

## ***Vastutas tu: Methodology and the New School of Sanskrit Poetics***

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**Abstract** Recognizing newness is a difficult task in any intellectual history, and different cultures have gauged and evaluated novelty in different ways. In this paper we ponder the status of innovation in the context of the somewhat unusual history of one Sanskrit knowledge system, that of poetics, and try to define what in the methodology, views, style, and self-awareness of Sanskrit literary theorists in the early modern period was new. The paper focuses primarily on one thinker, Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja, the most famous and influential author on poetics in the seventeenth century, and his relationship with his important sixteenth-century predecessor, Appayya Dīkṣita. We discuss Jagannātha's complex system of labeling of ideas as "new" and "old," the new essay style that he used to chart the evolution of ideas in his tradition, his notion of himself as an independent thinker capable of improving the system created by his predecessors in order to protect its essential assets, and the reasons his critique of Appayya was so harsh. For both scholars what emerges as new is not so much their opinions on particular topics as the new ways in which they position themselves in relation to their system.

**Keywords** *Alaṃkāraśāstra* · Appayya Dīkṣita · Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja · Newness · *Rasagāṅādhara* · Sanskrit poetics

Recognizing newness is an important yet difficult task in any intellectual history. Since every creative effort deviates in some way from its precedents and, in that sense, is new, when one speaks of newness one has to discern between levels or orders of innovation—between what is radically new and

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what is only normatively so. Here, Thomas Kuhn's distinction between the progress of "normal science" and moments of paradigmatic shift comes to mind. Yet as this distinction is rooted in the context of Western science with its basic ethos of progress, its applicability to traditions which do not share the premises of modern science is questionable.

In fact, there are probably no hard and fast rules for what could count as a "true" innovation. Evaluations of novelty in a given intellectual tradition must take into account that tradition's notion of knowledge, its concept of innovation, the ways in which it brands things as new, its specific concerns, and its particular history. For the Sanskrit traditions of knowledge, one immediately recalls Sheldon Pollock's description of an ideological stance in which "knowledge of every variety ... is fixed in its dimensions ... [and] does not change or grow, but is frozen" and that hence "there can be no conception of progress." Innovations are thus "viewed, through the inverting lens of ideology, as renovation and recovery" of knowledge permanently fixed.<sup>1</sup>

To what extent this ideology is still accepted when, during the seventeenth century, writers in various disciplines "begin to label themselves and their opponents as 'navya' or new scholars" is a question that Pollock has already raised in a later essay,<sup>2</sup> and perhaps this volume may contribute to answering it. But one may also ask how universally this ideology was held even prior to the seventeenth century, and how applicable it is to a discipline like Sanskrit poetics. This, after all, is a field which from its earliest extant texts is at least partly based on an observation of the practice of the poets,<sup>3</sup> while the poets, for their part, constantly prize and emphasize the importance of innovation.<sup>4</sup> As we mention below, Abhinavagupta's treatment of understandings of *rasa* implies a notion, perhaps shared by others, of gradual advancement in theory. Indeed, the theoretical innovations celebrated by Abhinava's predecessor Ānandavardhana, as is well known, radically transformed the tradition in a fashion akin to a Kuhnian paradigm shift (McCrea 1998). Thus, the approach of *alaṃkāraśāstra* to the status of knowledge and to the possibility of new intellectual discoveries is potentially more nuanced and complex than in other Sanskrit disciplines.

This complexity is at least partly rooted in the unique nature and history of poetics, compared to other Sanskrit systems of knowledge. As a discipline *alaṃkāraśāstra* occupies a position intermediate between two groups of *śāstras*: on the one side are the Veda-related sciences and derivative philosophical systems, and on the other are the practical and artistic discourses. Through its focus on poetic language and texts, *alaṃkāraśāstra* has strong and obvious ties to its more senior siblings, grammar and Vedic hermeneutics

<sup>1</sup> Pollock (1985, p. 515).

<sup>2</sup> Pollock (2001, pp. 6–7).

<sup>3</sup> Daṇḍin, *Kāvya-darśa* 1.2 : *pūrva-śāstrāṇi saṃhṛtya prayogān upalakṣya ca*, a passage already noted by Pollock himself (1985, p. 510).

<sup>4</sup> See Bronner, Shulman, and Tubb, forthcoming.

(*mīmāṃsā*), and, less directly, to logic. Yet the category of the texts that it deals with is not scriptural or expository but literary, and the discipline, like its subject matter, is of much later origin. This may partly explain the fact that it has no recognized foundational treatise, unlike the paradigmatic *śāstras* we have mentioned. The *sūtras* that stand at the head of systems like grammar, hermeneutics, and logic command at least verbal allegiance throughout their systems' histories, which they shape in easily discernible ways.

