mention other, more complex scenarios? Would not the entire argument about the relevance of sequence and the importance of upakrama collapse?

It is perhaps with such thoughts that Appayya 2 suddenly emerges midtext and argues, in blatant contradiction to Appayya 1, that, in fact, sequence does not matter at all. It is not the ranking of ‘before’ and ‘after’ that counts in the Veda but the hierarchy of its different textual constituents. In the hierarchy that this Appayya emphasises, the injunction (vīdhi) is the absolute master, and any other part of the passage (vākyāśeṣa), particularly any narrative bit (arthaśāda), is this master’s abject servant. Injunction masters, moreover, are needy: they have requirements and demands, and their narrative servants, driven by these needs and demands, hasten to fulfill them, regardless of the linguistic sequence. This, in fact, is the actual lesson of the akta case:

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vastushitis tāvad iyam yad aktādhiķaraṇe vidhau saṃdirghasya yatra tatra sthite-
nārthavādena nirṇaya vyutpādita iti tad-ati-langhanena tatrāpasamhāra-
prābalyopajivanotpṛeksāyaṁ tu tato ’py āñjasyenopakrama-prabhāyopajivanam evō-
prēksitum śakyam. (Upakramaparākrama 40–41)
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Here, then, is how things really are: the aktādhiķaraṇa teaches that an ambiguity in the injunction is resolved with the aid of a narrative passage regardless of where it is located. If you defy this, seeking to bolster a case for the relative power of the closing (upasaṃhāra), then you can just as well make the opposite argument, namely, that the opening (upakrama) is stronger.

The problem in arguing for the power of the closing is that it is inconclusive and could be viewed as working in exactly the opposite sequence, as Appayya 1 himself did so far. But in reality, both arguments are equally flawed, and the real explanation lies in a procedure that is sequence blind.

This is just the beginning of a sweeping theory of disambiguation of Vedic injunctions that Appayya 2 now turns to offer. He understands the akta example
as part of a much larger set of possible injunction-related ambiguities that can be resolved with the help of the context. These ambiguities pervade a vast semantic-pragmatic spectrum: doubts that arise from polysemic stems, ambiguous morphological endings, multivalent lexical items, and syntactic ambiguities; uncertainties that have to do with the scope of an injunction (should, for example, a rite prescribed for the days leading to the full-moon night be performed monthly or only in certain months?); and finally, ambiguities about ritual substances, as in the case of the generic ‘wet’ in the akṭādhikaraṇa. In all these cases, which Appayya 2 discusses and exemplifies in detail (see, in particular, Upakramaparākrama 36–39), the pragmatist reader arrives at a decision about the injunction with the help of other parts of the passage, but, again, regardless of whether the disambiguating part appears earlier, in the upakrama, or later, in the upasamihāra:

\[
\text{evāṁ yat kimcid vidhau samādīghaṁ tat sarvam upakramopasaṁhāra-gata-
tvānādārenārthavāda-mātrān nirnayam iti vyutpādayītum pravṛtte 'sminn adhikaraṇe 
nopasaṁhāra-prābalya-vyutpadana-śaṅkāvakāsah. (Upakramaparākrama 39)}
\]

Thus, if a doubt of whatever kind pertains to the injunction, it is resolved with the help of a narrative bit, regardless of whether this narrative bit is found in the opening or in the closing. This is precisely what the akṭādhikaraṇa sets out to impart, and there is no reason to argue that it proclaims the power of the closing.

Both Appayya 1 and Appayya 2 agree that Vyāsatīrtha misunderstood the real import of the akṭādhikaraṇa. But if Appayya 2’s interpretation of it is correct, this equally undermines Appayya 1’s advocacy of the power of the upakrama, an advocacy that gives the work its topic and its title (The Charge of Primacy).

