

Abhinavagupta is undoubtedly the most famous Kashmirian medieval intellectual: his decisive contributions to Indian aesthetics, Śaiva theology and metaphysics, and to the philosophy of the subtle and original Pratyabhijñā system are well known. Yet so far his works have often been studied without fully taking into account the specific context in which they are embedded – an intellectual background that is not less exceptional than Abhinavagupta himself. While providing fresh interpretations of some of the great Śaiva polymath's works, the nineteen essays gathered here attempt to map out for the first time the extraordinary cultural effervescence that took place in the little kingdom of Kashmir around Abhinavagupta's time.

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Around Abhinavagupta

Aspects of the Intellectual History of Kashmir
from the Ninth to the Eleventh Century

edited by

Eli Franco and Isabelle Ratié

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Understanding Udbhata: The Invention of Kashmiri Poetics in the Jayāpīḍa Moment*

YIGAL BRONNER

According to the standard account of the Kashmiri school of literary theory and of the history of Sanskrit poetics more generally, the work of Ānandavardhana (c. 850), typically read together with that of his important commentator Abhinavagupta (c. 1000), is the tradition's only watershed. Whatever preceded it was primitive in comparison to Ānanda's sophisticated theory of suggestion and the non-dualist inflection it received at Abhinava's hands, and everything that followed was a secondary formulation at best. This account is problematic even aside from its strong bias in favor of Kashmiri theorists, who never enjoyed the almost sacred aura that some Indologists grant them. Indeed, various misconceptions that mire our understanding of the evolution of literary thinking within Kashmir itself hinder a more accurate appreciation of its legacy. The purpose of this essay is to correct one such misconception and to show that, contrary to the prevailing view, the big breakthrough of Kashmiri poetics took place, or at the very least decisively began, a generation or two before Ānanda. This breakthrough was led by Udbhata (c. 800) and, to a lesser extent, Vāmana, his colleague at the court of Jayāpīḍa (r. 776-807), and Rudraṭa, who must have followed them by no more than a couple of decades. It was during this important phase that all the building blocks of Ānanda's theory were introduced and Sanskrit poetics dramatically changed its course, as voices within the tradition testify. The genius of Ānanda's *Dhvanyāloka* (*Light on Suggestion*, henceforth DhvĀ), I argue, was in his perfect

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combination of his predecessors' building blocks in a uniquely coherent and hence uniquely powerful – some would say too powerful – package or framework.

I should note that scholars have already realized several significant aspects of this thesis, even if strangely in isolation from one another, and I will highlight their insights in the course of my discussion. In this sense, this article may be read as a review essay that pieces together evidence from earlier works. From these and other evidentiary pieces, however, a new picture emerges, namely, that Sanskrit poetics underwent its pivotal turning point during Jayāpīḍa's reign and under Udbhaṭa's lead. It is this thinker whom Indologists have most misunderstood and neglected, partly, of course, because of the loss of the bulk of his corpus. But enough has been preserved or quoted to at least begin to understand his true impact.

1. THE JAYĀPĪḌA MOMENT AND THE ACADEMIZATION OF SANSKRIT POETICS

In an earlier essay I argued that from the vantage point of Kalhaṇa, Kashmir's towering twelfth-century chronicler, Jayāpīḍa's reign was seen as a defining moment in the kingdom's attitude to learning and the arts. Kalhaṇa describes Jayāpīḍa as inaugurating and personally overseeing a great intellectual renaissance and suggests that in doing so, he was trying to emulate the vast but short-lived political hegemony of Kashmir of his grandfather, Lalitāditya, with a cultural hegemony that was just as impressive and far more enduring. Moreover, I argued that central to this king's intellectual makeover was his investment in poetry and poetic theory. According to Kalhaṇa's account, which is unique in its wealth of details, the king appointed numerous poets laureate and even assigned some of them to high government posts. Indeed, the two highest offices went to the literary theorists who are the focus of this essay: Vāmana, who was made a minister or councilor to the king (*mantrin*), and Udbhaṭa, who was installed as the chief scholar in his assembly (*sabhāpati*), the highest academic placement in the kingdom. Kalhaṇa even mentions Udbhaṭa's astronomical remuneration in the only report in his chronicle of the wages paid to an academic: the extraordinary sum of 100,000 dinars per diem.¹

¹ The description of Jayāpīḍa's cultural makeover is found in Kalhaṇa, *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* (henceforth RT) 4.486-499, where 4.495 and 4.497 mention Udbhaṭa and Vāmana, respectively. For a discussion of this passage and its significance,

I do not think that I am reading too much into the text by suggesting that Kalhaṇa was consciously evoking here a dramatic change in the prestige and institutional support enjoyed by the study of poetry. In this connection, a comparison with his account of the relevant record of King Avantivarman (r. 855-883), under whose auspices Ānanda worked, is revealing. In three short verses Kalhaṇa reports that Śūra, Avantivarman's minister, made new appointments to the assembly, thereby causing the sciences to reappear in the country after a period of neglect; that these scholars received wealth and honor and were carried around in royal palanquins; and that four poets gained fame during Avantivarman's reign, one of whom was Ānanda.² There is no mention of poets being appointed to high cabinet posts, no word of the king's direct involvement in the project (or, indeed, of actually sponsoring Ānanda and his colleagues), and nothing to suggest that literary theory was the target of special attention. To judge from a comparison of Kalhaṇa's two passages, then, the Jayāpīḍa era plausibly represents a major turning point for Sanskrit poetics in Kashmir, while Avantivarman's reign marked a secondary and partial revival.

To realize why Kalhaṇa may have held this view, compare the state of Sanskrit poetics when it was entering the Jayāpīḍa moment with that of contemporary knowledge systems. By the close of the eighth century, many of Sanskrit's scientific disciplines and philosophical schools boasted long-standing and prestigious textual traditions. These traditions were usually well defined and well structured, so that new contributions were easily contextualized vis-à-vis an ancient core text and its established interpretations and in contrast to rival disciplines. In grammar, for instance, the triad of a core text by Pāṇini, a supplement by Vātsyāyana, and an authoritative, vast exposition by Patañjali had been in place since the beginning of the Common Era. In the field of Vedic hermeneutics (Mīmāṃsā), the seventh century CE witnessed a major rift between Kumārilabhaṭṭa, whose influence on poetics in the Jayāpīḍa moment I address later, and Prabhākara, both of whom expressed their views in expositions of Śābara's authoritative commentary (c. 400) on the foundational

see BRONNER 2013, pp. 167-176 (for payments of 100,000 dinars, see p. 174, n. 38).

² Kalhaṇa, RT 5.32-34. The trope of reinstating a discipline after a period of neglect is common in the chronicle and is said also apropos of Jayāpīḍa; RT 4.486-488. For the trope of revival as used specifically apropos of grammar, see AKLUJKAR 2008, pp. 42, 71.

Sūtra by Jaimini (second century BCE). In the field of logic, the sixth century saw Uddyotakara's elucidation of Vātsyāyana's commentary (c. 450) on Akṣapada Gotama's core dicta (second century CE? The text's final redaction must have taken place later). The logicians and the Mīmāṃsakas often argued with one another (and occasionally with the grammarians), as well as with an equally long line of Buddhist thinkers. Thus, when Dharmakīrti in the seventh century presented his ideas on the nature of valid knowledge, he contrasted them with those of the logicians of Gotama's line while at the same time placing himself in a parallel Buddhist textual tradition by composing a commentary on the earlier work of Dinnāga, naturally inviting later Buddhist thinkers to comment on his works.³ Even discourses on more mundane and practical topics, such as staccraft, archery, architecture, and lovemaking, all had a claim by 750 CE to a core *sūtra* text, written in elliptical style and archaic language and often claiming a divine origin.⁴ And although this cannot be documented in every case, it can be assumed that these academic disciplines came to enjoy regular support from royal courts throughout South Asia.⁵

Literature, by contrast, could lay claim to no comparable scholarly tradition. Despite centuries of composing and appreciating poems in literary gatherings, and despite a long-standing agreement about the nature of a core of poetic devices, by 750 CE this tradition possessed no more than a handful of manuals for aspiring poets. Two such works, Bhāmaha's *Kāvyaḷaṃkāra* (early or mid-seventh century, henceforth KA1) and Daṇḍin's *Kāvyaḷadarśa* (c. 700, henceforth KĀ), have survived, and we know of a handful of other such texts that are no longer extant.⁶ But there was no foundational, au-

³ Obviously, the organization of these discourses was not always so neat. Bharṭṛhari's fifth-century treatise on the philosophy of language had close ties with grammar, Mīmāṃsā, and Vedānta but is not easily defined as belonging to any of these lines. Likewise, in grammar there were texts that competed with Pāṇini's for authority, and in Mīmāṃsā, Śabara "worked in a field where there were many rival interpreters of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*" (MCCREA 2013, p. 128). But such competition only serves to highlight the prestige of these academic disciplines.

⁴ On the ideology and structure of such *śāstras*, see POLLOCK 1985. For a good discussion of the different kinds of *sūtra* texts, see HOUBEN 1997.

⁵ For a detailed discussion of royal investment in grammar, for instance, see POLLOCK 2006, pp. 162-184.

⁶ For the relative chronology of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, see BRONNER 2012.

thoritative text for this tradition, let alone a single learned commentary. The bulk of the discussion must have been oral, and the discussants were not professional *ālaṃkārikas* but poets and lay connoisseurs of the verbal art.⁷ In short, this tradition was not a full-fledged academic discourse carried out by scholiasts, and it had nothing like the shelf space, patronage, respectability, and court visibility of its sibling disciplines.

All this changed rapidly and dramatically during the three decades of Jayāpīḍa's reign. First, note the marked shift in the pattern of institutional support enjoyed by literary experts, which, as we have seen, Kalhaṇa recorded; it is clear from his account that poetics is treated on a par with such senior and far more prestigious scholarly disciplines as grammar and logic. Second, there is the volume of production. The corpus of Vāmana's and Udbhaṭa's works alone is as large as all earlier works on poetics combined. This is primarily the result of the productivity of Udbhaṭa, who authored four works in the field.⁸ Third, there is the change in the nature of the works produced. What these leading theorists of Jayāpīḍa's court were actively seeking to create was precisely a well-defined starting point necessary for an aspiring academic discipline, namely, a core text followed by a succession of commentaries. In fact, they produced two alternative and hence competing such beginnings. Udbhaṭa identified an existing text, Bhāmaha's KAl, as a worthy starting point and presented his work as expanding and continuing it. He thus composed an extensive scholastic commentary on Bhāmaha, the first such learned treatise in this tradition. Vāmana, by contrast, composed a *sūtra* text in clear imitation of Pāṇini's aphorisms and supplied them with a self-written commentary, surely hoping that additional subcommentaries would follow.

Even before I address the main innovations of these works, it is important to notice what immediately changed with the shift in

⁷ Bhāmaha's text, with its implied and at times expressed hostility to kings, does not give the impression of a work sponsored by a court (BRONNER 2009, pp. 182-184). Daṇḍin's work, however, was almost certainly produced at the Pallava court in Kanchipuram (BRONNER 2012, pp. 70-78).

⁸ These are his short textbook, the KAlSS; his accompanying *Kumārasambhava*, a poem on the theme of the marriage of Śiva and Pārvatī that exemplifies the ornaments discussed in the textbook; his mostly lost *Vivaraṇa* on Bhāmaha; and his commentary on the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, now lost but amply quoted and unambiguously cited in later literature. It is arguable that the second of these is not an entirely independent work, but even so, the volume of production is entirely unprecedented in the earlier history of Sanskrit poetics.

genre and style. Udbhata and Vāmana no longer presented their works as meant for poets in the making, as Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin had done before them.⁹ Rather, they were writing for, and thereby cultivating, a readership of fellow literary scholars. This meant, among other things, a move from a writer-oriented perspective to a reader-oriented one. Such a move is usually associated with Ānanda or Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka,¹⁰ but in fact, it originated in the Jayāpīḍa moment.

Think, in this context, of the question of illustrations. Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin were, for the most part, content to make up their own examples, which lent their manuals a consistent and easy style in the simple *anuṣṭubh* meter and helped impart the art of poesy to aspiring poets. Of course, educated readers could detect in these examples echoes of famous couplets and art-prose passages, and some of the illustrations were not without charm, Daṇḍin's in particular. Occasionally, a real verse from the praxis also made its way into these books.¹¹ But on the whole, the works of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin had, by design, a textbookish texture. Things could not have been more different in Jayāpīḍa's court. True, to accompany his *Kāvyaḷaṃkārasārasaṃgraha* (henceforth KAISS), a simpler work that presents the gist of his worldview, Udbhata produced a *Kumārasambhava*, an entire poem made of illustrations in *anuṣṭubh* (although now with their own narrative integrity). But his extensive *Vivaraṇa* was simply packed with examples that demonstrated how the theory applied to actual poetic praxis. As K. Krishnamoorthy has shown, cited excerpts from the *Vivaraṇa* show that Udbhata was engaged in close reading and criticism of the very sort we find later in Ānanda and Abhinava.¹² This new orientation toward the practice is, moreover, clearly demonstrable even in the work's few surviving fragments, as Biswanath Bhattacharya has shown in a series of short publications. Indeed, this was no secret in the tradition, as Ānanda and

⁹ See, for example, Bhāmaha, KA I 6.3-4; Daṇḍin, KĀ 1.12.

¹⁰ See MCCREA 2008, pp. 220-259; and POLLOCK 2010.

¹¹ These rare instances include Bhāmaha's example of *paryāyokta* (KA I 3.9; originally from the now-lost *Ratnāharaṇa*) and Daṇḍin's example of *utprekṣā* (KĀ 2.224; the verse is found in both the *Mṛcchakaṭika* and the *Cārudatta*), both of which were originally in *anuṣṭubh*. Some illustrations, such as Daṇḍin's examples of *yamakas*, are in more complex meters and were possibly, even if unlikely, the work of another hand.

¹² KRISHNAMOORTHY 1979b, pp. 310-311.

Abhinava were the first to acknowledge.¹³ And Udbhaṭa was not alone. In his commentary on his own aphorisms, Vāmana made a point of giving extensive examples from a large variety of works with which his readers were familiar, called explicit attention to this feature of his work,¹⁴ and clearly tried, like many subsequent writers, to choose examples that were popular or striking.

One result of this new textual practice was that, almost overnight, Sanskrit poetics produced its first official canon, showcasing luminaries such as Kālidāsa, Māgha, and Bhavabhūti, to mention only a few, and a sizable corpus of beautiful and memorable stanzas, many of which continued to be cited and anthologized time and again.¹⁵ Even more significant is the change in the treatment that these verses received. The emphasis was no longer on the way poetry could be composed, as in the works of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, but on the processes through which it was cognized and appreciated, analyses that are crucial, as we shall see, to the attempts of Udbhaṭa and his colleagues to systematize their tradition and turn it into a respectable knowledge system. As Daniel Ingalls has aptly put it, “It was under King Jayāpīḍa that the school of literary criticism in Kashmir originated.”¹⁶

2. STRIVING FOR SYSTEMATIZATION

The intellectual heritage of the early poetic tradition, that is, before the Jayāpīḍa moment, has nothing like a coherent conceptual system. The main analytic categories of flaws (*doṣa*), virtues (*guṇa*), and ornaments (*alaṃkāra*) were loosely connected through the metaphor of a poem’s body, which they served to ornament, flaw, or be virtues of, but, as Edwin Gerow has noted, they seemed to require

¹³ See, for example, BHATTACHARYA 1978, for Udbhaṭa’s supplementing of one of Bhāmaha’s made-up examples for *yamaka* with one penned by Māgha (for more such studies, see n. 15). As for Ānanda, he refers to the fact that Udbhaṭa – the citation is anonymous, but Abhinava supplies the identification in his commentary on the passage – showed how *guṇavṛtti* operates in poetic practice (*amukhyavṛtṭyā kāvyeṣu vyavahāraṃ darśayatā*, [Abhinava:] *darśayatā bhāṭṭo-dbhaṭavāmanādinā*; Ānandavardhana, DhvĀ, pp. 31-32). I will come back to the implications of this quote.

¹⁴ Vāmana, *Kāvyaḷaṃkārasūtrāṇi* (henceforth KAlSū) ad 4.3.33: *ebhir nidarśanaiḥ svīyaiḥ parakīyaiś ca puṣkalaiḥ*.

¹⁵ See BHATTACHARYA 1973 and BHATTACHARYA 1977, where at least fifteen later repetitions of an example cited by Udbhaṭa are recorded.

¹⁶ INGALLS 1990, p. 5.

no universal theory.¹⁷ Thus it was never entirely clear how these categories worked in relation to one another. What, for example, was the division of labor between ornaments and virtues, and how were virtues related to flaws? It was likewise not a priority rigorously to differentiate one category from another even within the discussion of ornaments, the topic that received the bulk of attention. Thus, Daṇḍin seems undisturbed by the fact that some of his examples for “dismissal” (*ākṣepa*) are remarkably similar to those he provides for “denial” (*apahnuti*).¹⁸ Finally, the order in which ornaments were addressed was rather haphazard, so that similar devices were often grouped and discussed separately, without any apparent analytic criterion.

We should be careful not to overstate this seeming anarchy, both in absolute and relative terms. It is not as if Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin lacked aesthetic tenets altogether. Bhāmaha strongly believed that counterfactual speech (*vakrokti*), which he further modified as entailing intensification (*atiśaya*), is a criterion to which one should hold every ornament and every poem, and this sometimes led him to negate the aesthetic value of ornamental devices recognized by other thinkers if not entire poetic genres, whereas Daṇḍin had a more complex and holistic understanding of ornaments as disguising and revealing one another, even if this vision was never fully spelled out.¹⁹ Likewise, the prestigious sciences, and especially the triad of grammar, Mīmāṃsā, and logic, had their own fair share of ad hoc procedures that resisted theorization, and the order in which topics were addressed in the core texts of these disciplines was also not always thematic. Pāṇini’s *sūtras*, where economy overrides other organizing criteria, are a particular case in point.

Still, the senior knowledge systems always possessed sets of guidelines, stipulations that operated in tandem and, very often, hierarchically. These disciplines offered elaborate operations to create a word from morphemes, to realize the meaning of a sentence, or to come to possess valid knowledge: there were procedures that had to be activated before others could take place, and these often governed

¹⁷ GEROW 1977, p. 235.

¹⁸ Compare Daṇḍin, KĀ 2.121, 123, and 127 (*ākṣepa*), with 2.203, 205, and 207 (*apahnuti*).

¹⁹ On Bhāmaha, see BRONNER 2012, p. 111; on Daṇḍin, see Bronner 2010, pp. 214-230.

additional, subordinate procedures. Thus arriving at the correct declension of a noun, for example, required an intricate flowchart that was theorized as such, with metarules governing the application of ordinary rules, the relationship between general cases and exceptions, and the hierarchy between subordinate and superordinate cases. True, not every outcome was arrived at through such detailed flowcharts, not all the sequences were necessarily structured or theorized hierarchically, and there was not always a consensus about the nature of the sequence in question, as in the Mīmāṃsā debate about the production of sentence meaning as either a top-down or bottom-up process, or in the argument about the relative importance and even the validity of certain means of valid knowledge in logic. But we can say with confidence that the senior South Asian academic disciplines were used to thinking about their procedures as interrelated and hierarchical structures.