In contrast, *ālamkāraśāstra* proceeds in a noticeably freewheeling manner, with the discussions flowing from several starting points with many crosscurrents, backwaters, and fresh springs. In formal terms alone, the contrast with the older *śāstras* is striking: whereas in logic or in grammar one can easily find examples of commentaries upon commentaries six or seven levels deep, in poetics a sub-commentary is a rare event. Even where we see one scholar following another, the source is usually not acknowledged. We do not wish to overstate this fluidity; some features of the tradition of poetics were persistent in a way that recently led Pollock to refer to its "habit of sedimentation."<sup>5</sup> Yet this sedimentation took place in a highly turbulent current, wherein, for instance, the relative importance of certain categories was highly contested.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, this persistence should not be seen as sedimentation in the sense in which Husserl used the term: in his discussions of the history of science he used the word to refer to received truths whose origin in actual experience has been forgotten,<sup>7</sup> but in Sanskrit poetics it is precisely the ongoing experience of the expert reader that is repeatedly, and perhaps increasingly, appealed to in the discussion of these categories.

In short we have here a system of knowledge that appears to restart itself in various times and places, and the history of its innovations is bound to be complicated by its nuanced relationship with an ever-evolving practice. Against the backdrop of this constant change and influx of new poetic materials, real newness would mean not merely the introduction of a particular opinion on a specific topic, nor even a change in the method of dealing with a certain group of topics, but a shift in the overall orientation of *ālamkārikas*, one that would involve not simply the fact that they innovate but the way in which they do it. Our method in detecting and evaluating such an innovation thus consists of a close and historically backed inspection of the methodology of the Sanskrit poetics themselves. For a true change, we believe, must have involved a conscious transformation in their approach to their scholarly field, if not in their self-conception as intellectuals.

<sup>5</sup> Pollock (2003, p. 43).

<sup>6</sup> This turbulence also has to do with the fact that the conclusions of individual *ālamkārikas* were often drawn from the stances of other *śāstras*, and their methods were often an application of the differing approaches of these mutually contesting disciplines.

<sup>7</sup> Husserl (1970, pp. 353–378) ("The Origins of Geometry").

## Labeling as a Method

Does such a dramatic shift take place in *alaṃkāraśāstra* of the late precolonial era? Not if we are to believe scholars such as Sushil Kumar De, who deemed the intellectual products of the period particularly unoriginal, so that he found the very task of dealing with them tedious.<sup>8</sup> Nonetheless, the language of the texts themselves suggests a strong sense of something fresh happening on a large scale, in the works of scholars who begin, for the first time, to use in profusion terms such as “new” (e.g., *navya*) and “old” (e.g., *prācīna*) in reference to particular views and viewers.<sup>9</sup>

What are we to make of these labels? Is their use simply chronological? Is it merely postural? Is it meaningless or deliberately misleading? Does it refer to developments within the system, or to the importation of something already labeled as new elsewhere (e.g., the new language of *navya-nyāya* logic)? Moreover, what method should we use in judging what is new? One way to begin (novel as it may seem) is with a careful reading of representative passages in which these labels are applied to identifiable sources. Their use suggests a methodology in the texts themselves. Here we present a single case study, the encyclopedic *Rasaṅgādhara* of Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja, the most famous and influential work on poetics in the seventeenth century, which has already been singled out by Pollock in his discussion of such labels,<sup>10</sup> and which we view as a work embodying a highly innovative trend.

A survey of these labels in Jagannātha’s work reveals at once that they are not merely chronological in any simple way. For him, the boundary between “old” and “new” shifts, depending on the topic and its history. These terms do not really refer to people and their dates; in fact, in none of the places where Jagannātha uses the word “new” does he identify by name the person or work he has in mind. He always uses the term in connection with an idea on one side of a conceptual dividing line. This dividing line is flexible, as it is located at different chronological points in reference to different issues.

For instance, on the question of how to conceptualize suggestion in poetry, the obvious turning point is Ānandavardhana (c. 850), and on this topic those coming prior to him, beginning with Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa, are labeled “older.”<sup>11</sup> But on the question of whether phonemes are suggestive of *rasas* or only of *guṇas*, Ānanda’s view is labeled “old” (*prāñcaḥ*) and those who hold the opposing view are called “new” (*navyāḥ*).<sup>12</sup>

Very often, though, the dividing line is later. Jagannātha’s very first use of the word *prāñcaḥ* introduces the traditional definition of poetry, which he is

<sup>8</sup> De (1960, p. 2.252).

<sup>9</sup> Pollock (2001, 8ff).

<sup>10</sup> Pollock (2001, pp. 15–16).