And this is not all. There are various other cases of interpretive decisions that Appayya 2’s sweeping theory covers, such as doubts that do not fall under the scope of the akṭādhikaraṇa as he understands it. Given the context of Vyāsatīrtha’s argumentation, Appayya 2 is particularly interested in the conditions under which seemingly final interpretive decisions can or cannot later be reopened. Consider, in particular, two cases that involve the influence of mantras on the resolution of doubts. The first case is an injunction to sacrifice an unspecified animal, already discussed by Vyāsatīrtha.\(^{13}\) This is clearly a needy injunction—it needs further specification of the universal ‘animal’. One reads till the end of the passage with the hope of finding further parameters, only to realise that none is supplied and that the injunction is generic (aniyata): it requires the performer to use a sacrificial animal of his choice. Then, much later, far outside the boundaries of the relevant passage, the reader notices a related mantra that refers to a goat. Now the original need is rekindled, so to speak, and gets instantly satisfied. For Vyāsatīrtha, this is a case where the upasamihāra in the form of the mantra
overrules the *upakrama*. For Appayya 2, however, the decision is based on a very different and highly sophisticated interpretive procedure:

\[
\text{paryavasitasyápi vidheḥ pratyakṣa-viśeṣe saty ākṣepāyogād vidhi-mantrayor}
\text{ekārthā-visayatva-niyamāt paśutva-sāmānyasya kṛtsnasya chāge sad-bhāvāvirodhena}
\text{kāṃṣya-bhojana-nyāyāvatārān niyama-saṃbhāve 'niyamāṇapapattē ca mantrārpaṇita-
\text{viśeṣa-grāhakatvāt. (Upakramaparākrama 47)}
\]

The injunction, although already resolved, accepts the specification offered by the mantra because (1) it makes no sense to apply one’s own imagination when something specific is actually supplied by the text; (2) the injunction and the mantra must agree and apply to one and the same substance; (3) we apply in such a case the maxim about the brass utensils, given that the universal ‘animal’ in its entirety is present in the goat without contradiction; and (4) optionality in ritual performance is overruled by a stipulated restriction.

From all four reasons offered in this elegant sentence, typical of Appayya, the first is the most important. In the mind of the pragmatic ideal reader there was already a need for further instructions stemming from the non-specific injunction to sacrifice ‘an animal’, a need that was not met within the confines of the passage and that, therefore, required the reader to do something that is highly undesirable: use his own imagination (ākṣepa). But, as point 4 reminds us, such optionality is always overruled by a stipulated restriction. So, once a specification that relieves the reader of the need to decide is offered, even if by a distant mantra, outside the boundaries of the passage and long after its meaning was resolved, it will be taken into consideration. And, given that this specification makes for a more parsimonious conclusion and does not conflict with the original stipulation (there is no contradiction between being an animal and being a goat, just as there is none between the universal of utensils and their brazen variety), the pragmatic reader will revise his original interpretive decision and accept the information from the mantra.