Nothing of the sort existed for the early tradition of poetics. Not only were the different types of aesthetic elements and ornamental devices often based on entirely independent principles, sometimes ironically because they were originally modeled after tools from a diversity of other disciplines,²⁰ but also there was hardly any attempt to theorize the way in which they could be combined. A case in point is Daṇḍin's approach to the interaction among ornaments as a modular and hence endlessly open system, in which each device could interact with any other to create a new subtype.²¹ Other examples are Bhāmaha's mixture (*saṃsr̥ṣṭi*) of ornaments and Daṇḍin's idea about the combination of virtues; as Lawrence McCrea has shown, such amalgamations often came with no guidelines other than "the more, the merrier."²²

Let me clarify that there is no necessity to think of such elasticity as a problem in discussing poetry. In fact, I believe that the open-endedness and modularity of Daṇḍin's approach were key to his work's breathtaking success in the southern peninsula and then far beyond the confines of the Indian subcontinent, in Sri Lanka, Southeast Asia, Tibet, Mongolia, and possibly China, beginning in the

²⁰ For example, simile varieties of doubt (*saṃśaya*) and its resolution (*nirṇaya*) were modeled after steps in the logician's syllogism (Daṇḍin, KĀ 2.26-27), and the *rasa*-related ornaments, as is well known, reflected insights from dramaturgy.

²¹ I intend to write about this feature of Daṇḍin's work elsewhere.

²² MCCREA 2008, p. 39.

ninth century, that is, shortly after the Jayāpīḍa moment.²³ My argument is rather that from the vantage point of thinkers working within the Jayāpīḍa moment, this state of affairs was seen as one of the reasons that barred Sanskrit poetics from the coveted status of a respected academic discipline, and hence they sought to transform it radically.

It is hard to miss some of these efforts, and even scholars who were not very appreciative of the work of Udbhāṭa and Vāmana grudgingly recognized them.²⁴ Udbhāṭa sought to create a coherent model for the different aesthetic elements in poetry and, at the very least, to explain how virtues (*guṇa*) and ornaments related to and differed from one another. K. Krishnamoorthy offers a very useful elucidation of this attempt. He shows, on the basis of explicit references from the works of Ānanda, Abhinava, Ruyyaka, and Hemacandra, that while the job of virtues and ornaments is basically identical in Udbhāṭa's vision, they are distinct in their scope: the former are grounded in the arrangement (*saṃghaṭanā*) of materials rather than the materials themselves, which are the scope of the latter.²⁵ Vāmana, too, clearly took the seeming disarray of poetic categories as a priority and tried to rectify it on several levels. First, he envisioned virtues, flaws, and ornaments as part of a hierarchical universe, at the top of which stood the soul (*ātman*) of a poem, an organizing principle that he identified with *rīti*, poetic diction or style. This allowed him to turn the rather vague metaphor of a poem's body into an ordered one, at least in theory, and as is well known, Ānanda followed exactly the same basic scheme. Second, he tried to clarify the relationship between flaws and virtues as opposites and, somewhat more subtly, like Udbhāṭa he strove to differentiate between virtues and ornaments.²⁶ Third, he tried to show that ornaments are not as unruly as they seem and that, in fact, they are all

²³ This vast and hardly studied phenomenon is the topic of *A Lasting Vision: Daṇḍin's Mirror in the World of Asian Letters*, a research group held at the Institute of Advanced Studies in Jerusalem between September 2015 and January 2016.

²⁴ "In different ways Udbhāṭa and Vāmana present the first efforts that have survived to encompass or organize the theory of poetic diction under a principle. Both authors, however, continue the major thrust of the *alaṃkāra* or *kāvya*-oriented tradition of speculation" (GEROW 1977, p. 234).

²⁵ KRISHNAMOORTHY 1979b, pp. 308-309.

²⁶ For discussions of Vāmana's overall system, see LAHIRI 1933. For his theorization of *guṇa* and its distinction from and hierarchical relation to *alaṃkāra*, see RAGHAVAN 1978, pp. 278-284 and 289-291, respectively.

analyzable as permutations of one device: the simile. Possibly as a reaction to this last move, which many must have viewed as too extreme, Rudraṭa suggested a fourfold categorization of ornaments into those based on factuality (*vāstava*), similitude (*aupamya*), intensification (*atiśaya*), and textual embrace (*śleṣa*), which is one reason that Edwin Gerow dubbed him “the first successful systematist.”²⁷

But the elegant superstructures suggested by these thinkers are in some sense incidental to their efforts. Their main thrust for systematization is located elsewhere, namely, in their effort to explain poetry’s aesthetic effects as deriving from the semantic and cognitive processes that underlie them, with the help of a massive importation of tools and procedures from the senior academic disciplines, particularly Mīmāṃsā. This has been one of Lawrence McCrea’s major insights into the nature of Ānanda’s work as a paradigm shift, but here, too, the shift happened or at least began earlier.²⁸ As we shall see, both Vāmana and Rudraṭa were fascinated by such semantic-cognitive theoretical possibilities, and in doing so they were following Udbhaṭa, supposedly “the least theoretical *ālaṃkārika*.”²⁹

²⁷ For a discussion of Rudraṭa’s efforts, see GEROW 1977, pp. 238-245. The quote is from page 239.

²⁸ Although McCrea acknowledges that Udbhaṭa and Vāmana “on a few occasions drew on the concepts and terminology of linguistic philosophy (chiefly grammar and Mīmāṃsā) in explaining the non-literal meaning in various *ālaṃkāras*,” he believes that “these forays into the theory of non-literary language are for the most part incidental and do not play a major role in the aesthetic theory of these authors” (MCCREA 2008, p. 118).

²⁹ GEROW 1977, p. 235. To be fair, it should be noted that Gerow said this “on the basis of [Udbhaṭa’s] extant work,” that is, the KAISS, at a time when the authenticity of the fragments of the *Vivarāṇa* was still being debated. As I will show, however, even Udbhaṭa’s extant work is filled with theoretical innovations. Let me note, by the way, that my working assumption here is that Udbhaṭa was Vāmana’s senior, on four grounds. First, a verse from his commentary on Bhāmaha praising King Lalitāditya, Jayāpīḍa’s grandfather and predecessor, suggests that Udbhaṭa may have begun his career under Lalitāditya and was already a veteran and renowned scholar by Jayāpīḍa’s time (Udbhaṭa, *Vivarāṇa*, frag. 97, ll. 1-5; see BHATTACHARYA 1979). Second, his appointment as the president of Jayāpīḍa’s academy also points to his seniority, especially when compared with Kalhaṇa’s less detailed reference to Vāmana (RT 4.495, 497). Third, later references to these two scholars typically discuss Udbhaṭa before Vāmana (e.g., Abhinavagupta, *Locana*, p. 32; Ruyyaka, *Ālaṃkārasarvasva*, pp. 6-11; I come back to these citations later). Fourth, a comparison of their works on certain points (for example, *rūpaka*, discussed in section 3 of this essay) makes it likelier that Vāmana was familiar with Udbhaṭa’s ideas rather than the other

3. RETHINKING *RŪPAKA*:
THE FIRST THEORY OF METAPHOR IN SANSKRIT
POETICS

Consider, in this context, *rūpaka*, the first meaning-based ornament (*arthālaṃkāra*) listed in the oldest texts on poetics and clearly one of the most important devices throughout the history of this tradition.³⁰ In its original conception, *rūpaka* was understood as a statement of identity between a pair of entities, in which one (e.g., the moon) lends its shape or form (*rūpa*) to another (e.g., a face). The analysis of *rūpaka* was accordingly focused on the relationship of sameness between the equated pair, in contrast to mere resemblance in simile (*upamā*), and on the propositional structure of equating rather than of comparing them. Bhāmaha's definition of *rūpaka* uses the simile's pair of basic building blocks, the subject and the standard of comparison (*upameya*, *upamāna*), and he clearly thought of the two ornaments in close relation to each other. *Rūpaka*, he said, is the identity (*tattva*) with which the standard shapes (*rūpyate*) the subject, "based on an observed sameness in attributes" (*guṇānāṃ samatāṃ dr̥ṣṭvā*), whereas in simile the standard remains distinct (*viruddhenopamānena*) because the relationship is based on a partial set of attributes (*guṇaleśena*).³¹ Or, to follow Daṇḍin's succinct formulation, *rūpaka* is "nothing but a simile wherein difference is obscured."³²

Note that there is also a grammatical undercurrent to this discussion. The grammarians analyzed simile in the context of two types of nominal compounds, where either the entities themselves, as in the tiger-man (noun-noun) variety, or their attributes, as in compounds of the snow-white (noun-adjective) type, are likened.³³ The early discussion of *rūpaka* drew on this analysis, even though Pāṇini never sanctioned a *rūpaka*-specific compound (*rūpakasamāsa*). This created a problem for those who wanted to analyze *rūpaka* as a variation on simile while remaining faithful to Pāṇini, and it led to a

way around. None of this, of course, is conclusive proof, but I will follow this relative chronology as a working assumption.

³⁰ It is listed as the first ornament of sense in Bhāmaha, KAl 2.4 (after *yamaka* and *anuprāsa*).

³¹ Bhāmaha, KAl 2.21, 2.30.

³² Daṇḍin, KĀ 2.66: *upamaiva tirobhūtabhedā rūpakam ucyate*.

³³ See *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, 2.1.56 and 2.1.55, respectively.

spectrum of unhappy solutions. Bhāmaha treated *rūpaka* as if it existed solely within the confines of nominal compounds that were identical in form to the tiger-man variety discussed by Pāṇini apropos of simile, presumably in order to lend the analysis a Pāṇinian authority, although the poetic praxis offered many examples outside compounds.³⁴ But Vāmana, already in the Jayāpīḍa moment, denied outright that *rūpaka* could even exist inside compounds, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, presumably precisely for the same reason: the absence of an explicit Pāṇinian decree.³⁵

This makes it even clearer that whatever the linguistic environment in which early ornamentalists spotted *rūpakas*, they were modeling their analysis on that of simile and were basically defining the two devices in tandem: stating a resemblance between X and Y was a simile; equating or identifying them was a *rūpaka*. Likening and equating were understood as closely related propositions, even if each had its distinct aesthetic charm. What is entirely absent from this early phase is any attempt to understand *rūpaka* in terms of its special mode of signification, in which a *word* Y applies to the meaning of a *signified* X. This analysis, integral to the Western understanding of metaphor, was not part of the early study of *rūpaka* (or, for that matter, of any of its sister ornaments, like *utprekṣā*), despite the fact that it was available and even prominent in all the senior disciplines. Indeed, it can be stated more generally that although different strands of Sanskrit thought had produced highly sophisticated theories of semantics and had paid much attention to the role of figurative language (*lakṣaṇā*, *guṇavṛtti*, *upacāra*) in the process, the early texts on poetics happily ignored these as irrelevant for their purposes. All this was to change with Udbhaṭa, so it is perhaps not a coincidence that it was also he who decisively cut the Gordian grammatical knot that tied *rūpaka* to compounds express-

³⁴ See Bhāmaha, KAI 2.23-24, where all the examples are of compounds. Bhāmaha famously identified himself as a staunch follower of Pāṇini (see, for example, KAI 4.22, 6.36-37).

³⁵ Vāmana, KAI Sū ad 4.3.6: *mukhacandrādīnāṃ tūpamā. samāsān na candrādīnāṃ rūpatvam yuktam iti*. Another possible explanation is that Vāmana, like Udbhaṭa, was already silently moving away from the simile paradigm for analyzing *rūpaka*. Note that Daṇḍin, eyeing practice more than any readymade grammatical category, had no problem in identifying *rūpakas* either outside, inside, or partly inside and partly outside the confines of compounds in the context of his astonishingly detailed formal analysis of this ornament (Daṇḍin, KĀ 2.68).

ing similitude by identifying a different Pāṇinian noun-noun compound type, the *mayūra-vyaṃsaka* or “picaroon-peacock” variety, as its locus.³⁶ This certainly helped him move away from the question of *rūpaka*’s syntactic environment and concentrate, instead, on its mode of signification.

Here, then, is Udbhaṭa’s definition of *rūpaka*:

śrutyā sambandhavirahād yat padena padāntaram |
guṇavṛtti pradhānena yujyate rūpakam tu tat ||³⁷

Rūpaka is a word that is connected to a predominant word in its secondary-attributive capacity because a connection based on its explicit meaning is impossible.

Udbhaṭa, we will see later, has more to say about *rūpaka*, but even this brief statement in and of itself is a revolution in the discourse on ornaments. Indeed, it does not bear even the slightest resemblance to Bhāmaha’s definition. Recall that by virtue of composing a vast commentary on Bhāmaha’s work, Udbhaṭa basically installed his predecessor as the tradition’s founding father and tried, if possible, to retain his language. But when true innovation was called for, as was often the case, he signaled this by scrapping the older language altogether and introducing an entirely different statement. What, then, is the nature of the innovation in this case? First, note that Udbhaṭa no longer refers to the entities in *rūpaka* but to the words that denote them. Second, *rūpaka* is no longer seen as a relationship of identity (or heightened resemblance, or simile in disguise) but as a specific semantic process called *guṇavṛtti*, or the secondary-attributive capacity. Third, and this is something that is not entirely apparent from the definition itself but can be demonstrated with the help of other sources, this semantic operation is understood in terms of its relatively recent analysis by the seminal scholar Kumārilabhaṭṭa, who redefined *guṇavṛtti* in his *Tantravārttika*

³⁶ Udbhaṭa, *Vivarāṇa*, frag. 22b, l. 8. Sahadeva attacks this position (*Kāvyaśāstra-kārasūtrāṭippaṇa*, henceforth KAIŚŪṬ, folios 65-66), and later thinkers, such as Hemacandra, know it to be based on the *Vivarāṇa* (BHATTACHARYYA 1962, pp. 80-81). Judging from Udbhaṭa’s discussion of *upamā* in his KAISS (1.15-21) and Indurāja’s elucidation thereof, the introduction of *mayūra-vyaṃsaka* as the category of compound underlying *rūpaka* was part of a systematic analysis of the use of compounds in such statements. Pāṇini mentions this compound in *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 2.1.72 as the first of a larger list of miscellanea compounds that he does not further discuss and is, hence, very useful for Udbhaṭa’s purposes.

³⁷ KAISS 1.11.

(henceforth TV), a subcommentary on Śabara's exegesis on the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* of Jaimini.

Before I address Kumāriḷa's specific understanding of this term, let us appreciate the profound innovation in stating that *rūpaka* means the semantic process of *guṇavṛtti*. Authors of earlier texts on ornaments were obviously well versed in semantics. Bhāmaha even dedicated one full chapter out of six in his book to various aspects of language, where, among other topics, he directly discussed the relationship between words and the knowledge they produce. Here he endorsed the theory that words signify abstract universals (the word "cow" signifies cowness) and rejected the Buddhist theory of *apoha*, according to which a word communicates its referent through the elimination of everything other than it ("cow" eliminates everything that is noncow).³⁸ But nowhere in this earliest extant work on Sanskrit poetics is there even a mention of figurative language, let alone an explanation of its aesthetic potential or its being operative in the ornamental devices to which much of the remaining text is devoted. For Bhāmaha, it seems, the semantic and the aesthetic were mutually exclusive ways of approaching language: the former had to do with the movement from signifier to signified; the latter hinged on the counterfactual expressivity (*vakratā*) of poetry. The situation is only slightly different in Daṇḍin, who mentions the term *gaṇavṛtti*, a synonym of *guṇavṛtti*, twice in his book. The first is when he defines the poetic virtue of *samādhī*, which consists, for him, of the artful attribution of traits that really belong in one entity (X) to another (Y).³⁹ Although *samādhī* is defined in terms of the logical (or propositional) relationship between the entities rather than its underlying semantic operations, Daṇḍin's examples and analysis actually imply an emphasis on figurative speech, and he concludes his short discussion by recommending, in this context, the use of words such as "vomit," ordinarily vulgar, "if employed figuratively" (*gaṇavṛttivyapāśraya*).⁴⁰ The second instance is the only mention of figurative language in the entire chapter on poetic ornaments, the main and longest chapter in the book. Here Daṇḍin notes that some of the more colorful (*citra*) varieties

³⁸ Bhāmaha, KA1 6. 17-19. See also Śāntaraḷṣita, *Tattvasaṃgraha* 912-914 (quote) and 1019-1021 (refutation); BRONNER 2012, pp. 89-90.

³⁹ KĀ 1.93: *anyadharmas tato 'nyatra lokasīmānurodhinā | samyag ādhīyate yatra sa samādhīḷ smṛto yathā ||*.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 1.95.

of causation (*hetu*), where the effect is far removed from, is simultaneous with, or even precedes the cause, “are based on figurative usage” (*gaṇavṛttivyapāśraya*).⁴¹ This should be seen primarily in the context of his attack on Bhāmaha’s refusal to accept *hetu* as an ornament precisely on the ground that, according to Bhāmaha, stating a relationship of cause and effect is prosaic.⁴² Other than this, Daṇḍin has nothing to say about figurative language in his long primer on poetics, and it seems that for him, the role of figurative language in producing aesthetic enjoyment is, at best, incidental.⁴³

It is against this background that Udbhaṭa’s move is so dramatic. With no known precedent, he defines *rūpaka* as a word used in its specific semantic process of figuration, on the charm of which this all-important ornament now rests. Moreover, his reliance on the discipline of Mīmāṃsā in this analysis is unmistakable and, indeed, outspoken. As noted, Kumārila had influentially redefined *gaṇavṛtti* in his TV, a move that, for the first time in the history of Sanskrit thinking, sought to clarify the difference between the two main terms for the figurative function, *lakṣaṇā* and *gaṇavṛtti*, which up to that time had been used rather indistinguishably. For Kumārila, *lakṣaṇā* is a nonmetaphorical transference of meaning, as in a metonym or synecdoche (“the podiums are yelling”; *mañcāḥ krośanti*), whereas *gaṇavṛtti* is a metaphorical transference based on a two-phase process. First, a word Y, for example, “fire,” when applied to a predominant word X, for example, “boy,” is blocked from conveying its normal referent and signifies, instead, its attributes (*guṇa*), such as being vibrant and quick to flare up. Second, this word Y (fire) comes to signify attributes similar to those that exist in X (boy), so that we come to realize that the boy is vibrant and fiery.⁴⁴ This is

⁴¹ Ibid., 2.252.

⁴² Compare Bhāmaha, KAl 2.86-87, with Daṇḍin KĀ 2.233-242; see BRONNER 2012, pp. 102-104.

⁴³ Note that the term *gaṇa* appears in Daṇḍin’s definition of a pair of subtypes of *rūpaka*, *upamārūpaka* and *vyatirekarūpaka*, which runs as follows: *iṣṭam sādharmaivaidharmyadarśanād gaṇamukhyayoḥ | upamāvyatirekākhyaṃ rūpakadvitayam yathā ||* (KĀ 2.88). However, as the commentator Ratnaśrījñāna explains (and as Daṇḍin’s following examples demonstrate), the pair of *mukhya* and *gaṇa* refers here not to semantic operations but to the primary element (the beloved’s face-moon) and a secondary one (the moon) in a proposition that depicts them as either similar or dissimilar.

⁴⁴ TV 354: *abhidheyāvinābhūte pravṛttir lakṣaṇeṣyate | lakṣyamāṇagaṇair yogād vṛtter iṣṭā tu gaṇatā ||*. “The use [of a word] in a meaning necessarily connected with its literal meaning is called “figurative expression”; but usage arising from

exactly how Udbhaṭa understood *guṇavṛtti* in his brief definition of *rūpaka* in the KAISŚ and precisely the manner in which his commentator Indurāja further explained the process in detail. Even more important, Udbhaṭa deliberately cites a key phrase from Kumārila's new definition in a surviving fragment of his *Vivarāṇa*, just at the point when he is discussing *rūpaka*.⁴⁵

Udbhaṭa, in other words, used a cutting-edge analysis of figurative semantics from Mīmāṃsā to rethink *rūpaka* and define it, for the first time in the tradition's history, more like what we would call a metaphor. Several scholars have already identified key aspects of this move and have appreciated its innovativeness. Sivaprasad Bhattacharyya has noted that "the term *guṇavṛtti* at least in this form of the word as in Udbhaṭa (and in Ānandavardhana who criticises his view) was not in vogue in earlier literature" and was newly imported from other disciplines.⁴⁶ Chitta Ranjan Basistha dubbed Udbhaṭa's definition of *rūpaka* a "complete departure" from the work of all his predecessors.⁴⁷ Daniel Ingalls argued that the early tradition lacked a concept parallel to the Greek metaphor,⁴⁸ and that Udbhaṭa's definition of *rūpaka* introduced "a distinction that was new to Sanskrit poetics and that was destined ultimately to transform the analysis of all the figures. This is a distinction between the furnishing of a meaning *śrutyā*, that is, explicitly, and furnishing it *arthena*, that is, by the power of the contextual facts, or implicitly."⁴⁹ Similarly, Gnoli maintained that "Udbhaṭa, by introducing into poetry the secondary function of words... let open the door to the conception of a third potency of language, the *vyañjanāvṛtti*," thus implying that this definition eventually led the way to Ānanda's theory of suggestion.⁵⁰

attributes that are figuratively indicated is defined "secondary-attributive." See also the surrounding discussion. See McCREA 2008, p. 91, n. 61, from where the translation is borrowed with slight modifications.