<sup>11</sup> *Rasaṅgādhara* of Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja (hereafter abbreviated *RG*), p. 555 (*paryāyokta* section): *dhvani-kārāt prācīnair bhāmahodbhāṭa-prabhṛtibhiḥ*.

<sup>12</sup> *RG* pp. 133–134 (*rasa-sāmlakṣyakramatā* section): ... *vyañjakatāyāḥ siddhir iti prāñcaḥ, ... rasānām tadguṇānām cābhivyakti-ṣiṣayatēti tu navyāḥ*.

about to refute. According to this “old” notion, poetry consists of a balanced combination of words and their meanings. Jagannātha argues that poetry consists of words alone, and that these produce a beautiful meaning. Here the old view is clearly that of Mammaṭa, since it is quoted verbatim from his *Kāvyaṣaṣṭakāśa* (c. 1100).<sup>13</sup> Indeed, throughout the *Rasaṅgādhara*, Mammaṭa remains the most frequent spokesperson for the older tradition of poetics, since his *Kāvyaṣaṣṭakāśa*, which systematically incorporates the *dhvani* theory, had become its discipline’s classical treatise. Jagannātha recognizes this status when he sometimes refers to Mammaṭa as the final authority on the old school.<sup>14</sup>

Yet the dividing line between old and new is, at times, drawn still later, and again it is the topic that makes a difference. Ruyyaka, who worked at the beginning of the twelfth century, represents an advancement over Mammaṭa in Jagannātha’s eyes. However, he too is often taken to give voice to the “old” views. As an example, Jagannātha explicitly refers to Ruyyaka and his followers as “old” (*prācīna*) in his discussion of *pariyāyokta*.<sup>15</sup> The choice of Ruyyaka here is meaningful, for he represents an intermediate position between the older view of Mammaṭa and the radically new position of Appayya Dīkṣita. Ruyyaka is, perhaps, the first to come up with a clear solution for a problem which was not satisfactorily explained by Mammaṭa, namely how to distinguish between *pariyāyokta* and *aprasūtāpraśamsā*. For Ruyyaka, when a contextual effect implies a contextual cause it is *pariyāyokta*, and when the implication is occasioned by a non-contextual effect, it is *aprasūtāpraśamsā*. This distinction is totally rejected by Appayya, who revises the entire apportionment of figures involving such implication. Thus, Ruyyaka’s contribution is distinctive enough to deserve, here as elsewhere, individual notice from Jagannātha. It is therefore intermediate but still on the traditional side of the dividing line.

In this example, as in other places in Jagannātha’s book, it is Appayya Dīkṣita (mid-sixteenth century), Jagannātha’s great nemesis, who is the implied *navya* on a particular topic. But, to complete our list of shifting dividing lines, there are cases where Jagannātha places the “new” view in opposition to Appayya himself. Thus, in the debate over the figure *atiśayokti*, the *navyas* are said to refute what was written by Appayya in his *Kuvalayānanda*.<sup>16</sup>

It is thus evident that Jagannātha uses these apparently chronological terms in a flexible and nuanced way. Indeed, he is clearly aware of historical developments within the “old” system. This he indexes with the use of finer labels. For instance, when speaking on the question of the number of poetic

<sup>13</sup> RG p. 4 (*kāvyaṣaṣṭakāśa* section): *yat tu prācīnaḥ “adoṣau sa-guṇau sālankārau śabdārthau kāvyam” ity āhuḥ.*

<sup>14</sup> E.g., RG p. 57 (*rasabheda* section): ... *iti hi prācīnaḥ siddhāntāt*, referring to a quotation from *Kāvyaṣaṣṭakāśa sūtras* 48–49.

<sup>15</sup> RG p. 554 (*pariyāyokta* section): ... *ity alaṅkārasarvasva-kārādibhiḥ prācīnair ity āhuḥ*.

<sup>16</sup> RG p. 414 (*atiśayokti* section): *iti kuvalayānande yad uktaṁ tan nirastam iti navyāḥ.*

qualities (*guṇas*) Jagannātha recognizes Mammaṭa as a proponent of the doctrine of three *guṇas*. But he also refers to the older notion of 10 *guṇas*, and labels its holders as “even older” (*jarattara*).<sup>17</sup> In addition, the term *ciraṃtana* (ancient) is used only when speaking of Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa whom Jagannātha sees as the founding fathers of the discipline.<sup>18</sup>

Moreover, a further fine distinction in Jagannātha’s terminology seems to correspond to an evaluative aspect of his methodology. He tends to use the word *prācīna* in referring to older views that still deserve respect, and the term *prāc* in referring to older views that have become outmoded and are hence to be rejected. Given the frequency of these terms the details of their use are complex, but the contrast between them is especially clear in passages where they are used together to refer to different evaluations. An example is when Jagannātha complains that an opponent is abandoning the stance of courtesy to traditional views (*prācīna-mukha-dākṣiṇyam*) and is refusing to make the older sources into authorities (*naiva prāmāṅikurmahe vayaṃ ... prācaḥ*).<sup>19</sup> Here, as in many other places, the word *prācīna* has a positive connotation, and the word *prāc* does not.