Contrast this with an instance of an injunction that is entirely self-explanatory, totally unambiguous, and hence not needy, as in an offering prescribed to both Agni and Soma. The pragmatic reader is good to go, it would seem, but then, as Appayya 2 points out, the mantra that is associated with this ritual is directed at Agni alone. According to Vyāsatīrtha’s line of thinking, this mantra would have to be understood as an *upasaṃhāra*, one that contradicts the *upakrama*, and would hence necessarily overrule the initial injunction and decree that the rite be offered to Agni but not Soma. But here, as Appayya 2 notes, the mantra-related specification is simply ignored, and in reality the rite is always offered to both deities. This, he explains, is because no specification was needed in the first place. The fact that the ritual is performed for both deities, he shows, is an outcome that only his theory of interpretation could have anticipated and explained.
What Appayya 2 offers, we begin to realise, is a comprehensive theory for the disambiguation and interpretation of Vedic passages that is based on universal criteria and delineates various complex flowcharts, not all of which I can describe here. This theory postulates a pragmatist ideal reader who goes through the Veda with an eye for the most specific instructions possible and who is guided by an uncompromising quest for economy in his hermeneutic process. At the center of this theory stands the injunction as the most powerful Vedic textual component. The injunction is a rather ‘needy’ master, and Appayya 2, we have seen, provides a meticulous list of its needs and uncertainties. To meet these needs, other parts of the text are driven to provide the master with the specifications he requires, first within the boundaries of the passage, and then, if needed, even in mantras found elsewhere. If, on the other hand, the injunction is not needy, whatever information is supplied by the low-ranking textual components (such as narrative bits and mantras) is flatly ignored. Moreover, even when one is considering the information brought by these lesser textual bits in cases where the injunction is needy, the specifications they offer can never directly contradict the injunction; all they can do is narrow it down to a more specific version of what is included in the original, generic language. This theory is entirely new in the sense that nobody has ever articulated it, but in the way Appayya 2 presents it, he is only explaining the hermeneutic protocols that guided every single scholar in the tradition before him. And what is particularly important in the context of a work that sets out to demonstrate the power of the opening is that this theory is explicitly said to be sequence blind. If the injunction is needy, it does not matter whether the disambiguation is supplied by bits of texts that precede or follow it, and if the injunction is self-sufficient, what comes before is as inconsequential as what comes after.

Are the Two Appayyas Really One?

I may have somewhat exaggerated the differences between the two views presented in the preceding sections. After all, there are many areas on which the two Appayyas agree. First, they both oppose as absurd the notion that importance can be attributed to the closing merely by virtue of its being at the end. On this they fully concur, although for very different reasons: Appayya 1 because he defends the position that what comes earlier is more important, and Appayya 2 because he believes that sequence is altogether immaterial in the resolution of doubtful injunctions. Secondly, they both believe that Vyāsatīrtha’s arguments threaten the coherence of Māmāsā as a system, broadly conceived to include Vedānta as well, although again, it seems that their understandings of the nature of this system are quite different. Thirdly, they both imagine the same ideal pragmatist reader, whose reading of the Veda is governed by the principles of economy, and who, hence, is always on the lookout for designated specifications to avoid ritual decisions of his own design. Fourthly, they both invoke the maxim of the guru eating from brass vessels to elucidate the conditions under which a superior may adopt a
restriction for the sake of helping an inferior meet his or her constraints, although, as we have seen, this is apropos of different hierarchical orders: that of the opening and the closing for Appayya 1, and that of injunction and other textual types for Appayya 2.

Indeed, there are ways to further harmonise their arguments. It can be said that Appayya 2 would probably have agreed that, all other hierarchical relations being equal, if there are any residual doubts, what comes first to the mind outweighs whatever comes later because it limits the degrees of interpretive freedom, although he would probably also hasten to say that this is demonstrable in only a handful of cases, whereas usually sequence can be safely ignored. The problem with such a synthesis of the two Appayyas is that it is not stated in the text. More than that, the work never acknowledges that it offers two very different views, let alone attempts to harmonise them. Appayya merely slips, almost seamlessly, midway in his discussion of the aktâdhikarana, from speaking about the needs and dominance of the opening to speaking about the needs and dominance of the injunction, regardless of its sequential location, and then shifts back to defending the importance of the opening in various other cases in the concluding part of the work. We are thus faced with the strange phenomenon of an unmarked emergence, in the middle of a text dedicated to crowning upakrama and defending sequence, of a theory that pulls the rug from under the supremacy of the opening and undercuts sequence altogether.