⁴⁵ *Vivarāṇa*, frag. 22b, l. 5, *svābhidheyāvinā(bhūtagu)ṇavṛtti(tām)*; see GNOLI 1962, p. xxxiv, where the reminiscence of Kumārila is noted.

⁴⁶ BHATTACHARYYA 1962, p. 75.

⁴⁷ BASISTHA 2003, p. 139.

⁴⁸ INGALLS 1990, p. 8, n. 10: "*Rūpaka* is not what a Greek would have called a metaphor, but that translation has come to be used by every Sanskritist. *Rūpaka* is actually a simile in which the particle of assimilation has been omitted, e.g., 'her moon face, her cherry lip.' In a Greek metaphor the object as well as the particle is missing: 'her stars shone upon my face,' meaning that her eyes looked at me. The distinction is noted by Gero Jenner."

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁵⁰ GNOLI 1962, pp. xxiii-xxiv.

But what scholars have not fully appreciated is how pervasive this trend was already in Udbhaṭa's thinking and in the Jayāpīḍa moment at large.⁵¹ It is not so much that the figures were about to be transformed, but that the whole analytic paradigm was already radically altered, as I will try to demonstrate with several case studies later. Note, by the way, that Udbhaṭa was not alone in this move. Vāmana, too, defined *rūpaka* using the semantic capacity of *guṇavṛtti*, a fact that has been entirely overlooked. This neglect may be due to the fact that Vāmana's actual definition of *rūpaka* does not highlight this move and, in fact, is worded in a way that is closely reminiscent of older and more traditional definitions.⁵² However, two *sūtras* later, in introducing his newly minted ornament, *vakrokti*, Vāmana notes: "The following *sūtra* shows that just as *gauṇa* [a synonym of *guṇavṛtti*] is its own ornament, so is the case with *lakṣaṇika* [= *lakṣaṇā*]." ⁵³ In other words, Vāmana advances the discussion a step further. If Udbhaṭa identified *rūpaka* with *guṇavṛtti* as distinct from *lakṣaṇā*, Vāmana concurs and adds, as if completing an imaginary grid, an ornament that is based on this other main mode of figurative speech. It should be noted that, unlike Udbhaṭa, Vāmana does not seem to follow Kumārila's distinction between the two modes. Although his notion of *guṇavṛtti*, like Udbhaṭa's, clearly implies the transference of attributes, his concept of *lakṣaṇā* accommodates resemblance (*sādṛśya*) as well as metonymy – here he perhaps takes a cue from Bhartṛmitra⁵⁴ – and the new ornament of *vakrokti* is, in fact, based on *lakṣaṇā* involving resemblance (like all of Vāmana's figures). This new classification, moreover, allowed Vāmana to further tidy up the distinction between ornaments and virtues (*guṇa*) in

⁵¹ Ingalls did point in this direction, though, at least in the case of Udbhaṭa: "To follow the concern for the implied or suggested sense through the whole of Udbhaṭa's book would require a much more detailed exposition than is justified in this Introduction. It appears in his definition of *paryāyokta*, *aprustutaprasaṃsā*, *sandeha*, and elsewhere" (INGALLS 1990, p. 8).

⁵² KAISū 4.3.6: *upamānopameyasya guṇasāmyāt tattvāropo rūpakam*.

⁵³ Ibid., before 4.3.8: *yathā ca gauṇasyārthālamkāratvaṃ tathā lakṣaṇikasyāpīti darśayitum āha*. As the Kashmiri commentator Sahadeva observes, Vāmana refers here to *rūpaka* and its kin ornaments: *yathā ca gauṇasyeti, rūpakādīsthitasya rūpakādiṣu guṇāt puraskṛtya pravṛttaḥ* (KAISūṬ, f. 68).

⁵⁴ Sahadeva quotes a classical list of the five types of relationships in *lakṣaṇā*, and the verse he cites (*abhidheyena sambandhāt sādṛśyāt samavāyataḥ | vaiparītyāt kriyāyogāl lakṣaṇā pañcadhā smṛtā* ||; KAISūṬ, f. 68) is attributed by Mukula-bhaṭṭa to Bhartṛmitra (*Abhidhāvṛttimātrkā*, p. 17). For more on this list of five, see KUNJUNNI RAJA 1977, pp. 238-239.

that it helped him incorporate Daṇḍin's aforementioned virtue of *samādhī*, which had figurative language built into it, into ornament land. It is no coincidence that he begins his long list of examples for his new *vakrokti*, which includes citations from canonical works such as the *Meghadūta* and the *Śiśupālavadhā*, with a slight reworking of Daṇḍin's example for the virtue of *samādhī*: "The pond's day lotus opened his eyes just as the night lotus shut his."⁵⁵

In all of this discussion, it is important not to lose sight of the forest for the trees. Whatever the exact analyses of figurative processes they followed, the crucial thing about Udbhaṭa and Vāmana's relevant discussions is that they both equated *rūpaka* (and in Vāmana's case, also *vakrokti*) with what they identified as their underlying semantic processes, which so far had had no place whatsoever in the analysis of ornaments, and that for this purpose they were borrowing their terminology and analyses from other disciplines. For these theoreticians, what was charming or ornamental about such poetic ornaments was precisely their underlying semantics, and Vāmana even added, apropos of *vakrokti*, that the special cognitive process that was unique to this ornament was essential to its aesthetic experience: "The secret here is the swiftness with which such metaphors convey their meanings."⁵⁶ As we shall see, such attempts to ground ornaments in specific semantic operations and cognitive scenarios pervade and define the Jayāpīḍa moment.

4. ŚLIṢṬA AND ITS COMPLEX SEMANTIC-COGNITIVE SCENARIOS

Take, for example, *śliṣṭa* (later known as *śleṣa*), another case where Udbhaṭa discarded Bhāmaha's definition altogether and came up with a radically new one. Bhāmaha saw *śliṣṭa* as a footnote to *rūpaka*, and he used the same analytic tools to define both. *Śliṣṭa*, too, he

⁵⁵ Compare *unmimīla kamalaṃ saraśīnāṃ kairavaṃ ca nimimīla muhūrtāt* (Vāmana, KAIŚū ad 4.3.8) with: *kumudāni nimīlanti kamalāny unmīṣanti ca* (Daṇḍin, KĀ 1.94). These examples state only that the respective flowers "opened" and "shut," but in doing so they use verbs that apply to the eyes only (no comparable verbs exist in English). In the translation, however, the noun "eye" had to be added. To get a better sense of the metaphor Vāmana has in mind, read instead "The day lotus woke up just as the night lotus fell asleep." But the problem with this translation is that it lacks the similarity between flowers and eyes that is key for him.

⁵⁶ KAIŚū ad 4.3.8: *ity evamādiṣu lakṣaṇārtho nirūpyata iti lakṣaṇāyāṃ jhaṭity arthapratipattikṣamatvaṃ rahasyam ācakṣata iti.*

said, is a case of identity between a subject and a standard of comparison but not as a result of a genuine, empirically observed sameness between them; rather, the identity in *śliṣṭa* is manufactured (*sādhyate*) by adjectives, verbs, and nouns that apply simultaneously (*yugapad*, *samam*) to both. Even this characterization, he conceded, may be true of *rūpaka* as well, so he made a further stipulation: what ultimately sets *śliṣṭa* apart from *rūpaka* is its “embrace” (*śleṣa*) of either meaning(s) or sound(s) (*arthavacasoḥ*).⁵⁷ Thus Bhāmaha acknowledged that the ornament involves a linguistic manipulation, namely, simultaneity, and makes a reference, vague though it may be, to “sense and sound.” But his definition is still phrased primarily as the logical relationship (an identity, manufactured though it may be) between two entities and has nothing to say about the semantic-cognitive processes that underlie it. This is why it had to go.

Here, instead, is Udbhaṭa’s alternative definition:

ekaprayatnocāryāṇām tacchāyām caiva bibhratām |
svaritādiguṇair bhinnair bandhaḥ śliṣṭam ihocyate ||
alaṅkārantaragatām pratibhām janayat padaiḥ |
*dvididhair arthaśabdoktiviśiṣṭaṁ tat pratīyatām ||*⁵⁸

An arrangement of [words] that could be pronounced in the same articulatory effort, as well as of those that merely appear like them but differ in their phonetic aspects from the level of the accent on, is called *śliṣṭa*. It is labeled as either “sound” or “sense” depending on [its employment of such] twofold words, and it produces the impression that falls under the scope of some other ornament.

We are clearly in a very different world than Bhāmaha’s, one that is dense and complex and requires considerable unpacking, which is why we are lucky to have Indurāja’s detailed commentary. But even before we turn to his illuminating exposition – and this is another case where a close affinity between Indurāja’s commentary and a fragment that survived from Udbhaṭa’s *Vivarāṇa* can be demonstrated – what is absent from Udbhaṭa’s definition is immediately clear:

⁵⁷ KAI 3.14-17b: *upamānena yat tattvam upameyasya sādhyate | guṇakriyābhyām nāmnā ca śliṣṭam tad abhidhīyate || lakṣaṇam rūpake ’pīdam lakṣyate kāmam atra tu | iṣṭaḥ prayogo yugapad upamānopameyayoḥ || śīkarāmbhomadasṛjas tuṅgā jaladadantiṇaḥ | ity atra meghakarīṇām nirdeśaḥ kriyate samam || śleṣād evārthavacasoḥ asya ca kriyate bhidā |*

⁵⁸ KAIS 4.9-10.

there is no mention of a subject and a standard of comparison. Udbhaṭa frees *śliṣṭa* from the confines of *rūpaka* (or, for that matter, simile), in which Bhāmaha (and Vāmana after him) toiled to keep it, and on this issue he is closer to Daṇḍin's understanding of this device as freely associating with any ornament in the book.⁵⁹ But unlike any literary thinker before him, Udbhaṭa is first and foremost concerned with understanding how *śliṣṭa*'s special verbal arrangement (*bandha*) leads from two sets of signifiers to two sets of signifieds and then to the cognition of some other ornament.

Here is where we ought to follow the lead of Indurāja, a keen reader of Udbhaṭa who also had in front of him his voluminous *Vivarāṇa*. Indurāja first makes clear that Udbhaṭa subscribes to the one-word, one-meaning axiom. According to this worldview, which originated in Mīmāṃsā, the multivalence of language is not the result of true polysemy of any single word because signifiers, by definition, each have one signified. Rather, it is a special combination of two sets of entirely monosemic signifiers that creates semantic proliferation.⁶⁰ If the two sets consist of words that are entirely identical in form, then they can be uttered concurrently, and presumably their meanings are simultaneously activated; Indurāja, perhaps in agreement with the *Vivarāṇa*, explains this using the Mīmāṃsā term *tantra*, which applies to cases where one ritual act serves two ritual goals simultaneously. Here, it would seem, a single articulatory effort serves two simultaneous semantic goals. But if the words differ in any audible way, beginning with accent, and are made to sound alike only through the poet's crafty way of embracing them together, then only one set of signifiers is uttered, and its signified is initially grasped (meaning 1), leading to an activation through resemblance of a second set of signifieds (meaning 2), whose signifiers are nonetheless not pronounced. The first semantic-cognitive scenario, which consists of true homophony even outside the context of a *śliṣṭa* arrangement, is labeled "sense based," while the second, consisting of manufactured homophony, is the ornament's "sound-based" variety.⁶¹

⁵⁹ KĀ 2.360ab: *śleṣaḥ sarvāsu puṣṇāti prāyo vakroktiṣu śriyam* |; see BRONNER 2010, pp. 214-230.

⁶⁰ Indurāja, *Laghuvṛtti*, p. 58: *arthabhedena tāvac chabdā bhidyanta iti bhaṭṭod-bhaṭṭasya siddhāntaḥ*. For a discussion of the Mīmāṃsā view on this and of Udbhaṭa as adhering to it, see KUNJUNNI RAJA, pp. 42-45.

⁶¹ Indurāja, *Laghuvṛtti*, pp. 58-59: *tatrārthabhedena bhidyamānāḥ śabdāḥ kecit*

And this is not all. What, one may ask, is this second meaning, and how does it relate to the first? Udbhaṭa is very clear about this point in his *Vivarāṇa*. The second meaning can be either another sentence or another ornament (*vākyāntare alaṅkāṛāntare vā prati-bhotpadyate*).⁶² This paves the way to another semantic phase where the relationship between meaning 1 and meaning 2 is itself the scope of reflection and comprehension (meaning 3), and as Udbhaṭa indicates in the *Vivarāṇa*, this further reflection takes into account which of the first two meanings was contextual and which was not rooted in the context.⁶³ Moreover, Udbhaṭa indicates (and Indurāja explains when discussing his examples) that the content of this further reflection (meaning 3) belongs not in *śliṣṭa* per se but in some other ornament, be it simile, *rūpaka*, or *virodha* (antithesis), to give the examples that Udbhaṭa himself supplies in the KAISS. Udbhaṭa is nonetheless very explicit, both here and in the surviving fragments

tantraṇa prayoktuṃ śakyāḥ kecin na. yeṣāṃ halsvarasthānaprayatnādīnāṃ sāmyaṃ te tantraṇa prayoktuṃ śakyante. yatra tu halām ekatvānekatvarūpatvāt... bhedaḥ teṣāṃ tantraṇa prayogaḥ kartum aśakyāḥ sādharmaṇarūpatvāt tantrasya. tad uktam sādharmaṇaṃ bhavet tat tantram iti. evaṃ cāvasthite ye tantraṇocchārayitum śakyante ta ekaprayatnocchāryāḥ. tadbandhe saty arthaśleṣo bhavati. tad uktam ekaprayatnocchāryāṇām iti. tathā ye teṣāṃ evaikaprayatnocchāryāṇāṃ śabdānāṃ chāyāṃ sādṛśyaṃ bibhrati tadupanibandhe ca śabdaśliṣṭam, śabdāntara uccāryamāṇe sādṛśyavaśenānuccāritasyāpi śabdāntarasya śliṣṭatvāt. Note that Vāmana, too, uses the Mīmāṃsā term *tantra* in his discussion of *śliṣṭa*, and that his language is closely reminiscent of what we find in Indurāja: *tantraprayoge tantraṇocchāraṇe sati śleṣa* (KAISū ad 4.3.7). All this suggests that Udbhaṭa's *Vivarāṇa* included a longer discussion of *tantra* in this context. For close similarities between Indurāja's comments on *śliṣṭa* and the relevant surviving fragment of the *Vivarāṇa*, see BASISTHA 2003, pp. 182-184.

⁶² *Vivarāṇa*, frag. 39b, ll. 7-8. For a useful reconstruction of this passage based on its citation in later works, see KULKARNI 1983, p. 131. If one compares this reconstructed *Vivarāṇa* citation with Indurāja's exposition on the KAISS, it is palpably clear that the latter is based on the former. Compare, for example, *Vivarāṇa*, frag. 39b, l. 6: *dantyausṭhyalaghupra[yatnatarālaghuprayainatara-kṛte ca bhede]* (reconstruction based on Hemacandra), to Indurāja, *Laghuvṛtti*, p. 58: *sthānānāṃ cauṣṭhyadantausṭhyatvādinā prayatnānāṃ ca laghutvālaghutvādinā bhedaḥ*.

⁶³ *Vivarāṇa*, frag. 39b, l. 5: *... pratipādakabhāvaḥ kintu tābhyāṃ prākaraṇikāprākaraṇika...* (see also frag. 39b, l. 2, and frag. 40a, l. 3). Udbhaṭa is generally interested in the semantic consequences of context relatedness when two meanings are involved. See, for example, his new definition of *samāsokti* (*prakṛtārthena vākyena...*; KAISS 2.10).

of the *Vivarāṇa*, that this further ornamental relationship is not another full-blown ornament but rather the “impression” (*pratibhā*) thereof.⁶⁴

All this is quite confusing and complicated, and to better appreciate the detailed theorization of the semantic-cognitive scenario in question, let us examine more closely one of Udbhaṭa’s illustrations:

indukāntamukhī snigdhamaḥānīlaśīroruhā |
*muktāśrīṣ trijagadratnaṃ padmarāgāṅghripallavā ||*⁶⁵

Her face is dear to the moon,
her tresses, shiny black sapphires,
and her delicate toes, crimson rubies –
she’s our mother of pearl,
the one gem
of the three worlds.

This is part of a longer description of Pārvatī, whom Śiva will eventually marry. My translation tries to re-create at least something of the simultaneity of the original, although in following Indurāja’s analysis, we will have to stay closer to the Sanskrit and its language-specific puns. As Indurāja explains, the verse has several semantic layers. In the first, the modifications of Pārvatī enhance the beauty of her various body parts: her face is dear to the moon in the sense that it is moon-like; her tresses are long and shiny black; her toes (or, more accurately, her feet) are like red lotuses (the compound word for ruby, *padma-rāga*, can also mean “lotus-red”); and finally – and this is absent from my translation – she is free of anything that is nonradiant (*mukta-aśrīḥ*). All this substantiates her supreme beauty as “the one gem / of the three worlds.” A second layer of meaning stems from an added set of signifiers that are embraced into the verse: her face is a moonstone (the stone that is “dear to the moon”), her tresses are black sapphires, her toes are rubies, and her radiance is that of a pearl, or “mother of pearl,” in my translation (now reading *muktā-śrīḥ*). This level of signification, with its identification of the body parts with various precious stones, further explains why Pārvatī is in the end *identified* with a unique, marvelous jewel, “the one gem / of the three worlds.” So the final, third meaning is *rūpaka*,

⁶⁴ Udbhaṭa, *Vivarāṇa*, frag. 39b, l. 7: ... *āntarapratibhā. tayālaṅkāntare vākyāntare vā pratibhotpadyate*; Indurāja, *Laghuvṛtti*, p. 59: *alaṅkāntarāṇām atra pratibhāmātraṃ na tu padabandha ity arthaḥ*.

⁶⁵ KAISS, example 4.16.

an identification of the wholes (Pārvaṭī and this gem of the three worlds) that is based on that of the parts. Yet presumably because it is based on this unique linguistic embrace, this is not a full-blown instance of *rūpaka* but merely an impression thereof.⁶⁶ Note, by the way, that this is mostly a sound-based embrace, because most pairs of signifiers are for various reasons not homo-articulable.⁶⁷

I should say that this semantic-cognitive scenario is not without problems. It is not always easy to understand why its different phases should follow this sequence: why, for example, context alone should determine which meaning gets to be articulated and cognized first, and why *śliṣṭa* is more present in our mind than *rūpaka* and not the other way around. Indeed, these issues were the focus of criticism by later thinkers such as Mammaṭa in a debate that received significant scholarly attention.⁶⁸ For the purpose of this essay, however, we can ignore most aspects of this dispute and focus on the important pattern it embodies, namely, that thinkers like Udbhaṭa and his followers are suddenly focusing, like their colleagues from the senior disciplines, on explaining the different aesthetic elements (*śliṣṭa*, *rūpaka*, *virodha*, *upamā*) as constituting flowcharts and hierarchies: a system that is now organized and analyzable thanks to the multilayered semantic-cognitive processes underlying it. In the case of the *śliṣṭa* scenario, what Udbhaṭa is doing is mapping a series of meaning moments, cataloging them, and explaining the way earlier meaning moments lead the way to later ones.