By this point it should be clear that this system of labels is by no means simple or straightforward. It rests on an awareness of ideas whose nature and chronology shift from topic to topic, and indicates a series of conceptual dividing lines. It carries historical nuances reflected, for example, in the different shades of meaning in words such as *ciraṃtana* and *jarattara*. Furthermore, it embodies value judgments of a complicated kind. Such labels, however, are not enough in themselves to explain Jagannātha’s understanding of newness. Do the proponents of these “new” views constitute a new movement and, if so, what are the features of the movement? This question can be answered only if we go beyond the labels, and consider the contents of the views presented under them and the overall context in which they are presented.

## The New View of *Rasa* and the New Essay Style

Consider, for example, the very first use of the word *navya* in the *Rasagāṅgādhara*. The question being discussed is the precise nature of the aesthetic experience called *rasa*, which had come to be considered the most important goal of Sanskrit poetry, and hence forms the first word in the title of Jagannātha’s treatise. What Jagannātha labels as the new view of *rasa* is, of course, set against the famous theory of Abhinavagupta. For Abhinavagupta, *rasa* is an experience that occurs in the spectator of a play or in a reader of a

<sup>17</sup> *RG* pp. 69–70 (*guṇa* section): *jarattarās tu ... iti daśa śabda-guṇān, daśāiva cārtha-guṇān āmananti.*

<sup>18</sup> E.g., *RG* p. 499 (*samāsokti* section): *... iti bhāmahôdbhaṭa-prabhṛtīnām ciraṃtanānām āsayaḥ.*

<sup>19</sup> *RG* pp. 487–488 (*sahokti* section): *yadī tu ... iti vibhāvyaṭe, nīrasyate ca prācīna-mukha-dākṣiṇyam tadā ... prācīnā eva sahoṅkteḥ pṛthag-alaṅkāratāyāṃ pramāṇam. anyathā evaṃ-jātyōpaplavena bahu vyākūṭsiyāt. nāiva prāmāṅikurmahe vayaṃ mṛṣā mukulīta-vilocanān prācaḥ, nīveśyatām cēyam alaṅkāratara-bhavanôdarāṃ varākī iti tu prabhūtaiva kevalā, na sahrdayatvam.*

poem in response to the characters' suggested emotions. According to his theory, the spectator identifies, on the basis of his own past experience, with this emotion in its universalized form, and because of this depersonalization the resulting aesthetic experience is essentially the unveiled consciousness of the self. Obviously this view rests on Vedānta-style metaphysics, according to which the eternal self is ordinarily obscured by practical entanglements.

The new view, as described by Jagannātha, has more in common with the rival epistemology of the logicians (*naiyāyikas*). In this view the aesthetic experience of *rasa* is based on a temporary identification with a fictive character, made possible by the reader's sensitivity, which is theoretically analyzed as a form of a cognitive defect (*doṣa*). It is this "defect" that allows the spectator or reader to feel, while the illusion lasts, the character's emotion, such as love for a person in the play or poem. Here the *navyas*, as presented by Jagannātha, audaciously invert Abhinavagupta's classical metaphor. For Abhinavagupta the *rasa* experience results from the removal of a veil (*bhagnāvaraṇā cit*); in the "new" view, it results from the imposition of a veil (*avacchādite svātmani*).<sup>20</sup>

Thus, the new position moves away from mysticism and metaphysics to a more mundanely oriented psychology. This same contrast is clearly apparent in the ways in which the two views deal with the question of how *rasa* experience can be enjoyable even if the underlying emotions are not in themselves pleasant. In Abhinavagupta's view, the question receives an automatic and extreme answer in the mystical doctrine of the inherently blissful nature of the self, which needs only to be unveiled to shine forth. For the *navyas*, the answer must be more complicated. For them it is not clear, to begin with, that the experience of *rasa* is purely blissful, and they at least allow the possibility that the identification with a suffering character may produce a mixture of pleasure and pain. But in either case, there will be more pleasure than pain, because poetry has the power to produce pleasure and, if necessary, to block pain. Jagannātha gives the example of sandal paste, which has its negative sides—the chore of preparing it and its texture once it is dried—yet people enjoy using it because the coolness and fragrance it produces give comparatively greater pleasure.<sup>21</sup>