How are we to understand this strange situation? A possible explanation can be found in Appayya’s overall conflicting agendas mentioned at the outset. On the one hand, we have the Appayya who is a self-avowed polemicist and who is always ready to defend his party line against what he perceives as highly dangerous views. This is the Appayya that we meet in the outer frame of the Upakramaparâkrama: as a non-dualist he is eager, here as elsewhere, to attack the position of Madhva and his followers, and as a self-identified admirer of Kumârila in Mîmâṃsā and Śaṅkara in Vedânta, he is keen to defend their position (as he understands it) of the upakrama’s supremacy over the upasamhâra against Vyâsatîrtha’s complete reversal of this hierarchy. But then there is the other Appayya, a freethinking intellectual who is loath to accept the traditional tenets just because they were handed down as such, and who perhaps even enjoys causing a provocation. It is this Appayya who may have realised, perhaps even in the course of refuting Vyâsatîrtha’s arguments, that sequence is not a decisive factor in Vedic interpretation, and that altogether different theory of interpretation may better explain the reading protocols of both Mîmâṃsā and Vedânta. Moreover, his refusal to thematise the contradiction between his two arguments (or two personas) is entirely consistent with what we see in many of his other works, such as the Kuvalayânanda in poetics or the Vidhirasâyana in Mîmâṃsâ. Instead, here as elsewhere, he likes to pretend that his new theory was really what guided Kumârila and Śaṅkara in the first place, which helps him disguise, however thinly, his novel ideas as nothing new at all.
It should be said that, as in other cases, Appayya’s readers were not particularly impressed by this masquerade. His junior contemporary, fellow southerner, and main opponent in this case, Vijayendra Tirtha (a grandstudent of Vyāsatirtha), wrote a direct rejoinder to Appayya’s *Upakramaparākrama* titled *Upasamhāravijaya (The Conquest of the Closing)*. I do not have the space to discuss this fascinating work, something Lawrence McCrea and I plan to do elsewhere, but I will mention briefly two observations about it. First, Vijayendra is keenly aware of the slippage between Appayya’s two personas and is fond of using the position I called Appayya 2 to counter and embarrass the one I called Appayya 1. Secondly, just like Appayya, Vijayendra plays a dual game in that he defends his sectarian party line but also comes very close to Appayya 2’s new theory according to which sequence does not really matter. It can thus be said that the *Upasamhāravijaya*, too, is the work of two authors, Vijayendra 1 and Vijayendra 2.

Thus, tempting though it may be, we should not rush to harmonise Appayya 1 and Appayya 2 and explain their differences away, because the tension between them is key to Appayya’s career, constitutive of his thinking, and inherent in his mode of innovation. Indeed, this sort of intellectual multiple personality may be emblematic of scholarly activity in Appayya’s period, during which, as Sheldon Pollock and others have shown, bold innovation is mixed with the traditional in ways that are not easy to analyse. The *navya* scholars of India in the 16th and 17th centuries were not innovators in the Cartesian sense of the word, and it may be that Appayya’s dual reaction to Vyāsatirtha and Vijayendra’s similar response to him can supply us with a new framework within which to think of innovation in their times, but this bigger claim will have to await a separate discussion.

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Notes

1 This paper was originally presented in October 2014 at the University of Wisconsin Madison Annual Conference on South Asia as part of the “Age of Vedanta” project. This project involves an international group of scholars active in the field of late medieval and early modern Indian intellectual history, and aims to chart the rise of Vedānta as a primary marker of intellectual and sectarian identity over the course of the second millennium CE.

2 See Bronner (2015) for a study of Appayya’s impact on Banaras and the invention of these narratives.

3 See Bronner (forthcoming) for some of these tensions in Appayya’s thinking and his notion of sarvatāntra-svatantra. For his ability to think as a Vaiṣṇava, see Rao (forthcoming). For his virtual invention of Śaiva qualified dualism as a sort of an intellectual playground, see McCrea (forthcoming). For criticism directed at him for being a qualified dualist in disguise, see Minkowski (forthcoming). For Appayya’s influence on Bhaṭṭoji and Jagannātha, see Deshpande (forthcoming) and Tubb and Bronner (2008), respectively.
The foundational contribution here is Pollock (2001), which started the discussion about innovation in this period.