This is even more manifest in Rudraṭa's discussion of *śleṣa* (his name for *śliṣṭa*). Rudraṭa differs from Udbhaṭa in several key aspects in defining this ornament. He accepts the possibility of homonymy in language (thus rejecting the one-word, one-meaning axiom), and he thus identifies sound-based embraces with cases of manufactured homophony but sense-based embraces with true homonymy. But

⁶⁶ Indurāja, *Laghuvṛtti*, p. 60: *indukāntamukhīy atra bhagavatī candravatsundaram mukhaṃ yasyāḥ sā tathāvidhā. tathā snigdhadīrghakṛṣṇakeśī. muktā parityaktāśrīr aśobhā yayā sā tathāvidhā. trailokyotkṛṣṭā ca. tathā padmavat kamlavat rāgo lauhityaṃ yayos tathāvidhau pādapallavau yasyās tadrūpā. yadā tv asau bhagavatī rūpakapratibhotpattinibandhanena śleṣeṇa trailokyādaravartimāṅkīyasaṃbhārarūpatayā rūpyate tadā prakṛto 'rthaś candrakāntendranīlmauktikaśobhāpadmarāgair avacchāditārūpatayā pratīyate sākṣād evaṃvidharatnamayāvayavayogivāt tribhuvanodarāntargataratnasamṛddhirūpeti.*

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 60, ll. 22-27.

⁶⁸ Mammaṭa, *Kāvyaṇprakāśa*, pp. 520-529. See AGRAWAL 1975; and ROODBERGEN 1984.

just like Udbhata's and, indeed, more so, his discussion is focused on the way one meaning can lead to the cognition (*gamayet*, *avagamayet*, and so on) of another, and it is this movement from one sense layer to another that he views as the defining characteristic of a sense-based "embrace."⁶⁹ Rudrata goes on to list ten scenarios in which one meaning (meaning 1) can produce another (meaning 2) and a relationship between the two (meaning 3). Meaning 2 can be an unrelated piece of information, in which case, as the commentator Namisādhū explains, what readers cherish is precisely their unrelatedness, as in the speech of a madman.⁷⁰ But this is only a rather generic (*aviśeṣa*) version, a first step, and from here on things become considerably more complicated. A second meaning may be the ornament of antithesis (*viruddhaśleṣa*) that adds to the power of the verse; it may enhance the first, as when a description of an ideal king is amplified by a second reading that modifies Śiva (Rudrata calls this type *adhika*); it may supply a proverb (*ukti*) that complements the first sense; it may sum in toto (*tattva*) what is first stated in parts (*avayava*); it may supplement the emotional flavor (*rasa*) of the first with another, appropriate one, as when a verse refers to both a king's military and his erotic conquests; or it may ironically contradict and thus supplant the first, as when we understand that a woman's praise for her go-between's selfless dedication really amounts to blaming her for betraying her and jumping into bed with her beloved (*vyāja*).⁷¹ In such and similar cases, meaning 2 can be either a mere statement, an ornament, or an emotional flavor, and the different aesthetic effects involved are the results of distinct cognitive scenarios in which the second meaning either supplements or supplants the first. Those familiar with Ānanda's analyses of suggestion by content (*vastu*, *alaṅkāra*, *rasa*) and by cognitive scenario will at once see that these analytic tools are already all present in Rudrata's extensive analysis of *śleṣa*, and to some extent also in Udbhata's analysis of the same ornament.

There is much more that could be said about this discussion, but for my purposes it suffices to say that at the hands of Udbhata and

⁶⁹ KAI 10.1: *yatraikam anekārthair vākyam racitaṃ padair anekasmin | arthe kurute niścayam arthaśleṣaḥ sa vijñeyaḥ ||*. For his definition of *śabdaśleṣa*, see *ibid.*, 4.1.

⁷⁰ *Ṭippanāka* ad 10.3: *nanu prakṛtānupayogyarthāntaram unmatvāvākyavad aśambaddham avagatam api kvopayujyate. satyam. etad evāsyālaṅkāratvam. evaṃ hi sahrdayāvarjakatvam asya.*

⁷¹ KAI 10.1-23.

his followers the analysis of *śliṣṭa/śleṣa* changed dramatically. From an ornament Bhāmaha analyzed very much like an identification (*rūpaka*), involving a manufactured identity between the subject and the standard of comparison, it became a locus for startlingly complex analyses of semantic and cognitive scenarios, where a series of additional statements and ornaments (for Udbhaṭa) and also emotional flavors (for Vāmana⁷² and Rudraṭa), appeared in layered structures, each with a distinct aesthetic feel. One could argue that such cognitive-aesthetic layered structures are unique to the special effects of *śleṣa* and are not found elsewhere in the works produced in the Jayāpīḍa moment. But nothing can be further from the truth. To realize this, let us first return to Udbhaṭa's discussion of *rūpaka*, which I have only very briefly sampled.

5. RŪPAKA'S MULTILAYERED ORNAMENTAL PROCESSES

Here is Udbhaṭa's first example of *rūpaka* in the KAIS:

*jyotsnāmbunendukumbhena tārākusumaśāritam |
 kramaśo rātrikanyābhir vyomodyānam asicyata ||*⁷³

Pouring moonlight-spray
from their Luna-jar,
the night-maidens gradually
watered the sky-garden,
whose blossoms are stars.

This is a description of nightfall, wherein the night's gradual overtaking of the sky is described as an act of irrigating a garden, bit by bit. According to Indurāja's explanation, the comprehension of such a poem involves two distinct stages. The first takes place within compounds such as "moonlight-spray" (*jyotsnāmbu*), where the word "spray" is applied to "moonlight." Here we see the semantic process of *guṇavr̥tti* in operation: "moonlight," which is the predominant word insofar as it is contextual (this, after all, is part of a longer description of nightfall), blocks "spray" (the subordinate word)

⁷² This is not a topic Vāmana discusses, but his example beautifully "embraces" the fearsomeness of veteran soldiers and the charms of skilled courtesans – the heroic and the erotic – who both fail to disturb the Buddha's calm (KAISū ad 4.3.7).

⁷³ KAIS, example 1.11.

from conveying its literal meaning. “Spray” thus comes to denote not some liquid but “brightness,” “delightfulness,” “shimmer,” and so on, attributes that belong in it but also in “moonlight.” In the second stage, the word “spray,” now figuratively signifying (and thus consisting of) “moonlight,” becomes an implement in an act of irrigation insofar as it is construed with the overall syntax. Indurāja’s crucial point is that these two semantic-cognitive stages correspond, just as we have seen in the case of *śliṣṭa*, to two different ornaments and hence two distinct aesthetic experiences: only the first, which involves the figurative capacity (*guṇavṛtti*) of words like “spray,” is considered *rūpaka* because, as we have seen, *rūpaka* is now by definition identified with this semantic process. Yet in the second stage, the “spray” – now made of moonlight and used for irrigation – involves no *rūpaka* but rather a “touch of intensification” (*atiśayokticchāyām bhajate*).⁷⁴

A certain pattern begins to emerge: different ornaments are identified with distinct semantic operations and are understood to occupy analytically distinguishable moments in a multilayered but interconnected cognitive-aesthetic sequence. The one possible problem in applying this pattern to the example just discussed is that our understanding of it is based entirely on Indurāja, writing more than a century after the Jayāpīḍa moment: unlike the previous examples discussed, here we have no direct way of knowing whether his explanation replicates Udbhaṭa’s extremely fragmented *Vivaraṇa*. I am not particularly troubled by this problem. Indurāja was a very keen observer with an excellent grasp of Udbhaṭa’s stance, and both he and his intended readers had the full *Vivaraṇa* in front of them. Moreover, I find support for Indurāja’s take on the first example of

⁷⁴ *Laghuvṛtti*, pp. 11-12: *atra khalu dve ’vasthe vidyete. ekā tāvaj jyotsnāyā ambūkaraṇāvasthā. aparā tvambutvam āpādītāyā jyotsnāyāḥ sekasambandharūpā. tatra yadā tāvaj jyotsnāmburūpatvam āpadyate tadā prākaraṇikatvāj jyotsnā pradhānam ambu ca tadviparyayād guṇas tadānūṇī cāmbuśabdo jyotsnāśabdānurodhenāmbugataśauklyādiguṇasadṛśaguṇayogāl lakṣaṇayā jyotsnāyām vṛttim anubhavati. tadā ca tasya pradhānārthānurodhād guṇavṛttitvena rūpakatvam uktam. yadā tv asau ambuśabda āpādītāmbubhāvajyotsnābhidhāyī san sekakriyāyā samanvayam āpadyamāno yad etad atra sekasādhanatvenāmbūparyujyate taj jyotsnaiveti jyotsnāyā viśiṣyate tadā tasya na rūpakāvasthā, pūrvāvasthāyām evānubhūtaguṇavṛttivāt. atas tasyām avasthāyām asau atiśayokticchāyām bhajate. pūrvāvasthāpekṣayā tv etad rūpakam uktam. pradhānānurodhena tatra guṇeṣu vartamānatvāt. rūpakatvaṃ cātrādhyāropyamāṇagatena rūpenādhyāropaviśayasya vastuno rūpavataḥ kriyamānatvād anvarthaṃ draṣṭavyam.*

rūpaka from his discussion of the fourth, where a quote from the *Vivaraṇa* is found.

Udbhaṭa lists four types of *rūpaka* in the KAISS. The first two, the complete-set (*samastavastuviṣaya*) and the partial (*ekadeśavivartin*) *rūpaka*, are borrowed from Bhāmaha, but the third and the fourth are Udbhaṭa's own invention, and he relates each of the new pair to one of Bhāmaha's original duo. This is easy enough in the case of his *mālārūpaka*, where a string of standards is serially identified with a single subject (Bhāmaha's complete-set identification restated repeatedly).⁷⁵ More mysterious is the category of *ekadeśavṛtti*, whose name is intentionally similar to Bhāmaha's *ekadeśavivartin* and whose definition is opaque.⁷⁶ Udbhaṭa's example clarifies things at least somewhat:

āsāradhārāvīśikhair nabhobhāgaprabhāsibhiḥ |
prasādhyate sma dhavalair āśārājyaṃ balāhakaiḥ ||⁷⁷

Then the white clouds
illuminating the horizon
poured a rain of arrows
to redeem
the kingdom of the sky.

The sky's turn to autumn is described with a martial metaphor. It is easy to see that this is not a complete-set *rūpaka*: while the rain pour (*āsāradhārā*) is equated with arrows (*viśikha*) and the sky (*āsā*) with a kingdom (*rājya*), the white clouds (*balāhaka*) and the horizon (*nabhobhāga*) are not matched with an explicit standard of identification, such as warriors and the front line, respectively. But what sets this *ekadeśavṛtti* apart from the older and similarly named *ekadeśavivartin*? The explanation must lie in the "embrace" (*śliṣṭa*) in the verb *prasādhyate*, which refers both to the clouds' act of beautifying the sky in this season and to a forceful "seizing" of the heavenly "kingdom" (my translation tries to capture this duality with the verb "redeem"). This verb, too, thus supports the martial metaphor, although in a different and more tangible way than, say, the warriors, who are implied as the standard of the clouds but are never explicitly mentioned. The verb *prasādhyate* presumably allows the contextual operation of beautifying the sky to take place first, in connection

⁷⁵ KAISS 1.13ab: *samastavastuviṣayaṃ mālārūpakam ucyate |*.

⁷⁶ KAISS 1.13cd: *yad vaikadeśavṛtti syāt pararūpeṇa rūpaṇāt |*.

⁷⁷ KAISS, example 1.14.

with all the other beautifying aspects that are mentioned, and then, thanks to its polysemy (or, as Udbhaṭa would probably explain this, the perfect “embrace” of two verbs, one meaning “beautifying” and another “conquering”), it fits in with the military metaphor for capturing the kingdom, along with its other necessary implements, agents, and loci, some of which are only implied. It is the partial (*ekadeśa*) semantic operation (*vṛtti*, as in *gunāvṛtti*) – partial in the sense that it is limited to one cognitive moment resulting from this verb – that explains why Udbhaṭa’s *ekadeśavṛtti* variety of *rūpaka* supplements Bhāmaha’s *ekadeśavivartin*.

This, indeed, is what Indurāja maintains, and he caps his explanation with a surprising gloss on the word *ekadeśa* in the variety’s name. He understands this seemingly straightforward nominal combination of the words *eka* (one) and *deśa* (place) as instead consisting of *ekadā* (at one point in time) and *īśa* (powerful), which *sandhi* resolution also allows and which supports his reading of the second semantic-cognitive operation here as a matter of temporal sequence: initially, the meaning that agrees with the verb *prasādhyate* is the one that fits with the contextual description of the beautiful autumnal sky, but then a second realization of the various semantic elements as construing with the verb in its martial sense becomes powerful. The first moment, Indurāja maintains, leads to *rūpaka* (of the partial-set type, with its explicit and implied identifications), but the second, if I understand him correctly, brings in a touch or shadow of *śliṣṭa* (*śleṣacchāyā*). So here, too, we have a multiphase semantic-cognitive sequence, and again each phase in this sequence seems responsible for a different aesthetic effect. But in an exact reversal of what we have seen in the previous section, here *rūpaka* comes in first, as the main ornament, and *śliṣṭa* dovetails in a partial, shadowy form. The reader may be right to be skeptical about Indurāja’s unusual gloss on *ekadeśa*, and he, too, felt a need to cite a precedent from a particularly relevant and authoritative source to substantiate his gloss: Udbhaṭa’s own *Vivarāṇa*. It is taken, of course, not from Udbhaṭa’s commentary on the category of *ekadeśavṛtti*, because such a category did not yet exist in Bhāmaha, but from his gloss on Bhāmaha’s definition of *viśeṣokti*, where Udbhaṭa analyzed Bhāmaha’s *ekadeśa* as made of *ekadā* and *īśa*, and where he was clearly interested in precisely this same sort of cognitive alternation between two different meaning moments.⁷⁸ It is worth noting that the

⁷⁸ *Laghuvṛtti*, pp. 14–15: *atra prasādhyata ity ayaṃ śabdaḥ śleṣacchāyayā dvayor arthayor vartate bhūṣaṇa upārjane ca. tatra bhūṣaṇaṃ prakṛtam. śaratsamayo*

other Kashmiri commentator on Udbhata, Tilaka, also follows this ingenious gloss,⁷⁹ and I believe that both have correctly captured Udbhata's understanding of *ekadeśavṛttirūpaka* as a *rūpaka* that is in control in the first meaning moment.

To summarize what we have seen so far: Udbhata silently rejects Bhāmaha's approach to both *śliṣṭa* and *rūpaka* as logical relationships between an X (*upameya*) and a Y (*upamāna*) and instead adopts a radically different analysis that is rooted in a nuanced attention to the context-governed semantic processes that each is now understood to entail, and which he borrows from other disciplines, particularly Mīmāṃsā. Moreover, in both *śliṣṭa* (as Udbhata explained it) and *rūpaka* (as explained by his trustworthy commentator Indurāja), the semantic-cognitive operation is multiphase, so that each phase is responsible for a different aesthetic effect or ornament. Put differently, *śliṣṭa* and *rūpaka*, as they are now understood, each correspond to one semantic-cognitive step in a chain of reactions, wherein they can be either the trigger or the triggered, and which involves aesthetic hierarchy: the initial impression is a full-blown ornament, while the later one, which also seems necessarily to involve a reflection on the former, tends to have a more shadowy presence (*pratibhā, chāyā*). Nothing of this has any precedent in older discussions of ornaments, and we begin to realize the dramatic theoretical breakthrough in the Jayāpīḍa moment.

6. MULTIPHASE MIXTURES AND THE AESTHETICS OF COGNITIVE MISSTEPS

Many more examples of this trend could be supplied. There is, for instance, the entire rethinking of mixtures in this period along the

hy atra prastutaḥ. tatra ca śuklāir balāhakaiḥ diśo bhūṣyante. yad upārjanam tad aprakṛtatvād atra param anyat. tasya ca parasyāprakṛtasyopārjanasya yat tadrūpaṃ kārakakadambakaṃ yena tad rūpavat kriyate nṛpaviśikharājyasaṅgrāmahūmyātmakaṃ tenātra yathākramaṃ balāhākāsāradhārādīnabhobhāgānāṃ rūpyatvenābhimatānāṃ rūpaṇā vihītā. tenātraikadeśavṛttitvam. ekadeśavṛttīty atra hy ekadānyadeśaḥ prabhaviṣṇur yo 'sau vākyaṛthas tadvṛttitvam rūpakasyābhimatam. viśeṣoktilakṣaṇe ca bhāmahavivarāṇe bhāṭṭodbhāṭṭena ekadeśaśabda evaṃ vyākhyāto yathehāsmābhir nirūpitaḥ. tatra viśeṣoktilakṣaṇam "ekadeśasya viḡame yā guṇāntarasamstutiḥ | viśeṣaprathanāyāsau viśeṣoktir matā yathā ||." iti tenātra viśeṣoktilakṣaṇavad ekadeśaśabdena anyadā prabhaviṣṇur vākyaṛtha ucyate. anyatra cānyadā prabhaviṣṇunūpārjanam aprakṛtaṃ hi tac chleṣavaśenātra nūtam. tenātraikadeśavṛttitā.

⁷⁹ *Vivṛti*, p. 10.

lines we have just seen. The mixture (*saṃsṛṣṭi*) of ornaments is traditionally thought of as an ornamental variety in its own right. Bhāmaha defined it as the mere coexistence of several ornaments, regardless of possible interrelations.⁸⁰ This must have troubled Daṇḍin, because he insisted in his corresponding discussion on the possibility of hierarchy among the ornamental devices involved. Mixtures, he said, can be of two kinds, “depending on whether one component is deemed primary (*aṅgin*) and the other supportive (*aṅga*), or whether they are seen as equivalent in terms of their relative importance.”⁸¹ This stipulation, however, has more to do with the logical or aesthetic relations between the ornaments than with the semantic operations and temporal cognitive scenarios they entail, and in any case Daṇḍin had his reasons not to expand on the topic of mixtures more than was absolutely necessary.⁸²

All this changed quite dramatically during the Jayāpīḍa moment, in which mixtures and their cognition become a major topic of attention. Udbhaṭa has no less than four categories of what he calls “fusion” (*saṃkara*) on top of Bhāmaha’s mixture (*saṃsṛṣṭi*), and his analysis is all about semantic and mental scenarios. Take, for example, the first subcategory of fusion, where the charm is in the fact that the reader is left in some kind of aesthetic limbo about the operating ornament in a given passage. This sort of fusion, which Indurāja dubbed “doubt,” is defined as “the impression of a plurality of ornaments, when they cannot operate simultaneously, and when the grasping of any one of them involves neither a decisive reason in its

⁸⁰ KAI 3.49: *varā vibhūṣā saṃsṛṣṭir bahvalaṃkārayogataḥ | racitā ratnamāleṣā sā caivam uditā yathā ||*

⁸¹ KĀ 2.357cd-358: *nānālaṃkārasaṃsṛṣṭiḥ saṃsṛṣṭis tu nigadyate || aṅgāṅgibhāvāvasthānaṃ sarveṣāṃ samakakṣatā | ity alaṃkārasaṃsṛṣṭer lakṣaṇīyā dvayī gatiḥ ||*

⁸² Consistent with his emphasis on ornaments’ subtypes as the main arena for creative variation, Daṇḍin begins this discussion by reminding his readers that he has already dealt with the devices that are appended to Bhāmaha’s list, where they are seen as either independent ornaments (e.g., *ananvaya*) or mixtures thereof (e.g., *upamārūpaka*), as subtypes of their respective parent ornaments, where, he believes, they truly belong. He then proceeds to curtail the importance of Bhāmaha’s “best embellishment,” so that where Bhāmaha gave a pair of examples of his one type of “mixture,” Daṇḍin uncharacteristically supplies only a single example even though he insists that there are two methods for mixing ornaments (KĀ 2.356-359). In addition, Daṇḍin silently appropriates at least one of Bhāmaha’s “mixtures” into the fold of his ornamental subtypes. Compare, for example, KAI 3.50 with KĀ 2.179 f.

favor nor any counterreason against it.”⁸³ Indurāja explains in some detail how this is a case where several ornaments vie for our attention at successive cognitive moments without allowing us to reach a conclusive decision.⁸⁴ We need not follow every particular of Indurāja’s fascinating discussion to realize that all the aspects we have been examining are prominently manifested in it and also in Udbhaṭa’s own words: the focus on semantic operations (*vṛtti*); the importance of sequence (*samaṃ... asaṃbhava*); the close attention to what goes on in the mind of the listener, where various inferential signs are sought in order to corroborate or eliminate the individual ornaments (*ekasya ca grahe nyāyadoṣābhāve*); and the regard for the more shadowy impressions (*ullekha*) ornaments may leave in the mind.