In all of this, of course, it is difficult to say where Jagannātha is reporting the statements of others and where he is interpreting or enhancing their views. But there are places where he explicitly demarcates his interventions. It is characteristic of Jagannātha's method that in presenting the classical and new views on *rasa* he cannot refrain from suggesting refinements of both. Even his initial presentation of Abhinava's theory—that *rasa* is an emotion qualified by the unveiling of the self—is a paraphrase, extracting what he takes to be the logical import of views expressed by Abhinava in various places. Yet

<sup>20</sup> RG p. 27 (*rasa* section): ... *bhagnāvaraṇa-cid-viśiṣṭo raty-ādiḥ sthāyī bhāvo rasaḥ*; and p. 30: ... *doṣasya mahimnā kalpita-duṣyantatvāvacchādite svātmany ajñānānvacchinne ... raty-ādir eva rasaḥ*.

<sup>21</sup> RG pp. 31–32.

Jagannātha insists on pressing his own account of this view to its more rigorous formulation in which *rasa* is the unveiled consciousness itself, qualified by the emotion. This improvement he flags with the set phrase *vastutas tu*, “but really.”<sup>22</sup> When he turns to the view of the *navyas*, he first describes the reader’s identification with the character as resting on a cognitive defect of an extraordinary nature—it cannot be described as real or unreal. Here too Jagannātha presses forward to a stricter and clearer version, in which no mysterious status is allowed. The experience of the spectator or reader is simply a cognitive error, delightful though it may be. The reader is temporarily misled by the power of poetry, and the normal apparatus of epistemology is sufficient to explain this process. Here Jagannātha does not mark the improved version as his own, but ascribes it to “others” (*pare*).<sup>23</sup>

Jagannātha does not tell us which view he agrees with. In fact, although throughout the *Rasaṅgādhara* he makes general statements about contemporary discourse (*ādhunika*), in which he is clearly a participant, and although he occasionally refers to people who share his views on particular points (*mādrśāḥ*),<sup>24</sup> Jagannātha never explicitly calls himself “new.” In arriving at our own estimation of the nature of his newness, therefore, we cannot simply rely on his system of labels, revealing as it may be. Rather, we need to view it within the context of his overall method, in comparison to that of his predecessors. And, here too the discussion on *rasa* is a useful example.

The differing views on the nature of *rasa* had long before been treated extensively by Abhinavagupta, in an apparently chronological manner. Abhinava begins with the *rasa sūtra* itself, the terse and enigmatic sentence defining *rasa*, attributed to the ancient sage Bharata. Commenting on Bharata’s work, Abhinavagupta describes the development of increasingly sophisticated views on the meaning of this *sūtra*, associating each distinct view with the name of a particular thinker. Abhinavagupta’s real purpose in retelling the history of the *rasa* discussion is to impose upon it a linear narrative in which his own view is the triumphant culmination.

Jagannātha’s arrangement is quite different. He begins with Abhinavagupta’s position, presumably in recognition of its classical status. This is in line with his overall practice of identifying the established views of the past. But then he turns to a presentation of the older opinion of Bhaṭṭanāyaka, which has already been refuted by Abhinavagupta. Clearly, then, it is not a concern for chronology which determines the order of presentation, but rather an interest in the interrelationships of ideas. Jagannātha mentions Bhaṭṭanāyaka here because certain questions raised in his explanations will be addressed in the immediately following position, that of the *navyas*. After describing the new view and the refinement of it that we have mentioned, Jagannātha goes on to record several other views, covering 11 positions in all.

<sup>22</sup> *RG* pp. 27–28 (*rasa* section): *vastutas tu vakṣyamāṇa-śruti-svārasena...*

<sup>23</sup> *RG* pp. 32–33 (*rasa* section): *pare tu ... ity api vadanti.*

<sup>24</sup> *RG* p. 555 (*paryāyokta* section): *tair ... ādhunikānām vāco-yuktir ayuktāiva*; and p. 69 (*guṇa* section): *... upacāro nāiva kalpya iti tu mādrśāḥ.*

Most strikingly, Jagannātha then ends precisely where Abhinava begins, by quoting the *rasa sūtra*. He summarizes his review of the various possible theories on the nature of aesthetic experience in what amounts to tabular form, by showing how each of the words of the *sūtra* would be interpreted using each of the viable views he has discussed. Here again we can see how his goal differs from Abhinava's. Rather than aiming at showing how his own view is the ultimate fulfillment of the *sūtra*, he is interested in exposing how different ideas would work in making sense of the ancient dictum. His focus is unquestionably on the history of ideas.