Vāmana was perhaps trying to take the discussion one step further by ignoring amalgamations of independent ornaments in the way Bhāmaha understood them and most of Udbhaṭa’s varieties of fusion and by arguing, instead, that mixtures should be understood purely as hierarchical relations among aesthetic devices, each embodying a separate cognitive moment. Thus he was trying to limit mixture to just one semantic-cognitive scenario of succession and subordination, as his definition succinctly states: “Mixture is an ornament that begets an ornament.”⁸⁵ Indeed, Sahadeva, in a lengthy miniessay that he appends to his commentary on Vāmana’s section on ornaments, systematically refutes all of Udbhaṭa’s categories of mixture and fusion but one and concludes by stating that it is only Udbhaṭa’s last type of fusion, dubbed the “assisted-assistant” type by Indurāja (*anugrāhyānuvrāhaka*), that Vāmana accepted when speaking of “mixtures.”⁸⁶ Rudraṭa, for his part, was less restrictive and may have been leaning more toward Udbhaṭa, if we are to judge by the terminology he uses (*saṃkara* rather than *saṃsṛṣṭi*). But it is palpably clear that he, too, like the other thinkers in the Jayāpīḍa moment, was interested in mixtures from the listener’s cognitive-

⁸³ KAIS 5.11: *anekālaṃkriyollekhe samaṃ tadvṛttiasaṃbhava | ekasya ca grahe nyāyadoṣābhāve ca saṃkaraḥ ||*.

⁸⁴ *Laghuvṛtti*, pp. 68-69.

⁸⁵ KAISū 4.3.30: *alaṃkārasyaālaṃkārayonitvaṃ saṃsṛṣṭiḥ*. Vāmana goes on to show that ornaments found in Bhāmaha, such as *upamārūpaka* and *utprekṣāvayava*, are really instances or subtypes of mixture thus defined, thereby using his new definition of mixtures to lend the ornamental tools in his box added coherence.

⁸⁶ KAISūT, f. 89: *anugrāhyānuvrāhakaṣaṃkaras tu gṛhīta eva*.

aesthetic perspective. Thus he divided fusions into two types, based on whether the components of the blending remain distinct in our mind, as in mixtures of rice and sesame, or become indistinguishable from one another, as in the water-and-milk variety.⁸⁷

Udbhaṭa's assigning a unique aesthetic pleasure to a reflection on ambiguous ornamental cocktails and Rudraṭa's water-and-milk metaphor for a similar sense of inconclusiveness call to mind a related mode of analysis that is particularly prominent in the Jayāpīḍa moment: the grounding of ornaments in scenarios that entail, first, a cognitive misstep and, second, a subsequent realization of it as such. Consider Udbhaṭa's ornament of apparent redundancy, *punaruktavadābhāsa*. It has already been recognized that Udbhaṭa's removal of Bhāmaha's *yamaka* (twinning) and placing, in its stead, this newly coined ornament at the very beginning of his KAISS, where he generally follows Bhāmaha's list and its arbitrary order very closely, was a bold and deliberate statement that was meant to call attention to its innovativeness.⁸⁸ The boldness did not end there: Udbhaṭa also used his commentary on Bhāmaha's text for a lengthy discussion and a tripartite illustration of *punaruktavadābhāsa*, despite the fact that Bhāmaha knew nothing of this ornament.⁸⁹ But what was the reason for this move, which does not seem to be motivated solely (if at all) by observation of the poetic praxis and cannot be reduced to some aversion to *yamaka*?⁹⁰ Could it be that Udbhaṭa wanted to signal the importance of aesthetic pleasure as rooted in semantic-cognitive scenarios of the sort discussed earlier? After all, the charm of *punaruktavadābhāsa* rests undeniably in the fact that the reader, at first blush (*upakramāvasthā*), misjudges words such as *nāga* and *kuñjara* as both denoting "elephant" (*gajavācivitvenaikārthatvaṃ pratibhāti*), and then this initial impression is blocked by further consideration of the way the signifieds are construed together (*padārthā-*

⁸⁷ *Kāvyaśāstra* 10.25: *yogavaśād eṭeṣāṃ tilataṇḍulavac ca dugdhajalavac ca | vyaktāvyaktāśatvāt saṅkara utpadyate dvedhā ||*.

⁸⁸ Basistha perceptively compared this move to Daṇḍin's topping of the traditional set of devices with *svabhāvokti*, an ornament the aesthetic merit of which Bhāmaha had explicitly denied (BASISTHA 2003, p. 116).

⁸⁹ *Vivarāṇa*, frag. 19. For a good discussion of this passage, see KRISHNAMOORTHY 1979a. See also BASISTHA 2003, pp. 116-120.

⁹⁰ Krishnamoorthy maintains that this figure was nonexistent in pre-Udbhaṭa poetry, and that one of the first poets to actually use it after Udbhaṭa was Ānandavardhana himself (KRISHNAMOORTHY 1979a, pp. 31-32).

nvayaparyālocanayā tu tad bādhyate) – a very Kumārila-like scenario.⁹¹ And surely, this second cognitive moment, when the reader realizes that the word *kuñjara* here modifies the elephant (*nāga*) as “fabulous” or “preeminent,” is followed by a third, where the falseness of the initial impression is realized as such and the craftiness of the poet is cherished. This further realization is the key to the charm of the new ornament and the reason for the presence of the word “apparent” (*ābhāsa*) in its name. The pages of the KAISS are full of cases where such appearances (*ābhāsa*), impressions (*ullekha*), and shadowy presences or mental impression (*chāyā, pratibhā*) are recorded in the mind, are recognized as such, and cause aesthetic pleasure, and it may well be that to call attention to this new notion of the aesthetic Udbhaṭa began his book with *punaruktavadābhāsa* instead of *yamaka*, or, in fact, as a new framework within which to explain *yamaka*, hitherto analyzed only in formal-structural terms, as an ornament whose charm is based on exactly this sort of cognitive scenario.⁹² And as we shall see in the next section, *ābhāsas* and other misconceptions are a trademark of poetics in the Jayāpīḍa moment.

7. UTPREKṢĀ, ADHYAVASĀNA, AND VĀMANA’S THEORIZATION OF ORNAMENTS

The clearest example of this tendency is Vāmana’s crucial and entirely overlooked redefinition of *utprekṣā*, for which the common translation is “poetic fancy,” but which I prefer to call “seeing as.” *Utprekṣā* has always been understood as entailing an act of fictive-creative imagination, as in seeing darkness as rubbing the body with a thick black ointment.⁹³ As in other instances I have examined, ear-

⁹¹ This is the explanation given in Indurāja, *Laghuvṛtti*, p. 3, apropos of Udbhaṭa’s example.

⁹² In his *Vivarāṇa*, Udbhaṭa suggests that *yamaka* should be seen as just one instance of the more expansive and hitherto unknown *punaruktavadābhāsa* (see frag. 1, l. 5, where he considers and rejects an objection arguing for a categorical distinction between the two). If this is correct, the reanalysis of *yamaka*, too, is entirely based on the cognitive sequence it entails: how it looks to us redundant at first, and how we go on to resolve the evident redundancy it contains. I am grateful to Lawrence McCrea for calling my attention to this line in the *Vivarāṇa* and its significance.

⁹³ The example, which is cited and discussed in KĀ 2.224-232, is actually far more complex, and it is not simple to decide what is imagined as what, as is

ly writers felt no need to relate such imaginative moments to theories of erroneous perceptions and cognitive blunders that were abundantly available in other *śāstras*. But this theoretical freedom was precisely what literary thinkers in the Jayāpīḍa moment were willing to sacrifice in order to make Sanskrit poetics an academic discipline. It is in this context that we must understand Vāmana's identification of *utprekṣā* with *adhyavasāna* or its close synonym *adhyavasāya*,⁹⁴ which, as in the case of Udbhaṭa's rethinking of *rūpaka*, is an innovation that is closely modeled on a recent development in another field.

This field is logic, and more precisely Buddhist epistemology. As McCrea and Patil explain in an excellent essay, the meaning of *adhyavasāna* underwent important developments in the line of thinkers following Dharmakīrti. For Dharmakīrti, they show, it was an inferential determination – useful and indeed necessary from a pragmatic point of view, but nonetheless erroneous – that our mental concepts and images are identical with external objects. The usefulness of such a misidentification is evident in the successful equation of the particulars with our mental universals for them, or in inferring fire from smoke. As McCrea and Patil demonstrate, for Dharmakīrti, this was but one cognitive misstep in a whole palette of inferential and perceptual misjudgments, leading to “the misidentification of our own conceptual images with objects that are not perceptually available to us at all.”⁹⁵ McCrea and Patil also show that Dharmakīrti's notion of *adhyavasāna* was significantly expanded by his commentator Dharmottara, who took it to be a necessary feature in every act of perceptual awareness: “For Dharmottara, an episode of valid awareness, whether perceptual or inferential, is not a single event, but a process made up of two stages. In the first stage, an object is grasped – that is, its image is directly presented to awareness. In the second stage, we determine a second and distinct object

shown in a pair of excellent forthcoming essays by Gary Tubb (TUBB forthcoming a and b).

⁹⁴ KALSū 4.3.9: *atadrūpasyānyathādhyavasānam atiśayārtham utprekṣā*. That the two terms are synonyms for Vāmana is made clear in his immediate glossing of one with the other: *adhyavasānam adhyavasāyaḥ*.

⁹⁵ MCCREA AND PATIL 2006, p. 313.

that can be attained – that is, an object upon which we may act.” This second step is *adhyavasāna*.⁹⁶

There are several features of Dharmottara’s rethinking of *adhyavasāna* that make it particularly handy and attractive for Vāmana’s purposes. First, there is the immediate availability of his innovation: Dharmottara was Vāmana’s colleague at Jayāpīḍa’s court, another stellar intellectual in this king’s galaxy of scholars, as Kalhaṇa reports in the passage with which this essay began.⁹⁷ Second, Dharmottara’s two-phase understanding of perception and the role of *adhyavasāna* therein fit the new general interest in Jayāpīḍa-moment poetics in the aesthetics of multiphase cognitive sequences, not unlike Kumārila’s two-phase notion of *guṇavr̥tti*, which became the basis of Udbhata’s *rūpaka*. Third, and more specifically, applying *adhyavasāna* to the *perception* of one object as another, which has long been the understanding of *utprekṣā*, or seeing as, allowed Vāmana to explain this ornament accurately while using cutting-edge theories from the highly respected discipline of logic. Note, by the way, that Vāmana’s quick adoption of the revised *adhyavasāna*, if I am right in making this link, indicates that the innovation that McCrea and Patil identified in Dharmottara was immediately noticed in wider intellectual circles, beyond the epistemological discourse per se.

Even more important, *adhyavasāna* helped Vāmana organize ornaments as occupying a spectrum of increasing imaginative-cognitive fictitiousness. First, as Vāmana explains, *utprekṣā* goes beyond *rūpaka*, which is based on the superimposition (*adhyāropa*) of the traits of one entity on another, and *vakrokti*, based as it is on *lakṣaṇā*, in that it alone involves the further step of perceptual misidentification (*adhyavasāna*). Second, the long-recognized ornaments of “doubt” (*sandeha*, which is different from the doubt type of fusion discussed earlier) and “antithesis” (*virodha*) are now seen as part of the same spectrum: doubt (*sandeha*), says Vāmana, is an inconclusive knowledge, whereas seeing-as (*utprekṣā*) entails an erroneous knowledge, and antithesis (*virodha*) is for the first time defined as the false impression of something as antithetical (*viruddhābhāsava*)

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 326. See also RATIÉ 2010 for further analysis of Dharmottara’s notion of *adhyavasāna* in ordinary perception and imagination and the fascinating legacy of *utprekṣā* in later Kashmiri thinking. See also Somdev Vasudeva’s contribution in this volume.

⁹⁷ RT 4.498.

– another of Vāmana’s key innovations and a further example of the growing interest in the Jayāpīḍa moment in the aesthetic value of apparent cognitive certainties and the realization of them as such.⁹⁸ In other words, the importation of concepts from logic, and in particular the new notion of *adhyavasāna*, allowed Vāmana to turn a bunch of ornaments that tradition had handed to him as unrelated devices into a far more coherent set of aesthetic tools that were based on a series of interrelated fictive or fictitious cognitive moments; it also allowed him, for the first time in the history of the tradition, to reorder the hitherto rather random list of ornaments in a way that reflected his new theoretical understanding of them.⁹⁹

Take, for example, Vāmana’s fascinating insight into the key distinction between *utprekṣā* (seeing as) and *atiśayokti* (intensification).¹⁰⁰ For him, the first of this newly conceived pair involves only one fictitious determination (*adhyavasāna*), while the second is a more layered imaginative act: “Intensification is the imagining of a conceived attribute [followed by] the imagining of its eminence.”¹⁰¹ In other words, Vāmana was reinterpreting the traditional *atiśayokti* as an even more complex cognitive scenario – an act consisting of multiple imaginative moments. Think, in this context, of Daṇḍin’s illustration of this ornament: a verse that depicts women who set out at night to meet their lovers and, given the whiteness of their clothes, become invisible in the moonlight.¹⁰² Vāmana replaces Daṇḍin’s illustration, in the simple *anuṣṭubh* meter, with one that expands on the same theme in the far more complex, rare *pādākulaka* meter – it is hard to say whether this verse is inspired by Daṇḍin or is the original on which Daṇḍin’s textbook example was based – and the verse is now understood as entailing a twofold act of imagination: first,

⁹⁸ KAlSū, before 4.3.11: *yathā bhrāntijñānasvarūpotprekṣā tathā saṁśayajñānasvarūpo sandeho ’pīti darśayitum āha*. On antithesis, see 4.3.12 and its introduction: *sandehavad virodho ’pi prāptāvasara ity āha: viruddhābhāsavaṁ virodhaḥ*.

⁹⁹ Daṇḍin and Udbhata, while occasionally highlighting their differences from Bhāmaha in a pinpointed change in the list of devices and its order, nonetheless adhered to its otherwise mostly arbitrary order. But after Vāmana’s radical revision and attempt to organize the list in a way that was theory-based, there was no looking back.

¹⁰⁰ KAlSū, introduction to 4.3.10: *utprekṣaivātiśayoktir iti kecī. tannirāsārtham āha*.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 4.3.10: *sambhāvyadharmatadutkarṣakalpanātiśayoktiḥ*.

¹⁰² KĀ 2.293. The verse itself is an echo of Bhāmaha’s example of the excessive whiteness of the *saptacchada* blossom, also invisible in moonlight (KAl 2.82).

of the extraordinary whiteness of the women's apparel and complexion, and second, based on it, of their disappearance in broad moonlight.¹⁰³

The verse depicting the women at night is Vāmana's second example of *atiśayokti*. Before this he supplies an illustration from Māgha that involves imagining, first, the Gaṅgā falling in two streams from heaven rather than in one, and second, that heaven, now supplied with its imagined two-pronged Gaṅgā, is comparable to Kṛṣṇa's Tamāla-dark chest with its bright, pearl strings.¹⁰⁴ One interesting thing about this illustration of *atiśayokti* is that it is already cited in Udbhata's *Vivaraṇa*, also while discussing *atiśayokti*, even though Udbhata's understanding of this figure may well have been different.¹⁰⁵ Thus Vāmana's short discussion, with its brief definition and two illustrations, is carefully tied to a coherent spectrum of ornaments, is rich in echoes and citations from the praxis, and engages other treatises in the discipline of poetics. In all of this it clearly led the way for later discussions of ornaments. Indeed, although I do not have the space here to discuss the full implications of Vāmana's rethinking of *utprekṣā* and its related devices, let me briefly note that this move was the basis of the subsequent theoretical revolution in thinking about ornaments in Kashmir. Ruyyaka, the great twelfth-century Kashmiri theoretician, identified *utprekṣā* with *adhyvasāna* and understood *atiśayokti* as a further step in the same fictitious determination of things as they are not, a part of his even more thoroughgoing rethinking of ornaments as imaginatively engaging with the real.¹⁰⁶ It has been said that "Ruyyaka is the first author to introduce *adhyavasāya* in *utprekṣā*," but in fact he is deeply and openly indebted to Vāmana in this and in his larger attempt to theorize ornaments.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰³ KAlSū, second example after 4.3.10.

¹⁰⁴ KAlSū, after 4.3.10; cf. Māgha, *Śiśupālavadhā* 3.8.

¹⁰⁵ *Vivaraṇa*, frag. 37b, ll. 6-7.

¹⁰⁶ For Ruyyaka, *utprekṣā* is *adhyvasāya* with an emphasis on the process (*adhyavasāye vyāpāraprādhānye*), and *atiśayokti* is an *adhyvasāya* with an emphasis on the product (*adhyavāsītaprādhānye*; *Alaṅkārasarvasva* 22-23). For a fascinating essay on Ruyyaka's understanding of *utprekṣā*, see SHULMAN 2012, pp. 55-62.

¹⁰⁷ It is thus not a coincidence that Ruyyaka's first example for *utprekṣā* (*sa vaḥ pāyād induḥ*; *Alaṅkārasarvasva*, p. 71) is the same one given by Vāmana and becomes a standard example in later discourse. The quote is from JANAKI 1965,

8. UDBHAṬA'S RETHINKING OF *PARYĀYOKTA*

Although Vāmana's reformulation of *utprekṣā* fits well with the attempts to rethink ornaments along the lines of semantic-cognitive theories from other fields, it is a detour for us in that it came to full fruition not in Ānanda's essay on suggestion but with Ruyyaka in a much later moment in the discourse on ornaments. Given my interest in the more immediate impact of the Jayāpīḍa moment, let us return to Udbhaṭa and to one final example from his work, that of *paryāyokta*, or "speaking around," a device that he rethought in a way that importantly prefigured Ānanda's notion of *dhvani*.

Both Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin understood *paryāyokta* as a case in which a speaker indirectly refers to something the direct mention of which is better avoided. The examples of both authors make it clear that what is spoken around in *paryāyokta* is some truth, presumably known to both speaker and listener, that is replaced with some obvious pretext because of considerations of decorum. Bhāmaha cites the now-lost *Ratnāharaṇa*, where Kṛṣṇa refuses Śiśupāla's offering of food he knows is poisoned by citing the custom of eating only what was first offered to Brahmins.¹⁰⁸ Daṇḍin's example, wherein a speaker has arranged a rendezvous of two lovers and dismisses herself by a transparent pretext, has a similar logic, albeit in a very different context and mood: what the friend wants to convey to the pair of lovers is that this is the time to consummate their love (*tadrasotsavaṃ nirvartayitum*), but she does so by telling them to wait while she tends to an urgent and entirely bogus gardening activity. As Daṇḍin explains in his definition, speaking around is "when one avoids stating one's desired goal directly and, instead, comes up with a speech in a different fashion that accomplishes this very goal."¹⁰⁹ This is probably meant to elaborate on Bhāmaha's definition, which is little more than a tautological gloss on the ornament's name ("*paryāyokta* is that which is said in a different fashion"; *paryāyoktaṃ yad anyena prakāreṇābhidhīyate*).¹¹⁰ Clearly, both au-

p. 107, although the misperception is widespread and although Janaki's introduction is an outstanding piece of scholarship.

¹⁰⁸ KAI 3.8cd-9: *uvāca ratnāharaṇe caidyam śārngadhanur yathā || grheṣv adhvasu vā nānnaṃ bhuñjmahe yad adhītinah | na bhuñjate dvijās tac ca rasadānanivṛt-taye ||*.

¹⁰⁹ KĀ 2.293: *artham iṣṭam anākhyāya sākṣāt tasyaiva siddhaye | yat prakārānta-rākhyānam paryāyoktaṃ tad īdrśam ||*.

¹¹⁰ KAI 3.8.

thors understood this ornament as a relationship between two meanings, one expressed and another intended, but neither was particularly interested in exploring the process leading from one to the other.

Turning to Udbhaṭa we immediately realize that he does not see *paryāyokta* as confined merely to cases of white lies. His example depicts Śiva as having the wives of the demon Gajāsura wear their hair disheveled, cry, pound their breasts, and break their bangles. In this way, Śiva’s slaying of Gajāsura is insinuated or “spoken around.”¹¹¹ Udbhaṭa thus vastly expands *paryāyokta* into a more general mode of indirect speech. And as we have come to expect, the aesthetic effect of this device is grounded in a specific, multi-phase semantic-cognitive scenario:

paryāyoktaṃ yad anyena prakāreṇābhidhīyate |
vācyavācavṛttibhyāṃ śūnyenāvagamātmanā ||¹¹²

Paryāyokta is what is said in a different fashion, namely, in a way that is cognized in a process that is different from the operations of the signifiers and signifieds.

This definition, which reshaped the discussion of this ornament in later centuries,¹¹³ consists of two distinct halves: in the first, Udbhaṭa repeats Bhāmaha’s words verbatim, a point I will return to later, but the second is entirely new and signature Udbhaṭa. *Paryāyokta*, we learn, entails three stages. First, there is the operation of the individual signifiers (*vācaka*), each of which signifies its own signified.¹¹⁴ This is followed by the operation of the signifieds (*vācya*) themselves when they are construed with one another. For Mīmāṃsakas of the Bhāṭṭa school, this is a straightforward explanation of meaning production along the lines of the “from signified to syntax” theorem (*abhihitānvaya*), and indeed, Indurāja, in explaining the passage,

¹¹¹ KAISS, example 4.6: *yena lambālakaḥ sāsraḥ karaghātārūṣastanaḥ | akāri bhagnavalayo gajāsuravadhūjanaḥ ||*

¹¹² KAISS 4.6.

¹¹³ It is repeated by Abhinavagupta as the ornament’s definition (see *Locana*, p. 117) and then used as the basis for some rewording by both Mammaṭa (*paryāyoktaṃ vinā vācyavācakatvena yad vacaḥ; Kāvyaṣaṣṭakā*, p. 680) and Ruyyaka (*gamyaśāpi bhāṅgyantareṇābhidhānaṃ paryāyoktam; Alamkārasarvasva*, p. 141).

¹¹⁴ As Indurāja explains: *vācakasyābhidhāyakaśya svaśabdasya vṛttir vyāpāro vācyārthapratyāyanam (Laghuvṛtti*, p. 55).

echoes the words of Kumārila, Udbhaṭa's likely inspiration here as well.¹¹⁵ From the point of view of Sanskrit poetics, this Mīmāṃsā speak is radically new. But what may have come as news to literary specialists and Mīmāṃsakas alike was Udbhaṭa's introduction of a third and independent semantic-cognitive phase, when the intended meaning is finally cognized or, indeed, suggested (*avagamātmanā*), which is how Abhinava himself glossed the term.¹¹⁶ It is this phase alone that Udbhaṭa identified with the aesthetic effect of *paryāyokta*.

What exactly happens in this phase? In his KAISS, Udbhaṭa characterizes it only negatively, as separate from the first two phases, and the relevant portion of his *Vivarāṇa*, where he might have explained this in more detail, is now lost. Indurāja, in his commentary on this passage, adds only that this phase's different expressivity is a cognition or insinuation (*avagamānasvabhāvena*) that comes about through (overall?) semantic implication (*arthasāmarthyātmanā*), and that, at least in the illustration, the cause (Gajāsura's death) is insinuated by its effect (his wives' intense lamentation).¹¹⁷ But Indurāja returns to this topic in an epilogue to his commentary in which he tries to convince his readers that every aesthetic effect that Ānandavardhana attributed to suggestion could be explained as the doing of ornaments as analyzed by Udbhaṭa. *Paryāyokta* figures prominently in this discussion (as does *śliṣṭa*). Indeed, Indurāja begins his epilogue by quoting a very similar verse to the one Udbhaṭa has given, which clearly involves *paryāyokta* in the way Udbhaṭa defined and illustrated it, but which was explained by Ānanda as involving suggestion as well. In this verse Viṣṇu's beheading of Rāhu, which did away with this demon's body but still left him with his head (the cause), is intimated by stating that from the elaborate love life of this demon's wives, kissing alone remained (the effect).¹¹⁸ For Ānanda, this is a case where the intended suggested

¹¹⁵ *Laghuvṛtti*, p. 55: *vāc[ya]ya tv abhidheyasya vyāpāro vācyāntareṇa sahākāṅkṣāsaṃnidhiyogyatāmāhātmyāt saṃsargagamanam*. Cf. Kumārilaḥṭa, TV 455: *ākāṅkṣā saṃnidhānaṃ ca yogyatā ceti ca trayam | saṃbandhakāraṇatvena kṛptaṃ nāntaraśrutiḥ* ||.

¹¹⁶ *Locana*, p. 118: *avagamātmanā vyaṅgyena*. I come back to Abhinava's discussion of this definition in n. 133 below.

¹¹⁷ *Laghuvṛtti*, p. 55: *atra lambālakatvādayaḥ kāryarūpatvāt kāraṇabhūtaṃ gajāsuravadhaṃ vācyavācakavyāpārāsprṣtam api gamayanti*.

¹¹⁸ *Laghuvṛtti*, p. 86: *cakrābhīghātprasabhājñayaiva cakāra yo rāhuvadhūjanasya | āliṅganoddāmaṅgālavandhyaṃ ratotsavaṃ cumbanamātraśeṣam* ||. Cf. Ānandavardhana, DhvĀ, p. 225.

meaning is the emotional flavor (*rasa*) of Viṣṇu's heroism, and *pariyāyokta* is a humble sidekick (although, as has been pointed out, Ānanda seemed concerned that the sidekick outshone the hero here).¹¹⁹ Indurāja, however, points out that what is suggested in this case, as in Udbhaṭa's very similar example, is neither an ornament nor a *rasa* but merely a piece of narrative content (*vastumātra*): the fact that Rāhu was beheaded and his head lived on. Indurāja reminds his readers that Ānanda himself divided suggestion according to the suggested content: a bare narrative fact (*vastumātra*), an ornament, or an emotional component (*rasādi*). And the suggestion of bare narrative facts, he maintains, requires no new theorization of the sort Ānanda proposed, since it is exactly what Udbhaṭa called *pariyāyokta*.¹²⁰

In this manner Indurāja systematically shows that all the other categories Ānanda devised for suggestion are nothing but the workings of the different ornaments in Udbhaṭa's book.¹²¹ Indurāja, of course, had an axe to grind. But it is clear that thinkers in the Jayāpīḍa moment prefigured Ānanda's ideas and analyses of suggestion in speaking, for example, of what "is cognized in a process that is different from the operations of the signifiers and signifieds" (as in Udbhaṭa's definition of *pariyāyokta*),¹²² or of one meaning as enabling the understanding of another (as in Rudraṭa's thorough analysis

¹¹⁹ DhvĀ, p. 225: *atra hi pariyāyoktasyāṅgitvena vivakṣā rasādītātparye saty apīti*. For a discussion of this passage and the problem of the sidekick, see INGALLS ET AL. 1990, pp. 276-277.

¹²⁰ For a comprehensive discussion of this passage in Indurāja, see MCCREA 2008, pp. 312-316.

¹²¹ Later in the passage Indurāja also argues that a further ornament, such as *rūpa-ka*, could also be insinuated through either *pariyāyokta* or *śliṣṭa*, in the way Udbhaṭa understood them, and *rasādi* through a variety of other ornaments, and he goes through Ānanda's other subtypes for suggestion, showing that all of them can be found in Udbhaṭa's ornaments. For more, see MCCREA 2008, pp. 311-330.

¹²² Thus, although Ingalls believes that Indurāja's conclusion is exaggerated, he concedes that Udbhaṭa "speaks of a meaning being understood (*pratīyamāna*), or implied (*gamya*), or of its being included (*antargata*) in another meaning," even though "he avoids using the more technical terms *vyajyate* or *dhvanyate* for 'is suggested.'" Ingalls, moreover, believes on the basis of Ānanda's quote of Manoratha's criticism of those who understood *dhvani* but failed to explain it, that Udbhaṭa was already familiar with this terminology. Indeed, he says, "Indurāja's remark is justified to this extent: Udbhaṭa was fully aware of the

of *śleṣa*), and, more generally, in grounding the discussion on poetics in semantic-cognitive scenarios. It is no wonder that Ānanda often had to bend over backward to distinguish between his notion of suggestion and ornaments such as *paryāyokta* and *śliṣṭa*.¹²³

9. ABHIDHĀ AND RASA: UDBHAṬA'S THEORY?

More examples can be easily provided,¹²⁴ but I think that the picture is clear enough. Thinkers of the Jayāpīḍa moment were hard at work revolutionizing the discourse on ornaments and making it academic. They each sought to produce a foundational text for the nascent discipline and a scholastic-commentarial tradition in the pattern of the senior *śāstras*; they turned their attention from textbook examples to actual praxis and from the writer to the reader; they grounded aesthetic effects in semantic capacities (*vṛttis*) and complex and often reflexive cognitive scenarios, with hierarchies that regularly culminated in implied meanings of various sorts (narrative contents, ornaments, and emotional flavors); and, precisely for this purpose, they extensively borrowed models, terminology, and analytic modes

type of semantic operation that Ānanda was later to call suggestiveness (*vyañ-jakatva*, *dhvani*) and of the importance to poetry of the suggestions which it could bring about." INGALLS 1990, p. 9.

¹²³ "In *paryāyokta* (statement of periphrasis), if the suggestion is predominant we may include it in *dhvani*. But by no means may we include *dhvani* in it, for as we shall demonstrate, *dhvani* is of much wider range and is always the predominant element. Furthermore, in the examples such as adduced by Bhāmaha, the suggestion is *not* predominant, because there is no intention there of subordinating the literal sense" (*paryāyokte 'pi yadi prādhānyena vyañgyatvaṃ tad bhavatu nāma tasya dhvanāv antarbhāvaḥ. na tu dhvanes tatrāntarbhāvaḥ. tasya mahāviṣayatvenāṅgitvena ca pratipādayiṣyamāṇatvāt. na punaḥ paryāyokte bhāmahodāhṛtasadṛṣe vyañgyasyaiva prādhānyam, vākyasya tatropasarjanā-bhāvenāvivakṣitatvāt*; DhvĀ, pp. 118-119; transl. INGALLS ET AL. 1990, pp. 149-150). Note that Ānanda finds it more convenient here to mention Bhāmaha's example and gloss over Udbhaṭa's.

¹²⁴ I will briefly mention only two additional and particularly understudied examples from a much longer list of candidates. The first is Udbhaṭa's *kāvyaḷiṅga*, a new ornament defined as the understanding that X is a cause for recollection or direct experience of Y (KAISS 6.7: *śrutam ekaṃ yad anyatra smṛter anubhavasya vā | hetutām pratipadyeta kāvyaliṅgaṃ tad ucyate |*). I mention this ornament briefly later. The second is Vāmana's *ākṣepa*, which he defined as two ways of suggesting a simile: negatively, by dismissing the standard as useless, but also through a more positive route of suggestion that is strongly reminiscent of Ānanda's *dhvani* (*upamānasyākṣepataḥ pratipattiḥ... upamānāni gamyante*; KAISū ad 4.3.27).

from other disciplines, particularly Mīmāṃsā (e.g., *guṇavṛtti*, *lakṣaṇā*, *tantra*, *abhihitānvaya*, and the one-word, one-meaning axiom), but also epistemology (*adhyavasāna*) and grammar (*mayūravyaṃsaka*). All these developments shaped the discussion on poetics in the coming centuries, and all are highly visible in Ānanda's seminal essay on suggestion, with its Mīmāṃsā-based semantic-hierarchical model and the various cognitive scenarios it identifies with different aesthetic responses. In trying to evaluate Ānanda's innovativeness more accurately in the context of these earlier changes, two crucial questions merit further examination: did thinkers like Udbhaṭa have a comprehensive and coherent semantic-aesthetic theory of which the preceding instances were part, and, if so, what place did *rasa* play in it?

These questions were already raised and given surprising answers several decades ago, but with little or no following. The most important and largely ignored attempt to answer the first is an essay by Sivaprasad Bhattacharyya, "Abhidhāvṛtti in Udbhaṭa," which appeared in 1962, the same year in which Raniero Gnoli published the surviving fragments from the *Vivarāṇa*. Bhattacharyya pieced together some of the just-published fragments with a vast number of citations of or allusions to Udbhaṭa's work in later tradition and made several bold arguments about his vision (although it is easy to lose sight of some of them in his dense prose style): (1) Udbhaṭa did have a comprehensive semantic theory of poetry. (2) This theory was based on a layered notion of *abhidhā*, a broad semantic capacity that included literal (*śruti* or *mukhyavṛtti*), figurative (*guṇavṛtti*), and suggestive operations. (3) Later thinkers were well aware of and strongly indebted to Udbhaṭa's theory of *abhidhā* and, in the case of Ānanda and Abhinava, struggled to show how *dhvani* differed from it. (4) Udbhaṭa also had a complete and related aesthetic theory that, like Ānanda's model, included all known poetic elements: ornaments, virtues (*guṇas*), and emotional factors, such as *bhāva* and *rasa*.¹²⁵

It is not easy to assess Bhattacharyya's arguments, but it is clear that *abhidhā* and its synonym *abhidhāna* were extremely important to Udbhaṭa, and that his notion of these terms was far broader than what we typically tend to associate with them today. Consider, in this context, a partially preserved discussion from an early passage

¹²⁵ BHATTACHARYYA 1962.

in the *Vivaraṇa* apropos of a verse wherein Bhāmaha, when introducing poetry, provides a seemingly straightforward list of the fields of knowledge it presupposes. The third in this list – after grammar and prosody and before historical narratives, worldly wisdom, logic, and the arts – is *abhidhānārthāḥ*, a compound that consists of *abhidhāna*, probably in the sense of “words,” and *artha*, “meanings,” thus referring quite naturally in the context of this list to words and their meanings, word meanings, or perhaps lexicography.¹²⁶ Interestingly, however, Udbhaṭa seizes on this compound to introduce a notion of semantics that has no precedent in the actual text of Bhāmaha or, indeed, in any early text on poetics. For him, the compound refers to the literal and figurative capacities of *abhidhāna* as a unified semantic model (*śabdānām abhidhānam abhidhāvvyāpāro mukhyo guṇavṛttiś ca*), for which he immediately provides a detailed discussion.¹²⁷ He goes on to demonstrate this broad notion of *abhidhā* by showing, for example, how the verb “goes” (*eti*) may be used literally, in a sentence such as “Devadatta goes to the mountain,” but also figuratively, in a *Rāmāyaṇa* verse describing how happiness “goes” to a man.¹²⁸ The idea is that both instances fall under the same semantic theory of *abhidhāna* that poetry presupposes. All this, moreover, comes on the heels of an earlier discussion of *abhidhāvvyāpāra* in fragment 9, the context and contents of which are not fully clear, but which is rather lengthy and involves citations of famous verses from the poetic praxis.¹²⁹

¹²⁶ KAI 1.9: *śabdaś chando 'bhidhānārthā itihāsāśrayāḥ kathāḥ | loko yuktiḥ kalāś ceti mantavyāḥ kāvyahetavaḥ ||* (I emend the last word on the basis of Gnoli’s suggestion; *Vivaraṇa*, frag. 10a, l. 2). For different ways of understanding *abhidhānārthāḥ*, see MASSON 1972, pp. 252-253.

¹²⁷ The quoted clause is not preserved in Gnoli’s fragments but is cited in Abhinavagupta and elsewhere (*Locana*, p. 32; see n. 131). Gnoli believes that its place was in l. 4 of fragment 10a of his manuscript (GNOLI 1962, p. xviii).

¹²⁸ *Vivaraṇa*, frags. 10a-b. This passage is discussed in MASSON 1972, p. 253, but Masson is mainly interested in arguing that the attribution of the fragments to Udbhaṭa is inconclusive, a view that no longer seems plausible. The *Rāmāyaṇa* verse (*eti jīvantam ānando*; 6.114.2) is cited in the grammatical literature (e.g., Patañjali, *Vyākaraṇamahābhāṣya* 3.1.67), but probably in different contexts, as noted in BHATTACHARYYA 1962, p. 76, n. 11.

¹²⁹ *Vivaraṇa*, frag. 9. The verses are *na dānena na mānena*, which appears in the *Hitopadeśa* and elsewhere (see GNOLI 1962, p. 6, n. 21), and *namas tuṅgaśiraś-cumbi*, the famous opening verse of Bāṇa’s *Harṣacarita* and one of the most popular *kāvya* stanzas ever (on this verse, see TUBB 2014, pp. 311-314). At the presumed end of this passage (frag. 10, l. 1), Udbhaṭa says *alaṃ vistareṇa*, indicating that the preceding discussion was not short.

So at the very least we can say that Udbhaṭa was eager to introduce his innovative agenda about the relevance of semantics to poetics in general and, more specifically, to showcase a notion of *abhidhāna* or *abhidhā* and its various layers as underpinning poetry, even if this meant hijacking an innocent item in Bhāmaha's list of poetry's presupposed fields of knowledge. It is also clear that this notion of *abhidhā* and similar semantic insights of the Jayāpīḍa moment are the context in which Ānanda formulated his theory of *dhvani* and from which he wished to differentiate it. Indeed, in quoting the relevant passage from Udbhaṭa's *Vivarāṇa*, Abhinava was primarily concerned with explaining and defending Ānanda's nuanced claim that, on the one hand, others had already equated the soul of poetry, which he identified with *dhvani*, with figurative language and, in doing so, had tangentially touched (*manāksprṣṭa*) on *dhvani*, but that, on the other, they had failed to name, let alone define, *dhvani*.¹³⁰ Abhinava identified those "others" as the main theoreticians of the Jayāpīḍa moment, Udbhaṭa and Vāmana; credited each of them with his distinctive innovation in this area (*guṇavṛtti* and *lakṣaṇā*, respectively); and provided a short quote from each of their main texts. For Vāmana he cited the identification of *vakrokti* with *lakṣaṇā*, and for Udbhaṭa, the just-mentioned line on *abhidhāna* that appears as a gloss on Bhāmaha's list of presupposed areas of knowledge.¹³¹

¹³⁰ DhvĀ, pp. 28-32: *bhāktam āhus tam anye. anye taṃ dhvaniśamjñītaṃ kāvyāt-mānaṃ guṇavṛttir ity āhuḥ. yady api ca dhvaniśabdasaṃkīrtanena kāvyalakṣaṇavidhāyibhir guṇavṛttir anyo vā na kaścit prakāraḥ prakāśītaḥ, tathāpy amukhyavṛtṭyā kāvyeṣu vyavahāraṃ darśayatā dhvanimārgo manāksprṣṭo 'pi na lakṣita itī parikalpyaivam uktam bhāktam āhus tam anye 'ti.* "Others say that it is an associated meaning (*bhāktā*).' Others say that this soul of poetry which we call *dhvani* is [merely] secondary usage (*guṇavṛtti*). And although the authors for definitions for poetry have not given the specific name *dhvani* to secondary usage nor to any other sort of thing, still, in showing how secondary usage is employed in poetry, they have at least touched on the process of *dhvani* even if they have not actually defined it." (Transl. INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 64.)