### Fearless Observer, Fierce Participant

Jagannātha uses the same basic method throughout his book. On each topic he finds significant, he writes a similar essay on the history of the ideas involved. Overall, this is the most innovative feature in the work of Jagannātha and some of his contemporaries, as compared to Abhinavagupta and Ruyyaka, the two most historically aware scholars in the older tradition.<sup>25</sup>

In his capacity as an historian of ideas, Jagannātha mentions very few names. He is interested more in ideas on their own merits than in persons, and he focuses more on the structural aspects of poetic theories than on their pure chronology—although he does not ignore chronology, and we have seen how much attention he gives to distinctions between old and a new, where this is important on the level of ideas.

In fact, as an historian he very often declines to side with any one view, as we have seen in his essay on *rasa*, and he is more inclined to chart the discussion than to participate in it. In such cases, his own intervention consists of occasionally emending the views he presents. In doing so he applies unprecendently demanding standards of intellectual rigor, consistency, parsimony, and clarity. He also enjoys restating views in the up-to-date jargon of *navyanīyāya*. His stance is that of an independent but thoroughly knowledgeable observer, free from any commitment other than to his own intellectual honesty. He occasionally even tells us of *alaṃkāraśāstra*'s independence from other systems of thought.<sup>26</sup> In this stance he resembles the audacious and commonsensical position he at times calls "*navya*."

<sup>25</sup> Ruyyaka's *Alaṃkārasarvasva* offers a restructuring of the system of poetic figures. Its brief historical preface, narrating the evolution leading to Anandavardhana's theory of suggestion, is really an apology for his focus on the ornamenting devices of poetry, rather than on what they ornament (suggested *rasa*). Ruyyaka's method in the work itself is analytical but not historical. Abhinavagupta's two works on poetics are commentaries on other works; in both, the discussion of *rasa* contains his own greatest contribution to the field, and the most notable example of something approaching an essay, although, as we have seen, with an approach quite different from Jagannātha's.

<sup>26</sup> E.g., on grammar, *RG* p. 396 (*utprekṣā* section): *na ca vaiyākaraṇa-mata-virodho dūṣaṇam iti vācyam, svatantratvenālaṃkārika-tantrasya tad-virodhasyāduṣaṇatvāt*. And on *nīyāya*, *RG* p. 697 (*sāmānya* section): *nahi pramāna-vibhājakānām naiyāyikānām ivālaṃkārikānām api saraṇiḥ*.

However, in addition to his persona of an observer standing aloof, as it were, there is another Jagannātha, who does participate in the discussion in a very personal and heated way whenever he mentions Appayya Dīkṣita. Here, there is no question of neutrality; much energy goes to attacking this close predecessor, who, as we have said, is often the implied *navya*. This nemesis is alternatively criticized for following an old-fashioned view or for breaking with the tradition. More specifically, he is ridiculed both for the extent of his dependence on Ruyyaka and for doing injustice to Ruyyaka's treatise.

References to Appayya cover the range from saying that he is simply wrong (*tan na, tan nirastam*), to not-so-subtle sarcastic remarks ("the bull of the Dravidians"), to outright nastiness ("this whole thing sounds good only if you don't think about it").<sup>27</sup> Or take the combination of personal reference and critical remark: "that proclamation by the most venerable crown jewel of the Dravidians is also downright ugly."<sup>28</sup>

Clearly Jagannātha's own personality plays a role in these diatribes; he can occasionally be just as cruel in attacking Ruyyaka, whom he considers Appayya's guru. But it would be a great mistake to think that his campaign against Appayya is unrelated to his interest in the history of his *śāstra*. In fact, the actual content of his complaints against Appayya, considered in separation from the nastiness of his style, betrays a concern for fundamental issues. The real dispute has to do, at its core, with competing attitudes toward the received tradition of Sanskrit poetics.

Appayya and Jagannātha have some things in common, which might serve as a capsule description of the concerns of the new poeticians. In the most general terms what they all share is a confidence in their own ability to explain things more accurately and more professionally, as implied in their frequent opener "*vastutas tu*," and also a new intellectual freedom and rigor. More specifically, we find in their works the following features: the essay style we have mentioned with its acute interest in the history of ideas, explicit attentiveness to intellectual developments in other disciplines, sophisticated knowledge of theories of semantics, a growing tendency to use the *navya-nyāya* terminology, and an attempt to deal more consistently and openly with the role of subjective experience. They share also an ambivalent view of the past, and correspondingly their aim is both to preserve their inherited system and to improve it in the ways they find necessary.

Jagannātha and Appayya come to this shared task of preservation from somewhat different backgrounds. Jagannātha was originally from the southern region of Telangana (in today's Andhra Pradesh). Yet he went up to Delhi, where he was associated with the Mughal court, and eventually to Banaras and Mathura. Appayya, as Jagannātha so often snidely reminds us, was from the Tamil country in the deep South; his connections were with a different cultural and political world. Moreover, Jagannātha identifies with the poeticians of Kashmir, who dominated *alaṃkāraśāstra* for many centuries. Appayya

<sup>27</sup> RG p. 551 (*paryāyokta* section): *tat sarvam avicārīta-ramaṇīyam eva*.

<sup>28</sup> RG p. 238 (*upamā* section): *draviḍa-śīromaṇibhir [yad] abhyadhīyata tad apy ahr̥dyam eva*.

is the greatest champion of the ancient scholar Daṇḍin, who despite being largely shunned in Kashmir was very popular in Southern India and beyond. Jagannātha never mentions Daṇḍin and discusses his views only indirectly, in the course of attacking Appayya. The two also have different intellectual tendencies beyond the discipline of poetics. Appayya is famous as a Vedāntin and grammarian; Jagannātha is in practice more a logician.

Some of these contrasts may be related to their fundamental difference of opinion, on the question of how to preserve the viability of a vulnerable knowledge system. While pretending to be merely repeating the words of his predecessors, Appayya sets out to thoroughly revise the overall framework of figures of speech. More specifically, he seems to be attempting to correct the course of a tradition which he believes has gone too far in the direction of transferring figurative phenomena into the realm of suggestion (*dhvani*). He sees this as an unjustified shrinking of the analytical power of the traditional category of the *alaṃkāra*. In compensation, he not only re-expands the scope of some of the old *alaṃkāras* and reorganizes their subtypes, but even creates new ones. Along the way he also adds new categories for features of poetic practice that he feels had escaped notice. The result of these changes is a significantly revised system of *alaṃkāras*.<sup>29</sup>

Jagannātha sees all this as dangerous. He believes that the system as it stands has arrived, through a long process of evolution, at a state of delicate equilibrium, and that tinkering with the basic categories will inevitably disrupt it. Unlike Appayya, he sees no need to single out poetic passages that have been analyzed as types of suggestion and relocate them in newly established *alaṃkāra* categories. Time after time he warns that theoretical chaos will result from loosening the inherited framework of analysis. He is particularly worried about Appayya's course-changing agenda, and is thus opposed, in principle, to the addition of entirely new categories or subcategories. For example, when Appayya introduces a new fourfold division of the figure *vyājastuti*, Jagannātha says:

If you are going to break the dam of the old conventions, and follow the path of your own whims ... there will be massive confusion. If you object, "In that case where am I to fit the four subtypes I just described?", then take it from me: leave them in the fold of suggestion. Because it will never be possible to fit all the endless types of suggestion into the small puddle of figurative analysis.<sup>30</sup>

Jagannātha is consistent in his objections to fiddling with the tradition's fundamental structure, even where the blame is not Appayya's. A conspicuous example is his repeated insistence that *bhakti*, or religious devotion, must not

<sup>29</sup> See Bronner (2004, p. 67).

<sup>30</sup> *RG* pp. 561–562 (*vyājastuti* section): *yadī tu prācīna-saṃketa-setuṃ nirbhīdya sva-ruci-ramaṇīyā saraṇīr ādriyate ... bahu vyākūli-syāt. evaṃ tarhi pūrvōktaṃ prakāra-catuṣṭayaṃ kutrāntarbhavatu? iti cet, vyaṅgya-bhedeṣy iti grhāṇa. nahi vyaṅgya-bhedāḥ sarve 'py a-paramitā alaṃkāra-prakāra-goṣpade 'ntarbhāvayitūṃ śakyaṃte.* For a similar controversy involving these two scholars see Bronner and Tubb (2008).

be inserted as an additional category of *rasa*, an innovation that had been urged by the Vaiṣṇava Goswamins and others.<sup>31</sup> Still, Jagannātha is far from believing that the received system should be left untouched. He thinks that what is called for is not a restructuring but a fine-tuning. He constantly exposes the statements of his predecessors to the bright light of his own strict standards and offers refinements of existing categories. A good part of this refurbishing is based on Jagannātha's concern for logical rigor. While the language of his analysis owes much to the new school of logic, the principles of classification he claims to apply are those that he describes as a legacy from the old writers on *alaṃkāraśāstra*.

### Method and Self-awareness

Jagannātha depicts his complex stance toward the past in an opening verse:<sup>32</sup>

Even if some of the leading critics add their own touch to these topics, still my effort will by no means be in vain. Even if these big fish continue to thrash around in the ocean, does that remove the achievement of the churning mountain?

The tradition of poetics is like the rich and vast milky ocean, deep inside of which lie waiting the invaluable treasures left by the masters of the past. The “big fish” of contemporary scholarship, despite all their exertions, can only stir up the waters on the surface. Only Jagannātha can do what the great churning mountain of Indian mythology is said to have done, which is to work so deeply and thoroughly within the ocean as to bring those treasures within view. The role of the new poetician is not to ruffle the body of analysis but to redeem it; to turn back to the history of his tradition and rescue from it what is already there.