¹³¹ *Locana*, p. 32: *darśayateti bhāṭṭodbhaṭavāmanādinā. bhāmāhenoktaṃ śabdās chando 'bhidhānārthāḥ, ity abhidhānasya śabdād bhedam vyākhyātum bhāṭṭodbhaṭo babhāṣe 'śabdānām abhidhānam abhidhāvyāpāro mukhyo guṇavṛttis ca' itī. vāmano 'pi 'sādrśyāl lakṣaṇā vakrokti' itī.* "He is referring to such authors as Bhāṭṭodbhaṭa and Vāmana. For where Bhāmaha says, 'Words, meters, designations (*abhidhāna*), meanings,' Bhāṭṭodbhaṭa explains the difference between words and designations as follows: 'Designation means the denotative function of words, which may be either primary or secondary (*guṇavṛtti*).' And Vāmana has said, '*Vakrokti* is secondary usage (*lakṣaṇā*) based on similarity.'"

So in the eyes of thinkers like Ānanda and Abhinava, at least, *abhidhā/abhidhāna* was elevated to soul-like importance in the eyes of Udbhaṭa, it included both denotation and figurative language, and it “touched on” *dhvani* without calling it so. Indeed, I believe that Udbhaṭa’s *abhidhā* also included, in addition to the primary and secondary functions, a third operation of suggestion of the sort we have seen in the case of *paryāyokta*. I find support for this argument in the fact that Udbhaṭa supplemented Bhāmaha’s definition of this ornament rather than supplanted it, even though he had no qualms about discarding a characterization of his enshrined predecessor when he was revising its accepted understanding, as we have seen with *rūpaka* and *śliṣṭa*. I believe that he nonetheless embedded Bhāmaha’s original language in his definition of *paryāyokta*, however opaque and tautological the original was, because it allowed him to get added mileage from the verb *abhidhīyate*, which Bhāmaha used and which is derived from the same verbal root and prefix as *abhidhā/abhidhāna*. Note that derivations from *abhi* and *dhā* appear frequently in Bhāmaha’s text, although in a nontechnical sense of “communicating,” “stating,” “naming,” or “describing.”¹³² In the case of *paryāyokta*, for example, Bhāmaha must have had in mind not the particular semantic capacity through which Kṛṣṇa conveyed his message to Śiśupāla, but merely the fact that it was “communicated” (*abhidhīyate*) in some other way (*anyena prakāreṇa*). For Udbhaṭa, by contrast, *abhidhā* was a technical term that was key to his project of semanticizing poetics, and thus there was added value

(Transl. INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 66.) Abhinava explains Udbhaṭa’s commentarial move as motivated by the need to differentiate two items on the list, *śabdaḥ* and *abhidhāna*, but I wonder whether he is not also gently insinuating that Udbhaṭa hijacked Bhāmaha’s text to introduce notions that were really his own. See also BHATTACHARYYA 1962, p. 73.

¹³² I have counted thirty-two occurrences of various derivations from *abhi+dhā* in Bhāmaha: *abhidhā*, in the sense of “name” or “statement” (3.21, 3.25); *abhidhāna*, in the sense of “word,” “utterance,” “communication,” or “mention” (1.9, 1.21, 1.37, 1.41, 1.59, 2.18, 2.34, 2.86, 3.25, 5.56); *abhidhāyin*, in the sense of “expressing” (6.13); *abhidhāsyate*, in the sense of “saying” (4.13); *abhidhītsā*, “the intention to say” or “the intention to communicate” (1.22, 2.2, 2.68); *abhidhīyate*, in the sense of what is “said,” “named,” or “labeled,” (2.33, 2.37, 2.42, 2.65, 3.8, 3.14, 4.12, 6.8); and *abhidheya*, in the sense of “signified,” “sense,” or a meaning that is distinct from the word signifying it (1.10, 1.15, 1.36, 2.17, 2.86, 4.34, 6.8). In none of these occurrences, as far as I can see, did Bhāmaha use the verb in its technical sense of direct, nonfigurative denotation, let alone in the expanded sense it had for Udbhaṭa.

in retaining it despite everything else that had changed in *paryāyokta*: it helped driving the point home that this third *vṛtti*, beyond those of the signifiers and the signifieds, was still part of *abhidhā/abhidhāna*, now seen as the underlying semantic function of poetry as such, and it allowed him to imply, as we have seen that he did in his gloss on *abhidhānārthāḥ* in the *Vivaraṇa*, that this was really Bhā-maha's position.¹³³

So I am inclined to agree with Bhattacharyya that Udbhata had a sweeping notion of *abhidhā* that included a variety of semantic-cognitive scenarios and was responsible for a diversity of aesthetic effects in poetry. It is also clear that later writers, both inside and outside Kashmir, gave Udbhata due credit for this vision and were influenced by it. A case in point is the late ninth-century *Hṛdayadarpaṇa* of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, another lost masterpiece of Sanskrit poetics. In an excellent essay that pieces together the views of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka from quotations of his work that survived in other works, Sheldon Pollock shows, among other things, that “for Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, *abhidhā* does not have its usual sense of direct denotation” and is “constantly essential” to the aesthetic process, leading the way to the complex process of *bhāvanā* (which Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka creatively borrowed from Mīmāṃsā). In fact, “*abhidhā* in Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's usage is best understood or even translated as ‘literary language,’ something ‘completely different’ from the language of scripture and everyday discourse, as Abhinavagupta describes it.”¹³⁴ It seems more than likely that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, like Mukulabhata and others who shared

¹³³ Abhinavagupta later argued, somewhat heavy-handedly, that this retained verb proves that *paryāyokta* and *dhvani* are distinct phenomena: *ata eva paryāyeṇa prakārāntareṇāvagamanātmanā vyaṅgyenopalakṣitaṃ sad yad abhidhīyate tad abhidhīyamānam uktam eva sat paryāyoktam ity abhidhīyata iti lakṣaṇapadam, paryāyoktam iti lakṣyapadam, arthālaṃkāratvaṃ sāmānyalakṣaṇaṃ ceti sarvaṃ yujyate* (*Locana*, p. 118). “When what is said is distinguished by a *paryāya* (periphrasis), that is, speaking in a different manner, which consists in giving to understand, [that is, when it is distinguished] by a suggestion, then the literally used words themselves form a *paryāyokta* (statement of periphrasis). Here ‘when something is said’ forms the definition, ‘statement of periphrasis’ is the thing to be defined, and the general characteristic of this thing is as a figure of speech based on meaning (*arthālaṃkāra*). And so everything here is in order.” (Transl. INGALLS ET AL. 1990, p. 150.)

¹³⁴ POLLOCK 2010, pp. 147, 153; for his discussion of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's date, see p. 144. It was Bhattacharyya who dubbed the *Hṛdayadarpaṇa* and the *Vivaraṇa*, together with the *Kāvyaakautuka* of Bhaṭṭa Tota, as “lost masterpieces” of the discipline (BHATTACHARYYA 1981).

this view, was following Udbhata in this approach, as already suggested by Bhattacharyya, and that Udbhata's theory of *abhidhā* preceded, led the way to, and for a long time continued to compete with Ānanda's theory of *dhvani*.¹³⁵

What is less clear is how detailed and systematic this *abhidhā* theory was, both in its analysis of language and in its application to ornaments. First, did Udbhata have a complete linguistic model of *abhidhā* that explained how words are analyzed from the level of word bases and case endings up (as Bhattacharyya takes a quote of Udbhata's *Vivarāṇa* from Rājaśekhara to imply),¹³⁶ and did he provide a detailed description of the various meaning moments, from the literal and the figurative to the suggested, or was he merely content with seeing *abhidhā* as coterminous with poetic language and its various semantic-cognitive effects? Second, how consistent was Udbhata in applying *abhidhā* to every ornament in the book? Did he keep coming back to this notion in his *Vivarāṇa*, explaining the semantic path of every aesthetic device, or did he do so only in cases that involved some sort of indirection, as in the cases I discussed earlier? To answer these questions, we would require a far better copy of the *Vivarāṇa* than we now have.

Let us now turn to the second query, regarding the role of *rasa* in Udbhata's thinking. It should be stated at the outset that Udbhata was a groundbreaking and influential *rasa* theorist. Udbhata was the author of the earliest known commentary on the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, the root text on dramaturgy ascribed to Bharata, and in this now-lost commentary he introduced key *rasa*-related innovations. For example, as V. Raghavan showed long ago, Udbhata was the first author in this tradition to expand the list of eight emotional flavors by introducing peace (*śānta*), a ninth *rasa*, possibly emending the *Nāṭyaśāstra*'s text in the process. This most likely meant that Udbhata also theorized the emotional basis (*bhāva*) and other psychoaesthetic factors that give rise to peace, and that this theorization served as the basis for later discussions of the topic.¹³⁷ Udbhata was also the first to coin and conceptualize *rasābhāsa*, a scenario of *rasa* production that cannot be completed because of social impropriety and is hence

¹³⁵ BHATTACHARYYA 1962, pp. 73-74.

¹³⁶ BHATTACHARYYA 1962, pp. 77-78.

¹³⁷ RAGHAVAN 1975, 13, 47, 71.

a mere “semblance of *rasa*.”¹³⁸ This, again, is a mode of analysis that played an important role in later *rasa* theory.

Moreover, Udbhaṭa was, as far as we know, “the first person to write on both Alaṅkāraśāstra and Nāṭyaśāstra,”¹³⁹ and in doing so he began to think the two together. More specifically, Udbhaṭa was the first to account for the fact that poetic language, and not just dramatic action, can convey *rasa* and its associated elements. There are two main steps in Udbhaṭa’s groundbreaking theorization of *rasa* in poetry. The first is his understanding that poetry can bring about the entire range of *rasa* experience, from its nascent state to maturation and then to cessation. To demonstrate this, Udbhaṭa kept the names of the five content-related ornaments that he inherited from his predecessors (with the unrelated *paryāyokta* inexplicably inserted in their midst), but he used them as empty bottles into which he poured new *rasa* wine. The old ornaments were now defined not according to the randomly chosen emotional and narrative contents after which they were still named – joy in “joyous” (*preyas*), emotional flavor in “flavored” (*rasavat*), pride in “prideful” (*ūrjasvin*), a lucky coincidence in “coincidence” (*samāhita*), and opulence in “magnificence” (*udātta*)¹⁴⁰ – but as different stages in the evolution of emotional flavors as understood in dramaturgy or, more precisely, in dramaturgy as Udbhaṭa theorized it. *Preyasvat* (his name for *preyas*) was now taken to express basic emotions (*bhāva*) that did not evolve to full-blown *rasa*; *rasavat* was fully evolved *rasa*; *ūrjasvin* became a case of *rasa* whose production was hampered by a socially inappropriate excess of emotions; *samāhita* was the cessation of emotion, *rasa*, or their incomplete imitations; and *udātta* (or at least one variety thereof) was a case of emotional description that played a supportive aesthetic role but did not dominate the poem.¹⁴¹ Second, Udbhaṭa explained that these emotional-aesthetic states are poetically communicated by up to five types of indicators: “the proper term, as well as the [depiction of] stable emotions, transitory emotions, stimulant factors, and gestures.”¹⁴² Udbhaṭa’s view that

¹³⁸ POLLOCK 2016, p. 11.

¹³⁹ MCCREA 2008, p. 44.

¹⁴⁰ My translation of the original ornaments reflects my understanding of them as used in Daṇḍin, as I intend to explain elsewhere.

¹⁴¹ KAISS 4.2-5, 7-8; see MCCREA 2008, pp. 44-50.

¹⁴² KAISS 4.3: *svaśabdasthāyisaṃcārivibhāvābhinayāspadam*. Or, as Indurāja points out, likely quoting one of Udbhaṭa’s lost texts, “For Udbhaṭa, *rasa* was

the mere mention of the name of a certain *rasa* (“proper term”) could give rise to its experience has often been criticized, but what the critics have overlooked is the big picture: Udbhaṭa was the first to theorize, under the heading of ornaments such as *rasavat*, a spectrum of linguistic means for evoking *rasa*, from the literal to the suggested, as Indurāja explains in detail.¹⁴³

Thus Udbhaṭa found a clever way to import the dramatic theory of *rasa* evocation into poetics. It has been said time and again that his solution, involving the analysis of *rasa* as an ornament (or, rather, a set of ornaments), is unsatisfactory, but the problem with this criticism is, first, that it overlooks Udbhaṭa’s vastly expanded understanding of ornaments. As we have seen, he no longer viewed ornaments as isolated devices defined by formal structures or the contents they conveyed, but as grounded, instead, in the poetic language of *abhidhā*, which covered everything from the literal to the suggested semantic-cognitive operations. Consistent with this analysis of ornaments, Udbhaṭa understood *rasa* as the result of the effect, or perhaps the cumulative effect, of all these capacities; this is also consistent with the way dramaturgy understood *rasa* production as the combination of all its underlying indicators.¹⁴⁴ Then there is the argument that viewing *rasa* as an ornament contradicts its status as the very soul (*ātman*) of poetry, because the soul is not an ornamental device but the very essence of the poetic body that ornaments are supposed to ornament. The problem with this criticism is that it is based anachronistically on Ānanda’s later formulation of *rasa* as poetry’s soul, its sole telos and the one element to which all others must be subordinated, and on the assumption that Udbhaṭa must have shared this model.

I will return shortly to Indurāja’s struggle to harmonize the worldviews of these two thinkers, also quite anachronistically. But note that for all the criticism, the majority of later thinkers accepted Udbhaṭa’s radically new and highly sophisticated understanding of the *rasa* ornaments. This is true even of Ānanda and Abhinava, although they were hard at work to differentiate these ornaments from what they saw as *rasa* as manifested through *dhvani*. And the irony is that even the basis for this differentiation was likely borrowed

brought about in five ways” (*yad uktam bhāṭṭodbhaṭena pañcarūpāḥ rasā iti*, followed by a detailed exposition of each of the five; *Laghuvṛtti*, p. 53).

¹⁴³ *Laghuvṛtti*, pp. 51-55. See the repeated use of the verb *gamayati*, “causes to understand” or “suggests,” in this exposition.

¹⁴⁴ As suggested by KRISHNAMOORTHY 1979b, p. 307.

from Udbhaṭa himself. As Krishnamoorthy has pointed out, Udbhaṭa's distinction between predominant *rasa* in *rasavat* and subordinate *rasa* (*upalakṣaṇatām prāptam*) in *udāta* was understood at least by the anonymous author of the *Kalpalatāviveka* (henceforth KLV) to have paved the way for Ānanda's differentiation between *guṇībhūtavyaṅgya*, where the element (whether *rasa* or not) is aesthetically subordinate, and *dhvani* poetry, where suggestion is predominant.¹⁴⁵

It is thus clear that Udbhaṭa gave a great deal of thought to *rasa*, a topic that was central to his work as both a dramatist and a poetician, and that he was concerned with newly theorizing the role of *rasa*, originally theorized in the context of drama, in nondramatic poetry. His answer was to make *rasa* part of his overall semantic-aesthetic model now standing at the base of his new notion of ornaments, and to maintain, in all likelihood, that as with *rūpaka*, *śliṣṭa*, and *paryāyokta*, *rasa* was based on several layers of semantic operations (from the explicit mention of the proper term to various indirect indicators) and a whole spectrum of cognitive scenarios in the reader's mind (from rising to cessation). If we examine this solution on its own terms, without viewing it through the eyes of posterity, we must admit its elegance and parsimony precisely because it requires no new semantic theorization beyond what Udbhaṭa took to be the linguistic basis of aesthetics. Yet it is also true that this was not the view of many of his junior contemporaries and immediate

¹⁴⁵ "Udbhaṭa and his followers maintained that when *rasa* becomes the meaning of the passage, it is a case of the ornament *rasavat*. The proponent who taught [the distinction between] *dhvani* and *guṇībhūtavyaṅgya* [Mammāta] responded to this by saying: 'This [*rasa* etc. as a primary suggested meaning] is different than the ornament for conveying *rasa* etc.,' and 'These are ornaments such as *rasavat*.' And to support his opinion, he spoke about the criterion of an existence that is meant for the support of another. But this is what was meant by [Udbhaṭa's definition of *udāta*] as secondary, that is, as *rasa* that has not become the meaning of the passage in the sense that it is not predominant. So the ornament of *udāta* is based only on the literal meaning, and, as such, it is not an exception to the rule of *rasavat*. So much was the opinion of Udbhaṭa and his followers" (KLV, p. 280: *rasasya vākyārthībhāve ye rasavadalaṃkāram ud-bhaṭādayaḥ pratipannās tān prati dhvaniguṇībhūtavyaṅgyavādinācāryeṇa 'bhinno rasādyaḥkārād' ity 'ete ca rasavadādyalaṃkāra' iti ca vadatā svā-bhiprāyapratipādanam yad vihitam tad upajīvyaparasyeyam uktiḥ. upalakṣaṇībhūtam iti. vākyārthībhāvam anāpannam aṅgabhūtam apradhānam iti yāvat. tena mukhyavṛttīvaivodāttam etat, na rasavadalaṃkārapavādatvenety arthaḥ. anyatra tu rasavad iti. etatparyantā bhāṭṭodbhaṭādīnām uktiḥ*). For a discussion of this passage, see KRISHNAMOORTHY 1979b, pp. 304-305.

successors. Vāmana, for example, removed *rasa* from the domain of ornaments altogether and viewed its evocation as the doing of poetic virtues; Rudraṭa discussed it in a way that was simply unrelated to either ornaments or virtues; and Ānanda postulated it as a distinct goal of poetry that virtues and ornaments both enhance, but that necessitates the separate and hitherto-unknown semantic model of suggestion in order to be realized.¹⁴⁶

What we cannot say on the basis of the available textual evidence is whether Udbhaṭa privileged *rasa* in relation to other aesthetic factors (as Lala Ramayadupala Simha and Krishnamoorthy maintain, but without sufficiently conclusive evidence),¹⁴⁷ or at least explained how *rasa* and other literary devices work in tandem, and Indurāja's contradictory attempts to deal with this question suggest that he, too, found it difficult. The topic comes up three times in his commentary. First, apropos of *rasavat*, Indurāja raises the objection that the status of *rasa* and *bhāva* as ornaments of poetry (*kāvyaśāstra*) contradicts their nature as its very life breath (*kāvyaśāstra*). His response is that Udbhaṭa did not address this question because this would have forced him into a lengthy digression, suggesting, at the very least, that he believed this question was not germane to Udbhaṭa's efforts in this book.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁶ For a discussion of this evolution, see MCCREA 2008, pp. 50-54. For a later direct attack on the notion that *rasavat* and its sister devices can even be considered ornaments, see Kuntaka, *Vakroktijīvitā* 3.11-15.