This general attitude is traceable also in the work of Jagannātha's greatest opponent. Like Jagannātha, Appayya sees much of recent scholarship as misguided. He believes that there are important things to be recovered from the past and that only a deeply penetrating examination can recover them. We have seen important differences between them in their actual procedures, how Appayya wants to rework the organizational structure and Jagannātha wants to preserve the structure but refine its contents. An additional difference between the two is their mode of self-presentation. In his own works Appayya begins by claiming to merely repeat what was already said by the elders, but

<sup>31</sup> The theory of *bhaktirasa* was first proposed clearly by the grammarian Vopadeva while commenting on the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, was made famous by Rūpa Gosvāmin in his *Ujvalanīlamanī* and *Bhaktirāsāmṛtasindhu*, and was supported thereafter not only by followers of Caitanya such as Kavikarṇapūra in his *Alaṃkāraśāstra*, but also by others such as Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his *Bhagavadbhaktirāsāyana*; see Raghavan 1975: 142–154.

<sup>32</sup> RG p. 3: *parīṣkurvantv arthān sahrdaya-dhurīṇāḥ katipaye tathāpi kleśo me kathamapi gatārtho na bhavitā /timīndrāḥ samkṣobhaṃ vidadhatu payodheḥ punar ime kim etenāyāso bhavati viphalo mandara-gireḥ //*

then proceeds to vigorously reconfigure their categories.<sup>33</sup> Jagannātha claims to re-churn the entire ocean of poetics but then proceeds to stubbornly defend its pre-existing structure. Yet in reality (or should we say *vastutas tu?*) these are two variations on the same nuanced attitude toward the past.

In fact, Appayya and Jagannātha are concerned precisely with the question of innovation. Both agree that the knowledge and analytical tools produced by the *alamkāra* tradition are essentially valid. They see no need for an overall theoretical revolution but rather for a kind of renovation. This notion, however, does not stem from a belief that knowledge is constant and frozen. On the contrary, it is based on a shared appreciation of the historical achievements of the tradition, on the notion that this tradition has already developed valuable ideas through several steps of theoretical insights and breakthroughs, and on the fear that the system is nonetheless vulnerable, partly due to some late and misguided contributions, and is hence in need of refinement. Both the misdirected writings and the suggested improvements may be part of what is labeled *navya* in these texts. This is no surprise, given that the improvements of one scholar (Appayya) are seen as a major problem in need of correcting by the other (Jagannātha). But perhaps more importantly, both scholars are self-consciously *navya* by sharing this new and similar approach to the history of their tradition and a novel and conscious methodology.

In this paper, we have focused on the work of one *ālamkārika*, Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja, and his relationship with a single earlier poetician, Appayya Dīkṣita. As these two writers, who dominated late precolonial *alamkāraśāstra*, differ strongly on point after point, it must be clear that it is not any specific set of discrete ideas that forms what is new in their discussion. But rather, as we have said, what is new is the way in which they position themselves vis-à-vis these ideas, through a new kind of concern for their history and a corresponding concern for their continuing vitality. The causes of this anxiety require further study, and may have to do with the changing political and intellectual environment. If we were to cast our net wider and consider other important thinkers from the same period, we would find many more examples of particular points of dispute.<sup>34</sup> But we suggest that we would still find a similar self-awareness and intellectual mission.

In practical terms, this diversity of views—which is perhaps even more pronounced in this period than before, precisely because of the intellectual freedom and breadth we have mentioned—complicates the task of recognizing newness in the new *alamkāraśāstra*. It is made feasible, however, by what the new *ālamkārikas* themselves are telling us about their methods.

We began by looking at Jagannātha's patterns of labeling views as "new" or "old"—an obvious choice given the explicit reference to innovation. The frequent use of these terms also proved a significant innovation in itself, in comparison to earlier works. A study of the surrounding passages revealed, in

<sup>33</sup> Bronner (2002, p. 445; 2004, pp. 75–77).

<sup>34</sup> Siddhicandra's *Kāvya prakāśakhaṇḍana*, for example, presents a large number of disagreements with Mammaṭa, many of them borrowed from earlier "navya" scholars.

turn, detailed and self-conscious attention to the nature of changes in Sanskrit poetics. In fact, the question of what type of change was appropriate emerged as the main topic of controversy between Jagannātha and Appayya. What they really argued about was how to renovate responsibly. We cannot afford to ignore this explicit and conscious discussion about innovation in considering the history of late *alaṃkāraśāstra*.

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