¹⁴⁷ This argument has a long and twisted history. It begins with a mistaken transliteration of Udbhaṭa's KAISS by Jacob, where a verse that Indurāja cites about *rasa* as the soul of poetry (*Laghuvṛtti*, p. 83: *rasādyadhiṣṭhitam kāvyaṃ jīva-rūpatayā yataḥ | kathyate tad rasādīnām kāvyaśāstram vyavasthitam ||*) appears as part of the root text (JACOB 1897, p. 847; cf. JACOBI 1902-1903, p. 396). P.V. Kane and others have pointed out this mistake and argued that the entire argument is anachronistic (KANE 1951, p. 137; INGALLS 1990, p. 7). But Simha nonetheless believed that the verse, although clearly part of the commentary, could have been a citation from one of Udbhaṭa's lost texts and concluded that "Udbhaṭa is to be regarded as one of the great pioneers of Rasavāda holding Rasa to be the soul of poetry in the most unequivocal, unambiguous and unfeigned terminology," and Krishnamoorthy thought that Simha "rightly holds these verses are from the pen of Udbhaṭa himself" (SIMHA 1958, p. 126; KRISHNAMOORTHY 1979b, p. 307). But although Simha is right that there is nothing in the citational practices of Indurāja to prevent this from being the case, the positive evidence he marshals in favor of this strong argument is far from conclusive.

¹⁴⁸ *Laghuvṛtti*, p. 54: *rasānām bhāvānām ca kāvyaśāstrāḥ śāhetuvāt kiṃ kāvyaśāstra-kāratvam uta kāvyaśāstratvam itī na tāvad vicāryate granthagauravabhayāt. rasabhāvasvarūpaṃ cātra na vivecitam aprakṛtatvād bahuvaktavyatvāc ca. See*

Indurāja returns to this issue later in two independent essays that are found at the end of his commentary, and in which he propagates views that seem contradictory. The first of these is in the context of Udbhaṭa's innovative *kāvyaḥetu* ornament (also named *kāvyaḷiṅga*). This ornament involves reasoning that is poetic rather than logical, and for Indurāja this is an excuse to probe at length the nature of poetry and ask whether it even requires ornaments in order to be poetic. Here he approvingly quotes Vāmana's position that poetry necessitates only virtues and not ornaments because it is the former that (according to Vāmana) evoke *rasa*, the very soul of poetry. To support this view, he cites a verse by Amaru that involves the following scenario: a woman has accepted her lover after suffering long in his absence; they begin to make love; he mistakenly calls her by the name of another, but after quickly ascertaining that this slip was not overheard by anyone, she ignores it and resumes lovemaking. The point of the example is that it involves no ornament whatsoever (*na khalv atrārthālaṃkāraḥ kaścit paridrśyate*), and that what makes it poetic is the virtue (*guṇa*) of clarity, amplified by those of sweetness and forcefulness (*atha mādhuryaujobhyāṃ pari-br̥ṃhitasya prasādasya vidyamānatvāt kāvyarūpatā*). Indurāja then raises a lengthy objection that this verse lends itself to being cataloged as an instance of the ornament of *rasavat*, and it seems that this would likely have been Udbhaṭa's position. But Indurāja flatly rejects this objection in favor of a combination of the views of Vāmana and Ānanda: *rasa*, being the soul of poetry, cannot ornament it (*na khalu kāvyasya rasānāṃ cālaṃkāryālaṃkārabhāvaḥ, kiṃ tv ātmaśarīrabhāvaḥ*), and hence the verse proves that a poem needs virtues but can do without ornaments (*yuktam idam uktam niralaṃkāram api kāvyam saguṇam drśyate*).¹⁴⁹ The logical implication of this discussion is that Indurāja rejected Udbhaṭa's analysis of *rasa* through *rasavat* and similar ornaments precisely because it contradicted Vāmana's and Ānanda's.

However, in the concluding passages of his book, Indurāja revisits this issue in the process of arguing that all of Ānanda's categories of suggestion are compatible with ornaments the way Udbhaṭa

also MCCREA 2008, pp. 323-324.

¹⁴⁹ *Laghuvṛtti*, pp. 82-84. Abhinava later quotes the same Amaru verse as an example of *rasa* in short, single-stanza poems (*Locana*, p. 325).

analyzed them.¹⁵⁰ Interestingly, his example involving the suggestion of *rasa* through an ornament is very similar to the one just cited: a woman is making love to a man, he calls her by the name of another, and yet she cannot bring herself to draw away from him. Here Indurāja analyzes the verse in a way that is closely reminiscent of the view of the objector he just refuted, and he concludes that since *rasa* is suggested here through the ornament of *rasavat*, this, too, is a case where Ānanda's notion of suggestion is in agreement with Udbhaṭa's analysis of ornaments (*ato 'tra saṃbhogaśṛṅgārasyer-ṣyāvipralambhaśṛṅgāratirodhānahetoḥ pratīyamānatā. tatra ca pūrvaṃ rasavattvalakṣaṇo 'laṃkāraḥ pratīpādito rasavaddarśitety-ādinā. evaṃ rasāntareṣv api vācyam*).¹⁵¹ This implies that for Indurāja, Ānanda's notion of *rasadhvani* was not entirely incompatible with Udbhaṭa's *rasavat*. It is possible, perhaps, to make sense of Indurāja's apparently contradictory views if we understand that what he was trying to do here was to harmonize the views of all the leading voices of the field, Udbhaṭa, Vāmana, and Ānanda (perhaps with a special inclination to Vāmana, a favorite of his teacher Mukula Bhaṭṭa),¹⁵² although what is sacrificed in this effort is precisely how these scholars differed. In short, here Indurāja does not prove particularly helpful for the attempt to uncover Udbhaṭa's precise position on *rasa* in relation to other aesthetic factors, even if the very fact that he struggled to harmonize this position with those of Udbhaṭa's successors strongly suggests that they were not identical.

To conclude, my discussion so far leaves some questions unanswered but also leads to some surprising realizations. It turns out that Udbhaṭa, in pioneering the semanticization of poetics, offered what may have been a comprehensive linguistic model for poetry that was based on a broad vision of *abhidhāna* or *abhidhāvyāpāra* as he understood it. Taking inspiration from Mīmāṃsā models in general and Kumārila in particular, he explained how poetry worked on the basis of the various semantic capacities of this expanded

¹⁵⁰ *Laghuvṛtti*, p. 85: *nanu yatra kāvyē saḥṛdayaḥṛdayāhlādināḥ pradhānabhūtasya svaśabdavyāpārāsprṣṭatvena pratīyamānaikarūpasārthasya sadbhāvas tatra tathāvidhārthābhivyaktihetuḥ kāvyajīvitabhūtaḥ kaiścit saḥṛdayair dhvanir nāma vyañjakatvabhedātmā kāvyadharmo 'bhīhītaḥ sa kasmād iha nopadiṣṭaḥ? ucyate. eṣv evālaṃkāreṣv antarbhāvāt.*

¹⁵¹ *Laghuvṛtti*, p. 88.

¹⁵² McCREA 2008, pp. 265-266, n. 11. I am grateful to Lawrence McCrea for sharing with me his insights about Indurāja's possible Vāmana inclinations.

abhidhā, from the literal to the metaphoric and the implied, in a layered process that necessitated the description and analysis of various cognitive phases. And he was keenly interested in grounding the aesthetic effects of many, if not all, ornaments in their specific semantic processes and cognitive scenarios. It is this new analysis – the reconceptualization of ornaments as grounded in a spectrum of semantic-cognitive scenarios – that enabled him to take account, for the first time in the history of Sanskrit poetics, of the way *rasa*, up to then seriously dealt with only in dramaturgy, was realized in poetry as well. *Rasa* and its related factors were now seen as aesthetic responses that poetry could partly evoke, fully evoke, evoke in a way that might be mitigated by socioaesthetic considerations, evoke and then put to rest, and evoke in a way that supported but did not dominate the main action of the poem. All this was done through a set of literal and suggested semantic capacities and under the heading of a radically new subset of ornaments or, more precisely, old ornaments of which only the name remained. We know that *rasa* was an important topic in Udbhaṭa's thinking, both as a drama theorist and as a literary theorist, and thus his revolution of the *rasa* ornaments must have been central to his work as he saw it. And although we do not know whether Udbhaṭa also privileged *rasa* in relation to other ornaments, there is no reason to think that his analysis of it was in any way inconsistent or contradictory. True, his successors moved to extricate *rasa* from the realm of ornaments and eventually to make it altogether independent from ornamental processes, borrowing a great deal from him in the process. But when his model is evaluated in its own right and not through later prisms, it is easy to see why Udbhaṭa believed that he had the problem solved.

10. CONCLUDING REMARKS

What, we may now ask, was the precise nature of Ānandavardhana's innovation? He was not the first to turn the attention of Sanskrit literati from the poet to the reader. He was not the first to semanticize literary theory and connect poetry's aesthetic effects, on the one hand, and the layered modes of signification and cognition it necessitated, on the other. He was not the first to suggest sweeping aesthetic models that had hierarchy built into them and to import rather massively from Mīmāṃsā in the process. He was not the first to rethink the roles of *guṇa* and *alaṅkāra* in a single coherent theory. And he was not the first to turn his attention to *rasa* and *rasa*-related elements within such a model and to discuss how poetry can convey

them in ways that are distinct from drama. All these innovations belong, as I hope I have shown, in a short period of great creativity and investment in poetics as an academic discipline under the auspices of Jayāpīḍa or shortly after his reign. Ānanda's distinct innovation was to take these ideas and tendencies, all introduced a generation or two before him, and push them further, arguably to their logical conclusion, thereby creating a semantic-aesthetic model that was even more sweeping, even more hierarchical, and even more indebted to Mīmāṃsā.

Ānanda's key move was to postulate the existence of suggestion, an autonomous capacity of language that was distinct from *abhidhā*, and to argue that although it was operative in ornaments as well, it was also to be understood as separate and aesthetically superior. It was in suggestion, he famously asserted, that connoisseurs found the highest pleasures of poetry and, most important, the savoring of *rasa*, which he dubbed the soul of poetry, a process that happened independently of ornaments. Ānanda maintained, moreover, that his new, thoroughgoing model explained what poets had done all along, despite the fact that it had escaped the attention of theorists, even as under the various types of *dhvani* he often appropriated what his predecessors from the Jayāpīḍa moment had analyzed as ornaments or explained through their own semantic models.¹⁵³ And it was this last claim, as McCrea has convincingly demonstrated, that Ānanda's critics heatedly challenged in a debate that flared for two centuries. What the critics of Ānanda objected to – and this is criticism that he anticipated or perhaps had already faced – was his insistence that poetry's aesthetic effect necessitated the theorization of a new semantic-cognitive process outside the existing models of *alamkāra*, *abhidhā*, *guṇavṛtti*, *lakṣaṇā*, *adhyavasāna*, or even *anumāna*.¹⁵⁴

I take this later criticism of Ānanda to further substantiate my claim that the first main breakthrough of Sanskrit poetics took place before him, and that it was on the heels of it that he proposed his important secondary breakthrough. For it was during the Jayāpīḍa moment that all these semantic-cognitive models – from which Ānanda tried to distance himself and to which his critics tried to hold him – were first applied to the analysis of poetry, and unlike that of Ānanda, this earlier paradigm shift was not at all heralded by any

¹⁵³ For an example of this in the case of *śleṣa*, see BRONNER 2010, pp. 211-212.

¹⁵⁴ For an excellent study of this controversy, see MCCREA 2008, pp. 260-448.

prior development in the field. Moreover, against the standard deterministic approach to the history of Sanskrit poetics, it is important to stress that this initial breakthrough was not a natural event, somehow necessitated by an inherent potential or trajectory within the tradition, as the continued popularity of the alternative text of Daṇḍin throughout the Indian subcontinent and south, east, and far north of its borders can attest: the discourse on poetry did not have to be semanticized, and a dominant branch of it continued to thrive without this added theoretical burden. The same hindsight determinism also requires us to believe that the efforts of Ānanda and Abhinava were somehow bound to happen, and to ignore the opponents of Ānanda from within the tradition as petty critics who presumably failed to recognize this historical inevitability. It is high time that we move away from this partisan and deterministic view of Sanskrit poetics and approach its intellectual history with new questions and fresh eyes.

For example, we can try to historicize the dramatic changes that took place in Kashmiri poetics during the ninth century and the great influence literary thinkers from this small Himalayan valley later came to exercise far and wide. We may ask, for instance, what was so unusual about the court of Jayāpīḍa that it fueled a sudden investment in poetics, and what propelled it along a path modeled after other academic disciplines? These are questions that require more research, but I would like to point attention to one aspect of Jayāpīḍa's investments in the arts and the learning that seems particularly relevant. His court, as we learn from Kalhaṇa's report, actively recruited intellectuals who belonged to a vast range of disciplines and philosophical schools in a way that may have encouraged an interdisciplinary approach. Indeed, the court was highly tolerant of these scholars' denominations, if not actively encouraging diversity in this area. Remember, for example, that the list of pandits of this king ends, or culminates, with the rising sun of the Buddhist scholar Dharmottara, whom we have seen directly influenced Vāmana's rethinking of ornaments. It is perhaps not a coincidence that it was here, in this fertile setting that invited thinking across schools and theologies, that the erosion of boundaries between poetics and dramaturgy began, and that models from Mīmāṃsā, Buddhist epistemology, and other disciplines began to be applied to the study of poetry.

In this context it is particularly tempting to postulate that the various Udbhaṭas who worked in Kashmir at the turn of the ninth century – the grammarian, the logician, the Cārvāka scholar, the drama specialist, and the literary theorist – were a single person with multiple scholarly identities. There are three aspects of the preceding discussion that make this hypothesis particularly attractive. First, even if installing him as the president of the royal academy and making him the highest paid-academic in Kashmir’s history were primarily tied to his literary activities, as the immediate context of the list provided by Kalhaṇa suggests, the sectarian-theological identity of “this partisan of this-worldliness alone who considers himself the world’s greatest Cārvāka” as Vādi Devasūri has called him, did not stand in the way.¹⁵⁵ Thus this identity, if it is indeed confirmed, could validate the particularly open and tolerant atmosphere of Jayāpīḍa’s intellectual assembly. Second, as a writer on an astonishingly broad spectrum of disciplines who constantly strove to merge them – we know that he tried to combine logic with Cārvāka philosophy¹⁵⁶ – Udbhaṭa would have been the very epitome of the interdisciplinary ideal of the Jayāpīḍa moment, perhaps supplying us with yet another reason for his status as *sabhāpati*. Finally, and perhaps most intriguing, from the little we know about the works of the various Udbhaṭas from later citations, a surprisingly similar intellectual profile emerges of a bold innovator cloaked in the rather thin guise of a traditionalist. Udbhaṭa the grammarian, for example, was a “non-orthodox” Pāṇinian who suggested derivations that “strike us through their audacity”: he “does not hesitate to split a rule,” “reckless changes in some rules do not deter him,” and “he felt almost completely free from the traditional interpretations of Pāṇini’s grammar, most notably Patañjali and the author of the *Kāśīkā*.”¹⁵⁷ As a Cārvāka, he “deserted the traditional explanation” and “had given a different interpretation altogether” for the first two aphorisms of the *Bṛhaspatīsūtra*, then turned the long-accepted interpretation of another key dictum about the relationship between material objects and consciousness on its head (arguing that *bhūtebhyaḥ* in *bhūtebhyaś caitanyam* is in the dative rather than in the ablative case), and even went as far as propagating an unseen property of the material elements that underlies the human experiences of pleasure

¹⁵⁵ *paramalokāyatamanyena lokavyavahāraikapakṣapatinā*. This is from Vādi Devasūri’s *Syādvādaratnākara*, quoted in SOLOMON 1977-1978, p. 987.

¹⁵⁶ SOLOMON 1977-1978, p. 992; BHATTACHARYA 2010, p. 421.

¹⁵⁷ BRONKHORST 2008, pp. 293-296.

and pain – positions that have earned him the nickname “cunning/fraudulent Cārvāka” (*cārvākadhūrta*).¹⁵⁸ Indeed, R. Bhattacharya even doubts Udbhata’s Cārvāka leanings altogether, saying that “there is every reason to believe that he had hammered out a philosophical system of his own but instead of writing a new *sūtra* work... he had manipulated the Cārvāka aphorisms to present his singularly distinct point of view.”¹⁵⁹ In his commentary on Bharata’s *Nāṭya-śāstra*, Udbhata may have taken the license to emend the root text so as to introduce, for the first time in the history of this discourse, a new *rasa* on top of the original group of eight.¹⁶⁰ And in the field of poetics, as this essay demonstrates, he wore the mantle of a conservative who sought to enshrine Bhāmaha’s KAI as the tradition’s foundational text but had no qualms about radically and repeatedly redefining his predecessor’s concepts. Thus, while limiting himself to the basic set of ornaments supplied by Bhāmaha and following rather faithfully their original, unsystematic order in his KAISS, Udbhata unceremoniously nixed the very first device in Bhāmaha’s list (*yamaka*) and replaced it with a different ornament of his own invention (*punaruktavadābhāsa*), dramatically changed the understanding of the remaining ornaments (as we have seen in every case I have looked at), added others that directly contradicted his predecessor’s view (*kāvyaheṭu* is the most blatant example, given Bhāmaha’s stark opposition to the ornament *heṭu*), and he had no problem, in his *Vivaraṇa*, with hijacking Bhāmaha’s root text to have it serve his own purposes and support his notions of semantic models (*abhidhāna*) and cognitive scenarios (*ekadeśa*). Many of these moves have been noted by later commentators from within the respective traditions.

In fact, it may not be entirely a coincidence that none of the prose treatises that had an Udbhata as their author have survived: some of them may have seemed simply too provocative in later generations. After all, as Bronkhorst has noted, “Udbhata united in his person two intellectual traditions which were both destined to disappear

¹⁵⁸ Jayanta Bhaṭṭa uses the term anonymously in the *Nyāyamañjarī*, but the commentator Cakradhara makes the identification (*cārvākadhūrtas tv itī udbhata*). For more, see SOLOMON 1977-1978, pp. 988-989 and FRANCO 2011, p. 638. As Franco notes, Udbhata, “the most innovative Cārvāka,” was also ironically referred to in this text as “the well-instructed Cārvāka” (*ibid.*, the quote is from p. 637).

¹⁵⁹ BHATTACHARYA 2010, pp. 421-422.

¹⁶⁰ RAGHAVAN 1975, p. 13.

from Indian soil during the following centuries,” namely, the Cār-vāka philosophy and “freethinking” grammar that did not accept Patañjali as an authority.¹⁶¹ Whatever the truth of this may be, and regardless of the still-open question of the identity of the various Udbhaṭas, it is clear that history has not been particularly kind to the literary theorist of this name, whose seminal contribution was eclipsed by that of followers who were heavily influenced by him and the bulk of whose corpus was lost. Further understanding of this prolific, original, and influential thinker depends to a large extent on the prospects of its recovery in the future. But it is important to remember that his now-lost works remained available for centuries to scholars inside and well beyond Kashmir, and their massive reliance on his works on poetics and dramaturgy, together with the information provided by Kalhaṇa, supports the main argument of this essay. Kashmiri thinkers like Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, Abhinavagupta, Mukula Bhaṭṭa, Mahima Bhaṭṭa, Mammaṭa, Tilaka, Ruyyaka, Indurāja, and Sahadeva and non-Kashmirians such as Hemacandra, Rājaśekhara, Bhoja, the author of the KLV, and many others all quoted Udbhaṭa extensively, and many of them credited him for his discoveries and explicitly viewed his contribution as a turning point in the tradition’s thinking. It is hard to imagine the further evolution of Sanskrit poetics, including but by no means limited to the DhvĀ of Ānanda, who was also influenced by Udbhaṭa even in his *Devīśataka*, without understanding the seminal contribution of Udbhaṭa and the Jayāpīḍa moment more generally.

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